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Abstract: Policy makers in education and international development have lately 
gravitated toward the randomized controlled trial (RCT)—an evaluation design that 
randomly assigns a sample of people or households into an intervention group and a 
control group in order to measure the differential effect of the intervention—as a means 
to determine program impact. As part of federal regulations, the U.S. Department of 
Education and the U.S. Agency for International development explicitly declared a 
preference for the RCT.  
 
When advocating for adopting the RCT model as the preferred evaluation tool, policy 
makers point to the success story of medical trials and how they revolutionized medicine 
from Medieval charlatanry to a modern life-saving discipline. By presenting a more 
nuanced account of the role of the RCT in medical history, however, this study finds that 
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landmark RCTs were accompanied with challenges, Evidence-Based Medicine had 
rightful critics, and opportunistic biases in drug trials apply equally to education policy 
and international development. 
 
This study also examines the recent privileged role of the RCT in education and 
international development, concluding that its initial promise was not entirely born out 
when put into practice, as the national Reading First Initiative exemplifies. From a 
comparative perspective, the RCT movements also encountered major RCT critics, 
whose voices were not initially heard. These voices, however, seem to have contributed 
to a swing of the pendulum away from RCT primacy back towards greater 
methodological pluralism.  
 
A major conclusion of this study is that policy makers should exercise great caution when 
using RCTs as a policy evaluation tool. This conclusion is arrived at via considering RCT 
biases, challenges, and limited generalizability; understanding its interpretive-qualitative 
components; and broadening the overall methodological repertoire to better enable 
evaluations of macro-policy interventions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The randomized controlled trial as privileged policy tool 
Policy makers in education and international development have lately gravitated toward 
the randomized controlled trial (RCT) in order to determine policy impact. In 2005, the 
U.S. Department of Education (USDOE) officially proclaimed that RCTs are best for 
determining program effectiveness when evaluating federally funded education programs 
(U.S. Department of Education, Federal Register, January 25, 2005). Similarly, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) stated in their new evaluation policy 
that RCTs generate the strongest evidence for impact evaluations, i.e., for determining the 
effectiveness of development programs (U.S. Agency for International Development, 
January 2011, 4). These two instances illustrate that the push for RCTs as a privileged 
evaluation tool became part of federal regulations and thus part of the policymaking 
process. 
 
The RCT is a simple design that randomly divides a sample of humans (or other discrete 
units) into two groups: a treatment group that receives a new intervention, and a control 
group that does not receive the intervention. If the observations are large enough, 
randomization distributes the characteristics (i.e., extraneous factors) evenly across the 
two groups, thereby averaging potentially influencing factors. The RCT measures the 
difference in the average outcomes of these two groups, and this difference can be 
attributed to the intervention—i.e., it indicates whether the intervention is effective. 
 
When calling for the RCT as the preferred evaluation tool in education policy and 
international development, RCT advocates point to the RCT’s success story in the field of 
medicine, citing the following points: since the 1940s, medical researchers were able to 
find cures for deadly diseases such as Tuberculosis and Poliomyelitis with the help of 
RCTs; in 1970, the federal government was right in making the RCT the required 
standard before any new drug was approved to be put on the market; and in the 1990s, 
Evidence-Based Medicine brought the RCT to the medical practitioners’ attention. This 
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focus on the RCT had helped to revolutionize medicine from a Medieval charlatanry to a 
modern life-saving science. 
 
The policy makers’ hope has been that the RCT would equally revolutionize education 
policy and international development, as it did medicine: that it would bring light into the 
uncertainty surrounding which interventions in educational and development are 
effective; that the RCT findings would adjudicate policy disputes on age-old policy 
questions; and that privileging the RCT would bring education and international 
development out of the Dark Ages and transform the two fields into scientifically based, 
modernized policy fields. 
 
The policy problem: RCTs surrounded by misconceptions 
When advocating for adopting the RCT model as the preferred evaluation tool, policy 
makers point to the life-saving history of medical trials and thereby make two key 
assumptions: First, that the RCT is indeed the ideal, unchallenged evaluation approach in 
medicine; second, that the RCT model could be directly transferred from medicine to 
education policy and international development. However, these assumptions are not 
without problems, as I show in following chapters. The policy problem is that 
misconceptions surround the RCT as policy tool in education and international 
development. Given these misconceptions, the RCT becomes a tool of belief and 
legitimization rather than science. 
 
Why the policy problem matters 
The privileged use of an evaluation approach has potentially far reaching policy 
consequences. Based on evaluation results, policy makers may start a new intervention or 
stop an existing one; or they may decide how much funding to allocate for a particular 
program in the next funding cycle. The fact is that privileging an evaluation approach, 
such as the RCT, necessarily devalues other evaluations approaches. 
 
The shift toward RCTs as the privileged evaluation tool may lead to unintended 
consequences in policy making. The focus on RCTs would unjustifiably skew the type of 
possible policy interventions being evaluated, bypassing other, potentially more 
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promising, policy interventions. For the RCT can only be applied to certain types of 
policy interventions that allow for randomization—i.e., ones that involve a large number 
of observations, amenable to the construction of a control group. Certain policy solutions, 
including macroeconomic or environmental policies, cannot be randomized and thus 
could not be evaluated. The knowledge gained by RCTs alone may result in biased 
policymaking—one of the very problems the adoption of the RCT model was intended to 
address in the first place. 
 
Research problem 
RCT advocates in education and international development praise the success of the RCT 
model in medicine and call for adopting it in order to make their policy field more 
scientific. The research problem is that policy makers do not possess a nuanced 
understanding of the RCT as an evaluation tool for policymaking: first, they need to 
understand what the role of the RCT model was in medicine and what challenges it faced; 
and they need to understand what additional challenges arise with importing the RCT 
model into other policy fields like education and international development. Ignoring 
these challenges may result in uninformed decisions. Non-reflective overreliance on 
RCTs may lead to biased policy solutions. 
 
This research constructs a more nuanced understanding from a cross-disciplinary 
examination of RCT use and RCT debates across policy fields. For example, although 
there has been research on the challenges of RCTs in medicine, no research has 
considered how these challenges and lessons of medical RCTs translate to the fields of 
education and international development. 
 
Research questions 
In order to determine the proper role of RCTs across three fields of policy-making— 
medicine, education, and international development—I pose the research question: What 
lessons for program evaluation can be discerned from the use of the RCT model in these 
three distinct areas of public policy making, and how can these lessons inform public 





1. How did the RCT model emerge and develop in the field of medicine? 
2. How did the RCT model get imported into the fields of education and international 
development? 
3. How did the three policy fields deal with critics of the RCT model? 
 
I first examine how the RCT approach emerged in the field of medicine. Medicine is of 
special interest because it embraced and institutionalized the RCT approach first and 
served as a model for modernizing the other two policy disciplines, education and 
international development. In the fields of education and international development, I 
analyze how the RCT model gained renewed interest, and how RCT advocates 
encountered and dealt with opposing views on the role of the RCT model.  
 
Based on my prior analysis, I compare the RCT model’s rise to prominence and its 
criticism across the three policy fields, and I show that the “RCT pendulum” is swinging 
away from RCT primacy back towards methodological pluralism. I compare the 
arguments of RCT advocates and RCT critics in order to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the RCT as an evaluation tool. Lastly, I identify challenges of using the 
RCT model across the three policy fields, taking into account their respective differences. 
A major purpose of this study is to propose lessons and create recommendations for 




My study provides a framework for a more productive discussion surrounding 
methodological choices for impact studies. It initiates an interdisciplinary dialogue on the 
policy role of impact studies, and RCTs in particular—specifically, its uses and 
challenges. I show, for instance, how different stakeholders refer to very different 
concepts when using terms like “impact” or “RCTs” in discourse. By comparatively 
analyzing the RCT use and debates across three policy fields, I contribute to the transfer 
of lessons from medicine to education and international development when it comes to 
the RCT approach. For example, the problem of “inclusion and exclusion criteria” in 
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drug trials translates to the question of sample heterogeneity in education and 
international development. I find that policy makers, researchers, and evaluators typically 
argue from their professional frameworks to make their case. For example, economists in 
international development use their quantitative framework of science to advocate for the 
RCT model, but they do not ask whether it takes into account the realities of program 
implementation. 
 
The example of the Network of Network on Impact Evaluation (NONIE; cf., chapter 
four) contributes to understanding semantic and epistemological perspectives that guide 
methodological choices. I surveyed the extant literature about and produced by NONIE, 
and I collected primary data on the NONIE process in the form of observation notes. I 
mastered the literature on the larger context of the debates on impact evaluation in 
international development. Excepting Alexandra Caspari’s policy work for the German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008) and Howard White’s 
internal view of the NONIE debates (2010), I am not aware of any use of NONIE 
working papers outside of my analysis. 
 
Organization of study 
My study is organized into five chapters. In the current chapter (chapter 1), I explain my 
methodological framework, a hermeneutic approach, and apply it to the rhetoric of two 
RCT advocates on importing the RCT model from medicine to education policy and 
international development. In a brief analysis of a school-based deworming RCT, I then 
demonstrate how RCT rhetoric could influence a shift in funding focus, despite 
unresolved policy issues. Lastly, although RCT advocates mostly use medicine as a 
reference point, I show that the origin of the RCT theory lies in agricultural statistics and 
in Ronald A. Fisher’s work in particular. My analysis of Fisher’s theory helps in 
understanding the challenges of RCTs, from which other policy fields such as medicine, 
education, and international development may equally benefit. 
 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 encompass the individual analyses of the RCT model in each of the 
three distinct policy fields. These chapters begin by analyzing several examples of RCTs, 




In chapter 2, I analyze the RCT model in medicine from several angles. First, I analyze 
two landmark RCTs, the Streptomycin trial on Tuberculosis in 1948 and the Salk trial on 
Poliomyelitis in 1954, because RCT advocates in education policy and international 
development point to these cases as successes. I show that even these trials faced 
challenges and provide lessons for policy. I then examine how the RCT became the 
regulatory standard in the drug approval process in 1970--though not without hurdles—
and how Evidence-Based Medicine brought RCT primacy to the clinician’s office in the 
1990s. Finally, I analyze countermovements in mainstream medicine. In particular, 
personalized medicine and comparative effectiveness research argued for a more 
inclusive evidence base for effective interventions, moving beyond (quasi-)experimental 
knowledge generation. I show that even in the field of medicine, the RCT model faced 
several challenges and was always accompanied by criticism—criticism that could and 
should inform other fields. 
 
In chapter 3, I analyze the RCT model in U.S. education from various perspectives. First, 
the Tennessee Class Size Reduction experiment in the 1980s became the poster child for 
successful RCTs in education. The California Class Size policy, however, illustrates the 
challenges in transferring RCT findings to different educational and policy contexts. 
Second, I analyze the National Reading Panel’s work, which attempted to utilize and 
adapt the medical model for education policy. The subsequent scientifically based 
reading policy experienced implementation problems at the state level and steered school 
districts towards corporate, rules-based practices rather than towards evidence-based 
practices. Next, I show how the No Child Left Behind’s Reading First initiative affected 
micropolitical decision making which resulted, for example, in regulatory alignment 
rather than a best practice in textbook adoption. Last, an illustrative case details the 
Federal Priority of RCT evaluation methods in education, which triggered many negative 
responses from the community of education evaluators. Although these were not 
acknowledged at first, the pendulum of RCT primacy seems to be swinging back to 




In chapter 4, I analyze the RCT model in international development from several angles. 
First, I review the illustrative case of Progresa, a Mexican conditional cash transfer 
program, which had an RCT attached from its founding. The rigorous evaluation effort 
may have helped the program survive political leadership changes in Mexico, although 
the actual program impact seemed smaller than anticipated. Despite widespread RCT 
evaluations, conditional cash transfer programs still pose many open questions regarding 
their design and implementation. Second, I analyze the Center for Global Development’s 
report on rigorous impact evaluations, which roused the international development 
community and led to an intense debate about how to best evaluate development impact. 
Third, I examine one such debate that took place within the Network of Networks on 
Impact Evaluation (NONIE), a multilateral donor network. The members of NONIE 
struggled to produce a guidance on impact evaluation, which should have defined what a 
high-quality impact evaluation would entail. Voices within NONIE criticized any 
hierarchical thinking (e.g., the RCT being the top choice) when making methodological 
decisions. Yet a compromise could not be reached. 
 
In chapter 5, I provide a comparative analysis along two dimensions; first among the 
RCT movements in the three policy fields of medicine, education, and international 
development; and second, among the arguments between RCT advocates and RCT 
critics. I find that terminological differences of key terms, including the term 
“randomized controlled trial,” have convoluted the arguments within the RCT debates. 
Epistemological differences prevail regarding what science is. Nevertheless, all sides 
agree that a triangulation of different methodological approaches and tools would 
increase the quality and relevance of an evaluation. 
 
Finally, I show how the RCT debates in the fields of medicine, education, and 
international development can and should inform evaluation policy going forward. By 
comparing RCT challenges across fields, I argue that policy makers need an awareness of 
the challenges of the RCT model in order not to over- or understate RCT findings. Policy 
recommendations include understanding RCT biases, qualitative elements, and 
representativeness. Furthermore, executive summaries of policy experiments should 
caution about the limitations of the RCT design and its implementation. Scientific 
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reviews of evaluation findings can help in their utilization in the political decision-
making process. Based on these recommendations, impact evaluations can obtain the 
necessary level of influence on policy decisions. The hope is that constructive debates 
further the quest for methodological rigor, quality, and relevance in the evaluation field. 
This can lead to both a stronger evaluation profession as well as better public policy 
choices based on methodologically sound evaluations. 
 
 
2. Methodological and conceptual framework 
My study uses the methodological approach of text interpretation in the hermeneutic 
tradition. Simultaneously, hermeneutics serves as a conceptual framework for my study 
because it situates the perception of RCTs with respect to the natural sciences. When 
RCT advocates praise the RCT model as the best evaluation tool, they typically harbor a 
perception of the natural sciences as being an objective and infallible means for 
uncovering truth. Hermeneutics enables me to demonstrate that privileging the RCT 
model is an attempt to model policymaking after the natural (“hard”) sciences, and more 
importantly, that this approach comes at a price. 
 
Natural sciences and the humanities, and where the RCT approach goes 
Hermeneutics has generally been concerned with the interpretation and understanding of 
texts. In the 19
th
 century, hermeneutic text interpretation assumed a strong historical-
critical focus, combined with an emerging self-understanding of the humanities as 
distinct from the natural sciences. In his “Studies toward the foundation of the human 
sciences” (1970), originally published as “Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der 
Geiseswissenschaft” in 1924, Wilhelm Dilthey laid the foundation for clearly 
distinguishing between the natural sciences vs. the humanities, which included history, 
political economy, law, philosophy, and the arts.1 
 
Dilthey conceived of the natural sciences as the “explaining sciences” and the humanities 
as the “understanding sciences” or “hermeneutic sciences.” The natural scientist was 
                                                 
1 The term “humanities” and “human sciences” are only approximate translations of the term 
“Geisteswissenschaften”, which more literally means “sciences of the mind.” 
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concerned with describing and explaining the connections and causations of natural 
phenomena via experimentation. Experimentation, in Dilthey’s worldview, referred to 
interventions performed and measured by a natural scientist in order to establish and test 
hypotheses about the natural world.2 Conversely, for Dilthey, the human scientist was 
concerned with understanding “human beings, their relation to one another and outer 
nature” (Dilthey, 2002, 91). These human phenomena are fundamentally more complex 
and less uniform than the natural phenomena. These would be phenomena of an 
“immeasurable” reality (Dilthey, 2002, 142), or at least a reality not as readily 
measurable as physical phenomena. Subjects of study could vary in scope from 
individual expressions, social organizations, historical movements, or nations. The RCT 
movements are likewise subject to the principles of the human sciences. All of these 
subjects hold in common their ”human-socio-historical reality” (Dilthey, 2002, 103). 
While the natural sciences were concerned with the discovery of universal laws behind 
the natural phenomena, the human sciences focused on understanding concrete 
expressions of the human productions (Dilthey, 2002, 103). Sometimes, the natural and 
human sciences overlapped. The study of language, for instance, includes the physiology 
of speech organs just as much as the theory of meaning and the sense of sentences 
(Dilthey, 2002, 103). 
  
Dilthey observed that the methodological approaches of the humanities had traditionally 
been based on the natural sciences. One reason for this dependence was that the natural 
sciences had formalized their methods—including the comparative and experimental 
methods—first (Dilthey, 2002, 152). Dilthey criticized the human scientists for 
misguidedly attempting to legitimize their work by adapting natural science approaches: 
Even today [1924], when psychologists, educationalists, linguists, and 
aestheticians tackle specific problems, they will often ask themselves whether the 
means and methods for the solution of analogous problems in the natural sciences 
can be fruitfully applied in their own field. But despite such particular points of 
contact, the procedures of the human sciences are from the beginning to the end 
different from those of the natural sciences” (Dilthey, 2002, 152). 
 
I make a similar argument that the adoption of the RCT approach in the human and social 
sciences is an attempt to establish them as rigorous sciences, so that they will enjoy the 
                                                 
2 Note that Dilthey did not equate experimentation with RCT yet. 
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same perception and privileges that the established natural sciences enjoy. The RCT is a 
substitute for the laboratory of the natural sciences. An RCT approach determines an 
intervention’s effect, but it falls short in understanding its underlying processes. The 
medical field widely used the RCT approach in order to determine drug effects on human 
biology. However, when used as an evaluation tool in policy fields of education or 
international development, the RCT model is transferred to disciplines of the humanities, 
which brings both gains and costs. Gains include greater clarity about whether a certain 
historical intervention achieved certain effects; costs include the extreme focus on 
specific information, which does not always allow for understanding the causal 
mechanisms of an intervention—an issue central to the humanities and thus 
hermeneutics. 
 
I argue that the adoption of the RCT model in public policy is an attempt to make 
policymaking credible and its programs legitimate, because it gives the impression of 
transforming policymaking into a hard natural science. One of the major questions 
underlying this study is where public policy, with its unique methodological approaches, 
fits into the canon of sciences. I argue, as Dilthey did for the humanities, that modeling 
public policy after the natural sciences may increase their scientific recognition, but it 
comes at the expense of reduced understanding and thus reduced policy relevance. 
 
How the hermeneutic process works 
The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer universalized the concept of 
hermeneutics to human communication and reasoning in general. In “Truth and method” 
(2004), originally published as “Wahrheit und Methode” in 1960, Gadamer laid out a 
system of interpretation and understanding as a fundamental means by which humans 
communicate with each other.  
 
Gadamer explained the process of understanding as follows:  
The process of construal is itself already governed by an expectation of meaning 
that follows from the context of what has gone before. It is of course necessary for 
this expectation to be adjusted when the text calls for it. This means, then, that the 
expectation changes and that the text unifies its meaning around another 
expectation. Thus the movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to 
the part and back to the whole. Our task is to expand the unity of the understood 
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meaning centrifugally [in konzentrischen Kreisen]. The harmony of all the details 
with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this 
harmony means that understanding has failed (Gadamer, 1960, 275; Gadamer, 
2004, 291).  
 
The interpreter starts with a proto-understanding, which is shaped by her historical, socio-
political context. It may consist of misunderstandings and preconceived prejudices, based 
on the historical and cultural distance between the interpreter and the texts (Gadamer, 
1960, 173). This proto-understanding guides the initial interpretation, which she then 
revisits and reinterprets in the light of the whole text and new text passages. The 
interpreter attempts to continuously explicate the tension and bridge the distance between 
herself and the texts. The interpreter oscillates between her own understanding, the text’s 
details, and the text’s whole. Gadamer’s “criterion of correct understanding” is whether 
the details are in harmony with the whole. Gadamer referred to this circular process of 
reinterpretation as the hermeneutic circle. 
 
I counter that Gadamer’s idea of the “harmony with the whole” is an ideal type, because a 
text and its details may not always appear univocal. Documents produced by committees, 
for instance, may reflect a diversity of voices. They may not be able to reconcile these 
voices. The perceived incoherence and ambiguity of the text could stem from both the 
inadequate understanding of the interpreter or the incoherent nature of the text. The 
interpreter’s task is thus to distinguish between these two sources of incoherence. 
Therefore, the interpreter needs to look at the historical context of the text to determine 
possible factors of incoherence.  
 
As I show in the example of the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (cf., chapter 
4), different stakeholders collaborated on the production of draft documents for impact 
evaluation guidelines. The NONIE stakeholders’ professional and cultural differences 
most likely affected how they contributed to and understood each others’ texts and 





My own hermeneutic process and motivation 
In line with the hermeneutic circle, I have changed my perception of the debates on the 
RCT primacy over time. Before I started my research, I was an RCT skeptic. I was 
worried about the potentially negative side effects of the 2001 No Child Left Behind 
Law’s insistence on “scientifically based research.” I assumed that they operated under 
the prejudice of scientism. The Federal Priority on scientifically based evaluation 
methods in 2003 furthered my suspicion of the possibly detrimental effects of the 
scientifically based research focus, which privileged RCTs as evaluation approach in 
education. My suspicion surrounding RCTs was my original motivation for developing 
my research agenda around the RCT advocates and their critics. 
 
Over the years, I have gained a much more nuanced understanding of the RCT model and 
have become more appreciative of the RCT as a policy tool, but also more pointed in my 
criticisms of its misuses. I learned to distinguish between the rhetoric of RCT “scientism” 
and the reality of RCT uses, where they are useful and where they are inappropriate. 
Although my original suspicion surrounding RCTs has become more founded by a better 
understanding of their limitations, I also conclude that RCTs make valuable contributions 
to policymaking, especially when accompanied by other approaches. Moreover, building 
bridges between the RCT model and social science approaches (including hermeneutics) 
can strengthen the value of RCT findings, leading to higher-quality evaluations and 
smarter policymaking. However, the limited applicability of the RCT tool in policy 
evaluation remains a valid concern. Their exclusive use would indeed bias policymaking. 
 
Document collection  
My study is based on texts of various types, depending on the particular policy field. In 
the discussion of RCTs in agriculture, I mainly relied on Ronald A. Fisher’s texts from 
the 1920s and 1930s (cf., chapter 1). 
 
Chapter 2 (on medical trials) relies on original source texts such as Austin B. Hill’s 
writings on randomization in the 1930s; published trial results (Streptymycin Trial on 
Tuberculosis; Salk Poliomyelitis trials); legislative texts and council reports on drug 
efficacy; Evidence-Based Medicine’s original publications and those of its critics; and 
 
 13 
speeches from federal commissioners in the United States and the United Kingdom on 
the new directions of federal policy. 
 
In chapter 3 (i.e., RCTs in education), I analyze originally published trials (Tennessee 
STAR trial; California Class Size Reduction); meeting notes and publications from the 
National Reading Panel and its critics; legislative texts and hearings; federal registers; 
and commissioner reports. I also use electronic lists of the American Evaluation 
Association (Evaltalk) to analyze the evaluation-internal debate on the Federal Priority.  
 
In chapter 4 (i.e., RCTs in international development), personal communications were 
instrumental in collecting what has been called “grey literature.” This term refers to either 
unpublished or electronic documents, rather than formally published documents. I 
collected materials from professional development trainings and professional evaluation 
conferences such as from the American Evaluation Association. For example , the 
International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET), organized by the 
World Bank in summer 2007, allowed me to make the connections for attending the 
Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation meeting in January 2008—a meeting that 
became an illustrative case of the RCT debate. 
 
I recorded all documents in Citavi, a bibliographic data management tool, which allowed 
for detailed summaries, quotations, and annotations; it also allowed for concurrent 
comparison of various, sometimes diverging sources. For example, I trace the RCT 
debate within the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE) via several 
documents: background papers, draft guidelines, visual presentations from various 
working groups, meeting notes, and personal communications. The citations in the 
bibliography are organized by their text format (eg., postings on electronic mailing lists, 
presentations, interviews, reports etc.). 
 
 
3. The rhetorics of RCTs: From the Dark Ages to modernity 
RCT advocates in education and international development use the modernization of 
medicine as an exemplary case of how a discipline shed its unscientific roots and became 
 
 14 
a true science. They observe that adopting the RCT as the methodological standard for 
evaluating new drugs was largely responsible for the success of medical science and its 
life-saving practice. RCT advocates accuse the fields of education and international 
development of remaining in an unscientific stage—comparable to Medieval blood-
letting or leech treatments. Doctors were convinced that their treatments worked; but had 
their convictions been scientifically evaluated, they would have found them to be at fault. 
RCT advocates in education and international development argue that in order for their 
fields to become equally successful and scientific as medicine, the adoption of the RCT 
as a matter of course will be necessary. 
 
In the following, I choose one example from the field of education and one from 
international development to illustrate this quest for adopting the medical RCT model. 
Using a hermeneutic-interpretive approach, I find inconsistencies in the line of 
arguments—which sets the stage for a closer analysis of how the medical RCT model 
could inform education policy and international development. 
 
The illustrative example in the field of education is Valerie Reyna’s presentation at a 
conference organized by the U.S. Department of Education (USDOE). Reyna, a senior 
research adviser at USDOE, suggested utilizing the medical RCT model for education 
reform: 
We know on the basis of experience that anecdotes have turned out to be false and 
misleading. Sometimes they are very representative, sometimes they're not. The 
problem is we don't know when. There's an analogy to medicine that I have 
obviously drawn on already. The first example, of course, is the classic one of 
when they used to bleed people. People would get sick. You know, I think it was 
when George Washington was bled that contributed to his death […]. 
 
The bottom line here is these same rules about what works and how to make 
inferences about what works, they are exactly the same for educational practice as 
they would be for medical practice. Same rules, exactly the same logic, whether 
you are talking about a treatment for cancer or whether you're talking about an 
intervention to help children learn. […] The reason I have the word "brain 
surgery" up there is that I think, you know, when we talk about medicine and 
things like brain surgery and cancer, it is very, very important to get it right. We 
all recognize that and most of us buy into that. You know, that you've got to have 
randomized clinical trials because we want to be able to benefit for these 
treatments for cancer. But when we teach students we really are engaging in a 




Reyna used the metaphor of education as “brain surgery” to illustrate the life-enhancing 
and possibly life-threatening nature of education, parallel to the nature of medicine. 
Reyna compared current educational practices to the outdated medical practice of 
bleeding, based on anecdotal, and thus unsubstantiated, evidence. Similar to bleeding 
patients, current education practices would harm students rather than help them. 
According to Reyna, the field of medicine had successfully chosen to be life-enhancing 
by adopting RCT standards. RCTs would distinguish between what works and what does 
not work. Reyna suggested a similar reform for the field of education by adopting RCT 
standards, modeled after the medical success story. 
 
Note some inconsistencies in Reyna’s arguments: First, the information about whether 
Washington had died from blood-letting was not based on RCT knowledge, but on 
historical reports. In fact, I do not know of any RCT that established that blood-letting is 
harmful to a human. Reyna referred to “experience,” on which basis anecdotal 
information (e.g., that leeches heal the sick) turned out to be false. This experience itself, 
which Reyna used to make her argument, however, is not based on an RCT, but rooted in 
historical observations. There is a tension between privileging the RCT model on the one 
hand, and relying on observational information (e.g., in the case of Washington’s death) 
on the other hand without acknowledging it as a reliable source of knowledge. 
 
Second, using the metaphor of “brain surgery” to argue for RCT standards is not 
conducive to Reyna’s line of argumentation either. Compared to drug testing, RCTs are 
difficult to use in brain surgery. Double-blinding, a core component of medical RCTs, is 
hardly justifiable due to ethical concerns. The fact that it is more difficult to use RCTs for 
brain surgery is an indication that educational “brain surgery” may be even more 
complex, because the procedures are not just biological, but also social and emotional. In 
sum, although Reyna’s argument was that education policy should follow the lead of 
medicine in adopting the RCT as an evaluation standard, there are certain incongruencies 




Similar arguments about mimicking the medical RCT model can be found in international 
development. An illustrative example is Esther Duflo’s talk in the Technology, 
Education, and Development (TED) series, with approximately 300,000 viewers. As co-
director of the Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), Duflo has advocated for the RCT in 
evaluating anti-poverty interventions in international development: 
“The thing is, if we don’t know whether we are doing any good, we are not any 
better than the Medieval doctors and their leeches. Sometimes the patient gets 
better, sometimes the patient dies. Is it the leeches? Is it something else? We don’t 
know. […] It is not the Middle Ages any more, it’s the 21
st
 century. And in the 
20
th
 century, randomized controlled trials have revolutionized medicine by 
allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don’t work. 
And you can do the same randomized, controlled trial for social policy. You can 
put social innovation to the same rigorous, scientific tests that we use for drugs. 
And in this way, you can take the guesswork out of policy-making by knowing 
what works, what doesn’t work and why. […] These economics I'm proposing, it's 
like 20
th
 century medicine. It's a slow, deliberative process of discovery. There is 
no miracle cure, but modern medicine is saving millions of lives every year, and 
we can do the same thing.” (Duflo, presentation, February 1, 2010) 
 
Duflo compared today’s international development interventions to Medieval leech cures. 
Doctors were wrongly convinced that the cures worked, based on individual 
observations. According to Duflo, most of the anti-poverty interventions in the 21
st
 
century were equally based on belief rather than knowledge. Thus, people assumed that 
they work, but they would never know whether they in fact did work. Next, Duflo argued 
that this situation could change via the RCT revolution. The RCT would finally enable 
distinguishing drugs that work that drugs that do not. Just as the RCT standard 
transformed medicine into a life-saving science, it has a potential for turning social policy 
into a scientific enterprise and to actually help people.  
 
Although Duflo constructs parallels between education and social policy, she indicates a 
desire for RCTs to accomplish more in social policy: First, Duflo referred to medical 
RCTs that distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that do not work. Later, she 
wants social RCTs to “know[ing] what works, what doesn’t work and why.” Duflo added 
the policy-relevant question “why” a social intervention worked. As I conclude in the last 
chapter, RCTs alone cannot answer the “why” question, but need to be supplemented by 
other methodological approaches to do so. For drug evaluations, the “why” question is 
less relevant because drug interventions are rather discrete, whereas social interventions 
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are often multidimensional within a complex environment. The answer to why a social 
intervention works is important in order to transfer the findings to other contexts. Thus, 
Duflo’s vision of saving millions of lives every year via RCT findings alone is less 
realistic for social than for medical interventions. 
 
By referring to medical history, Reyna and Duflo proposed that the RCT become the 
privileged model for evaluating interventions in their respective fields. They hoped that 
the RCT model would help their fields modernize and arrive at scientific knowledge for 
answering long-awaited policy questions. Their hopes were probably more optimistic 
than realistic. The facts that Reyna used non-RCT knowledge to make her argument and 
that Duflo overlooked the inability of RCTs to answer policy-relevant “why” questions 
illustrate that rhetoric is probably further from the reality. 
 
 
4. The rhetorics of RCTs put into practice: School-based deworming 
In the TED talk cited above, Esther Duflo referred to the RCT on school-based 
deworming in Kenya, among others, as a successful example of informing social policy. 
According to Duflo, the RCT findings had established the following: 
And for every hundred dollars, you get almost 30 extra years of education. So this 
is not your intuition, this is not what people would have gone for, and yet, these 
are the programs that work. We need that kind of information, we need more of it, 
and then we need to guide policy (Duflo, presentation, February 1, 2010). 
 
 
In the following, I take a closer look at the deworming RCT regarded as a success story 
in guiding effective social policy. This RCT is an example of how the creation of RCT 
evidence was combined with its promotion in the right circles, which led to a school-
based deworming movement. Based on the RCT evidence, deworming interventions were 
scaled up in several African countries, and many donor countries have since committed 
additional resources to the eradication of intestinal worms. However, many questions 
remain unanswered, and it is therefore unclear whether “grasping at straws” with respect 
to this particular RCT justifies the exclusion of streams of non-RCT evidence. I argue 
that the limited RCT findings appealed to a particular audience, economists especially, 




The economists Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer conducted an RCT in a small part 
of Western Kenya from 1997 to 2001 (Miguel & Kremer, September 2001; Miguel & 
Kremer, 2003). 75 schools serving approximately 30,000 students were randomly 
assigned to treatment condition and control condition. The control schools received worm 
treatment two years later. Miguel and Kremer found that administering deworming 
medication to students at a school decreased student absenteeism by 7 percent in two 
years, from ca. 23 percent to 15 percent in the first year, and from 35 percent to 29 
percent in the second year (Miguel & Kremer, September 2001; Miguel & Kremer, 
2003). They concluded that, indeed, school-based deworming increased school 
attendance. They estimated that the cost per additional year of school participation was 
$3 and concluded that this treatment was far cheaper than alternative ways of boosting 
primary school participation (Miguel & Kremer, September 2001, 2). The researchers did 
not find educational gains based on test scores, which would have been a higher-level 
impact than school participation (Miguel & Kremer, 2001, 1).  
 
Challenges of the school-based deworming RCT 
First, although school-based deworming is a laudable intervention, it may not have 
actually needed randomized evidence. Medical RCTs had already established the 
effectiveness of the distributed deworming medications like Albendazole and 
Praziquantel, and they had determined their positive effect on health. Healthier children 
are more likely to have higher school attendance. The question is whether an additional 
RCT would be necessary for establishing positive educational outcomes by themselves. 
 
Second, the deworming intervention reduced absenteeism where intestinal worms were a 
wide-spread problem. The researchers chose the two divisions of the district Busia in 
Western Kenya, with densely settled farming and high infection rates (Miguel & Kremer, 
September 2001, 7). In fact 92% of students were infected (Miguel & Kremer, September 
2001, 10). Such an intervention would not work in many other countries due to minimal 





Third, the cost estimate of 3 U.S. dollars per added school year seems like “hard data.” 
Note that Esther Duflo also cited 30 extra years per hundred dollars, which sounds 
impressive, but most likely fluctuates based on contextual factors. In the case of West 
Kenya, absenteeism was still 35 percent in the second year despite the deworming 
medication, possibly due to the El Niño flooding. Factors such as flooding and drought 
might equally influence school absenteeism, regardless of whether students receive anti-
worming medication. The intervention would also not work well for girls in countries 
where female education is not valued. Policy makers need to take into account the 
particular situation—e.g., if an area is affected by drought, flooding, or cultural beliefs—
before analyzing costs and benefits. 
 
Fourth, Miguel and Kremer did not use placebo pills in control schools. Therefore, the 
administration of the pill, rather than its active ingredient, could have increased school 
participation. For example, school participation may have increased due to parents’ 
perception that the school cared for their child’s health via the administration of these 
pills. According to Scriven, the lack of placebo in social-program RCTs could lead to 
major distortions (Scriven, 2008). Although, the deworming pills had been proven to be 
effective in treating intestinal worms, the simple fact of teachers administering pills could 
increase school attendance. Administering placebo pills at the control schools would have 
been unethical because the health-effects of the actual pills were already known, and a 
placebo would have deceived the participants. Furthermore, the low costs of the pills 
would not have justified excluding the other schools. Without using a placebo, however, 
the black box of school-based deworming has not been fully opened: What worked, the 
pill ingredients or the perception of the pill working? 
 
The deworming movement and channeling of funds 
Despite of the limited evidence of a small pilot, Michael Kremer and Esther Duflo 
succeeded in making the RCT findings known at the 2007 World Economic Forum 
Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland. As members of the Young Global Leaders 
Education Task Force, they launched the Deworm the World Initiative (DTWI) in 
Davos.3 The organization based its mission on the claim that mass deworming at schools 
                                                 
3 http://www.dewormtheworld.org/?q=node/68, accessed Oct 11, 2011. 
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improved school participation, increased ultimate earnings and workforce participation, 
and would be an efficient and effective way to treat large numbers of children. The 
organization asserted that all of these claims were based on rigorous evidence. As DTWI 
stated on their website: “This evidence was a breakthrough. School-based deworming 
was globally recognized as a ‘best buy’ for development.” DTWI garnered additional 
interest from funders, such as The United Nations (WHO, UNICEF), the World Bank, 
and several private-sector donors like the Gates and Dell foundations. Academic 
institutions, including J-PAL, are partners of DTWI. DTWI provided technical assistance 
to help the Kenyan government treat 3.6 million children in 2009 (MIT Technology 
Review, January 2010), and they promoted deworming in other developing countries. 
 
The RCT evidence allowed Kremer to convincingly draw attention from economists to 
the findings, thereby initiating an international deworming movement that was supported 
by the private and public sector funds. Economists by profession trusted the provided 
RCT evidence, and they became the original actors of the school-based deworming 
movement. DTWI gained momentum, and others from the public sector joined the 
movement. 
 
From a funding perspective, resources were channeled to the deworming cause. There are 
many other health problems in developing countries, malaria being just one example. 
Malaria, however, does not have an effective vaccine yet, and many additional resources 
are needed to create an effective vaccine. One major question is whether the deworming 
case generated additional funding or just redirected funding streams from, for example, 
discovering an effective vaccine for Malaria. An unintended side effect of funding 
interventions based on small-scale RCT evidence is that they could be crowding out other 
interventions—interventions that are potentially even more far-reaching.  
 
Intestinal worms are also a symptom of the problem of unclean water. Other interventions 
may have also been more effective in treating the problem at its core. Reinfection could 
easily happen if school-based deworming was stopped, because the problem was not 
treated at its core. From this perspective, the success story of school-based deworming is 
losing some of its “best buy” qualities. A more comprehensive policy review might be 
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needed to justify the increased funding towards this intervention, regardless of RCT 
evidence.  
 
This example illustrates how one single average data point from an RCT made history in 
international development. Its evidence created an expansive movement that believed in 
deworming in schools. It has been unclear, however, whether other interventions against 
intestinal worms (e.g., by prevention) or other intervention against absenteeism (e.g., 
school meals) would have been more effective policy solutions. Simultaneous RCTs in 
Western Kenya would have been necessary to make the results comparable and answer 
these questions. But even then, the RCT results would only apply to that particular 
context at that certain time and in that certain place. As I stated above, the RCT findings 
would remain ignorant beyond the duration and the location of the experiment, which 
also prevents any insights into the adaptation of the intervention to related contexts. 
Therefore, to take a closer look at the RCT and to understand its potential role in 
policymaking, I am going back to its theoretical foundation. This foundation does not lie 
in medicine, but in agriculture. 
 
 
5. Theoretical foundation of the RCT model: R.A. Fisher’s fertilizer 
studies 
RCT advocates in education and international development cite medical trials to make 
their case for using the RCT model in their field. Although medicine is currently the 
stronghold of RCTs, the theoretical foundation of the RCT dates back to the agricultural 
statistician Ronald A. Fisher in the 1920s. In his fertilizer studies, Fisher recognized that 
random assignment of soil plots would tackle the problem of soil heterogeneity due to 
innumerable causes, which had made it difficult to compare soil plots in the past.  
 
In the following, I review Fisher’s work on the RCT, citing original journal articles and 
books from the 1920s and 1930s (cf., bibliography) in order to understand the theoretical 
foundation of the RCT model. Going “ad fontes” is a key principle of hermeneutics in 




Backdrop of the RCT theory: Fisher’s quest for unifying the sciences 
Conceptually, Fisher stood in the British tradition of biometrics spearheaded by the 
biological statisticians Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. Using statistical methods, their 
goal had been to raise biology to the “status of a more exact science” (Galton, 1901, 10). 
Their journal Biometrika, founded in 1901, united their efforts to foster statistical “study 
of differences” in biological phenomena (Biometrika, 1901, 1). For Fisher, biometrics 
was part of an “intellectual liberation,” similar to the discovery of geometry in antiquity 
(Fisher, 1932). 
 
Fisher hoped for statistics to become the unifying foundation of the different sciences. He 
subscribed to the “efforts to unify the theoretical concepts underlying the two great 
branches of human knowledge” (Fisher, 1932, 3)—the natural and the social sciences. 
Fisher took a “statistical view of the world” (Fisher, 1932, 11), where the idea of 
variation and the concept of chance were applied the same way to the expansion of gases, 
the human body, and human societies. The statistical view would study these phenomena 
not as specific gas particles or human individuals, but as populations with inherent 
variations. In this vein, Fisher argued that: “Statistical methods are essential to social 
studies, and it is principally by the aid of such methods that these studies may be raised to 
the rank of sciences” (Fisher, 1925, 1).  
 
The RCT theory grounded in fertilizer studies 
In 1919, Fisher was appointed as statistician at the Rothamsted Experimental Station, the 
major center for agricultural research in the United Kingdom (Yates & Mather, 1963, 92). 
Such experimental stations had been established in the nineteenth century under the 
British law of Land Grant Colleges to institutionalize agricultural science as an academic 
discipline (Armitage, 2003, 925). The field settings of the research farm allowed for the 
experiments in a natural environment instead of a controlled laboratory setting. Fisher’s 
task was to scientifically investigate the impact of fertilizers on crop yield.  
 
Fisher found that plots naturally differed in crop yields up to 30 percent due to soil 
heterogeneity. For Fisher: “the greatest source of error in field experimentation is that due 
to the heterogeneity of the soil” (Fisher, 1931, 11). Fisher attributed variations in wheat 
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yield to annual variations caused by weather (e.g., light, temperature, moisture), soil 
deterioration, and other slow changes such as weed growth (Fisher, 1921, 108). The 
researcher could not make an exhaustive list of possible “causes of disturbances,” as the 
“uncontrolled causes which would influence the result are always strictly innumerable” 
(Fisher, 1935, 21). 
 
In his paper “The arrangement of field experiments” (1926), Fisher used the example of 
using manure for increasing crop yield to illustrate the problem of soil heterogeneity. The 
agricultural researcher had used similar seeds and treatments for two acres of land, with 
the only difference being that manure was applied to one acre but not the other. Even if 
he were to find a 10 percent difference in crop yield, the question was still whether the 
manure caused this difference: “What reason is there to think, even if no manure had 
been applied, the acre which actually received it would not still have given the higher 
yield?” (Fisher, 1926, 504) According to Fisher, the two plots may have had different soil 
composition and thus different fertility in the first place. The researcher would need to 
prove that the plot would have provided similar yields—an impossible quest; 500 years 
of comparative data points would have been necessary to do so reliably. Fisher suggested 
a much more efficient procedure to ensure comparability of the plots: Dividing each acre 
into 32 or 40 individual plots, pairing adjacent plots, and then randomly assigning these 
plots to treatment with or without fertilizer. As a result, the soil fertility and other factors 
that may influence crop yield would be equally distributed between fertilized and 
unfertilized plots (ibid., 505–506). The heterogeneity of the soil plots could be 
statistically controlled without requiring the physical isolation of the laboratory. After the 
treatment with fertilizer, the plots yielded a certain number of bushels of wheat. The 
difference between the average yield of fertilized and unfertilized plots would be the net 
impact or added benefit of the fertilizer. 
 
Note that the unit of randomization and analysis are plots, i.e., areas of land. The size of 
the plots could vary, and an acre could be subdivided in different ways, such as in squares 
(e.g., 5 by 5 or 6 by 6) or strips (e.g., 4 by 8 or 5 by 8). Smaller plots yielded more units 
of analysis per acre and therefore made the experiment stronger, with higher degrees of 
freedom. The plot size per acre also depended on the type of farm machinery used and 
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the precautions against edge effects.4 Proximity was an important concept in randomizing 
plots. Fisher pointed out that more proximate plots were more likely to be similar. 
Therefore he suggested a two-step process: First, creating blocks of adjacent plots, and 
second, randomly assigning those plots to treatment and control group. The 
randomization of adjacent pairs of plots would be advantageous as it would reduce the 
standard error between the units and therefore would yield more precise estimates 
(Fisher, 1926, 507). The researcher would not need to know the soil characteristics of 
those adjacent plots to assume their similarity.  
 
Fisher made two arguments for random assignment: one being the more theoretical 
argument for guaranteeing the validity of significance testing, and the other being the 
more practical to reduce experimenter’s bias. First, randomization was the “physical basis 
of the validity of the test of significance” (Fisher, 1935, 20), where the results would be 
governed only by the “laws of chance” (ibid., 20). Fisher recommended the probability of 
five percent as the standard level of statistical significance as a “convenient convention” 
(Fisher, 1935, 16), where one in twenty trials would yield results by chance coincidence. 
 
Second, Fisher found that by random assignment, the researcher would not be able to 
“cook” the arrangement to suit his preconceived ideas (Fisher, 1926, 509). The traditional 
practice of purposeful assignment had relied on such preconceived ideas of what plots 
were comparable and allowed experimenters to control what unit went into the treatment 
and control groups. This practice, however, would have compromised the results, leading 
to overestimation or underestimation of errors. 
 
Discussion: Fisher’s RCT theory 
Fisher’s original theory of randomized experiments gives rise to several considerations 
and insights for using the RCT model. Whereas Fisher used examples from the field of 
biology and agriculture, in which RCT design and application were most advanced at his 
time, he also argued that the principles would be applicable to other fields, such as the 
medical and social sciences (Fisher, 1935, 11). Because Fisher was mainly familiar with 
                                                 
4 Edge effects could impact adjacent plots resulting in possible contamination (Birk, 2005, 91). 
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agricultural and animal trials, he had, for example, little to say about allocation 
concealment, perception bias, or dropout rates, when dealing with human subjects. 
 
First, Fisher’s conceptualization of the sciences is juxtaposed to the hermeneutic thinking 
by Dilthey and Gadamer, as outlined above.5 The hermeneuticists insisted on distinct 
methodological approaches for the natural sciences and the humanities, based on their 
different nature and goals of investigation (i.e., to explain versus to understand). On the 
contrary, Fisher wanted statistics to unify the natural and social sciences and, in fact, to 
propel the social sciences into the rank of a true science. By applying the RCT model to 
the social sciences and the humanities, researchers attempted to generate true science. 
This came at a price. The focus on averages between groups would lead to an extreme 
“reduction of data,” as Fisher recognized (Fisher, 1925, 1). 
 
Second, Fisher’s own reflections illustrate how many more considerations went into the 
design and interpretation of an RCT than just purely statistical expertise. Despite the 
fundamental disagreement on science, Fisher and the hermeneuticists shared an important 
insight: Even natural scientists or experimentalists need to be critical of their work. Fisher 
called for a statistician’s general intelligible ability. Dilthey and Gadamer would point to 
natural scientists’ need for using hermeneutic skills. Fisher cautioned against the non-
critical use of experiments. Statistical skills alone were insufficient for designing and 
interpreting experiments. Fisher distinguished between a statistician’s technical craft, 
where he had special authority, and the craft of scientific inference, which would require 
general intelligible ability (Fisher, 1935, 2). A randomized experiment was based on 
inference like any other type of knowledge generation. Fisher assumed that it was 
“possible to draw valid inferences from the results of experimentation” (ibid., 4), and that 
it was possible to argue from consequences to their causes and from observations to their 
hypotheses. However, caution was warranted.  
 
Fisher found that some uncertainty existed in the inference process from an event to its 
possible causes, despite its rigor. Fisher argued that a statistician’s task was to determine 
                                                 
5 Note that Fisher and Dilthey lived concurrently, though they most likely did not know each 
others’ work due to language differences and geographical distance. 
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“how to evaluate the limitations of the data in hand” and to recognize the defects of the 
experimental technique (Fisher, 1933, 46). Fisher emphasized that every experiment 
should start with an explicitly formulated hypothesis, which might or might not be 
impugned by the result of the experiment (ibid., 19). This hypothesis could never be 
proved, however, but it could possibly be disproved in the course of experimentation. 
Fisher pointed out moreover that the selection of a hypothesis was always inductive, and 
thus preliminary to any deductive discovery (ibid., 6). However, inductive inference was 
the only process of knowledge generation (ibid., 8). Fisher argued that experimental 
observations had inductive elements and were directly linked to the existing body of 
knowledge (ibid., 9), as opposed to the purely deductive reasoning of geometry.  
 
Third, Fisher argued that randomization would ultimately guarantee the validity of 
statistical significance testing. Fisher picked the p value of .05 of a test of statistical 
significance as a “convenient convention” (Fisher, 1935, 16), not as a rigid standard. 
However, the p value became a fundamental indicator of whether an intervention is 
effective (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2008, 70). The psychologists Hubbard and Lindsay 
observed that researchers had been overly reliant on the p value as an objective, useful, 
and unambiguous measure of evidence in hypothesis testing (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2008, 
71).  
 
Instead, researchers should display more caution in using this measure in testing 
hypotheses. For example, sample size would influence the meaning of the p value. When 
the sample size is large enough, almost any null hypothesis would have a tiny, 
statistically significant p value (ibid., 75). Peter Freeman illustrated this concern with 
hypothetical medical trial results, where the subjects received treatments A and B and 
were asked about their preference. In Table 1, the p value is .041, i.e., statistically 
significant in all four trials (Freeman, 1993). 
 
TABLE 1: Statistically significant trial results with a p value of .041 
Trial No. preferring A No preferring B % preferring A 
1 15 5 75.0 
2 114 86 57.0 
3 1,046 954 52.3 




The preference rate in trial four of 50.07 percent would be considered equally statistically 
significant, as compared to the preference rate of 75 percent in trial one, in which the 
main difference is number of participants. This hypothetical trial illustrates that the p 
value is not sufficient in providing evidence for the effectiveness of a treatment. The test 
of statistical significance does not address the size of the effect, which may be a more 
relevant measure for decision makers. 
 
Fourth, gases, the human body, and human societies may all seem to behave in similar 
ways, but one fundamental difference is human self-reflection and spontaneity, which 
influence the experimentation process. 
 
Fifth, for RCTs outside the agricultural field, however, the concept of geographical 
proximity and the notion of partonomy were less relevant. The units of treatments are not 
geographically fixed plots or stuff type, but whole objects, i.e., human individuals and 
human groups, who are geographically mobile. Thus the principle of geographical 
proximity does not hold. Also, human self-reflexivity adds a new feature to the RCT 
model where individuals are influenced by their participation in RCTs and might change 
their perceptions or drop out of the RCT altogether. 
 
Sixth, Fisher emphasized that no isolated experiment, however significant in itself, could 
suffice for the demonstration of a natural phenomenon and its cause (Fisher, 1935, 16). 
At least in theory, the problem of soil heterogeneity could be overcome by replication, by 
diminishing experimental errors and by providing the magnitude of those errors (Fisher, 
1931, 12). Recall that the school-based deworming movement was based on one isolated 
RCT in Eastern Kenya, without replications in different contexts. Fisher would not have 
approved this use of a single RCT. 
 
As I discuss in chapters three and four, this problem of selection bias holds true for other 
policy areas such as education and international development. The following section 
applies Fisher’s concept of random assignment to the area of medicine, where allocation 
concealment and selection bias were major issues (Chalmers, 2001, 1162). 
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CHAPTER 2: THE RCT MODEL IN MEDICINE: THE 
REFERENCE POINT 
 
Many stakeholders in education and international development view the dominance of 
the RCT approach in medicine as a desirable goal for their own discipline. Many view 
RCTs as having transformed medicine from Medieval charlatanry to a modern science 
and having thus significantly improved the welfare of the world. They view landmark 
studies, such as the Tuberculosis trials in 1940s and the Salk Poliomyelitis trials in the 
1950s as major turning points for medicine, and they see the role of the Food and Drug 
Administration in the 1960s and 1970s as pivotal to making the RCT standard a reality. 
RCT advocates applaud the Evidence-Based Medicine movement in the 1990s for 
bringing the RCT-led decision making into clinical practice. 
 
In what follows, I present a more nuanced account of these medical landmark trials and 
developments. My purpose is to help policy makers better discern appropriate lessons for 
using RCTs in education and international development. In the first section, I investigate 
the following: the theoretical foundation of medical RCTs by Austin B. Hill in the 1930s; 
the Streptomycin trial on Tuberculosis, which was the first formally published and still 
frequently cited RCT by the U.K. Medical Research Council in 1948 (Hill was the lead 
medical statistician); and the 1953 Salk Poliomyelitis trials in the United States. Although 
these trials led to a wider acceptance of RCTs in the medical sciences, I illustrate that 
they also faced ethical, logistical, and interpretive difficulties, which are often overlooked 
when citing them as success stories. 
 
In the second section, I analyze the legal institutionalization of the RCT in the United 
States by the Food and Drug Administration in order to guarantee safe and effective 
pharmaceuticals for public distribution. The RCT as the sole means of drug evaluation 
was ultimately decided not by Congress, but by the federal court system in 1970. Despite 
its legal institutionalization, medical practice lagged behind medical science. The 
evidence-based medicine movement of the 1990s eventually brought the RCT 
requirement into the practitioner’s office. The hierarchy of methods and its channeled 
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decision-making model became an exemplar in other fields such as education, social 
policy, and international development.  
 
At the same time, calls for a widening of methodological approaches arose within the 
medical field to overcome challenges associated with RCTs. These challenges included 
limited external validity, black-box evaluations, and impersonalized decision-making. In 
the third section of this chapter, I analyze these responses within the medical field, 
including comparative effectiveness research and personalized medicine. Both responses 
argued for the widening of the evidence base and for tailoring medical research to 
individual patient’s needs. 
 
I show that the so-called success story of the RCT in medicine in fact exhibited many 
challenges, which RCT advocates in education and international development rarely cite. 
These challenges, however, are worth exploring because they are often more severe in the 
fields of education and international development, given that these require often more 
complex interventions than administering a drug. 
 
 
1. The Tuberculosis and Polio trials: “Poster children” of medical 
RCTs 
Grover (Russ) Whitehurst, Assistant Secretary for Research and Improvement at the U.S. 
Department of Education at the time, testified in front of the House Committee during the 
reapproval of the federal arm for education research:  
“If you look at medicine, for example, it’s really only been within the last 75 
years that medicine has become an evidence-based field. […] It was really the 
development of biochemistry, the science of physiology, which allowed medicine 
to get to the point where it had been a basic understanding of disease. Then it was 
the bringing on board of clinical trial experiments in the field in 1948 which have 
skyrocketed now to the point that there are 10,000 of them. That allowed 
medicine to take basic science and determine how it actually worked. We can do 
that in education. We need to do it.” (Whitehurst, testimony, February 28, 2002). 
When Whitehurst cited the year “1948” as starting point of medical RCTs, he was 
indirectly referring to the Streptomycin trial on Tuberculosis, which was the first 
published RCT in medical history (Armitage, 1995; Chalmers, 2001, 1162). Furthermore, 
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Whitehurst mentioned the thousands of trials since then that had transformed medicine 
into an evidence-based field, and he suggested that education could follow in its footsteps 
to become equally evidence based. 
 
The Poliomyelitis trials have also been cited as a poster child of a medical RCT. During 
an U.S. Department of Education conference, Stephen Raudenbush, a USDOE adviser, 
referred to the Salk Poliomyelitis trial as having helped produce a “sea change” in 
medicine: 
 
One of the questions that comes up that's interesting is what caused the sea 
change in medicine and is it likely that anything like that might happen in 
education. That's way too big of a question for me to try to answer, but there is an 
interesting vignette, I guess, a part of the story that has to do with the Salk vaccine 
for polio.[…] But the results showed definitively that the vaccine was far more 
effective than not having the vaccine which led to further perfection, further 
clinical trials and ultimately the wiping out of polio as a disease. Now, we may 
not expect quite such dramatic success in saving lives in education, although the 
relationship between education and health is actually a very durable and 
interesting one, so maybe not being educated can cause a loss of lives. […] We 
need to learn how to do this. People didn't think you could do it in medicine. Like 
I said, the Salk vaccine trial was incredible, the double blind experiment. We need 
to be able to make the argument and we need to learn how to do this stuff. 
(Raudenbush, U.S. Department of Education Working Group, February 2, 2002). 
 
The threat of Poliomyelitis was ingrained in the older generation’s memories, as 
Raudenbush expressed: “Your parents would stand by in mortal fear as the doctor 
exercised your legs and did various things to see whether it was Polio” (Raudenbush, 
U.S. Department of Education Working Group, February 2, 2002). Thus, Raudenbush 
and others regarded the 1954 Poliomyelitis trials in the United States as both a victory 
over a crippling illness and as a powerful validation of the new RCT approach. 
Raudenbush pointed to the parallels between medicine and education: both save lives, 
metaphorically for education and literally for medicine, and the idea that either might 
experience a sea change was met with strong skepticism in both fields. He implied that a 
sea change could also happen in the field of education if it embraced the RCT technology 




A closer look at the Tuberculosis and the Poliomyelitis trials reveals the historical role of 
these RCTs, and it demystifies their status as poster children. These trials are not perfect 
and positive models; they exhibited many challenges, which RCT promoters in education 
and international development rarely refer to. 
 
Austin B. Hill’s pragmatic perspective on the RCT model in medicine 
Austin Bradford Hill was the medical statistician for the Streptomycin trial on 
Tuberculosis and was a major force in popularizing the randomized trial in the medical 
profession in the 1940s and 1950s. Although RCT advocates in education and 
international development do not necessarily quote Hill’s works, they implicitly refer to 
his ideas when quoting the Tuberculosis trial. 
 
Before Hill participated in the Tuberculosis trial, he had written the “Principles of 
Medical Statistics” (1937) for contemporary clinicians and social workers who had little 
mathematical training. In fact, Hill strove to make “obscure and repellent” statistics 
understandable in an elementary way (Hill, 1937, 2). In the foreword, the editor pointed 
out the necessity for understanding statistical principles due to the “growing demand for 
adequate proof of the efficacy of this or that form of treatment” (Hill, 1937, iii). That is, 
any assessment of success should be based on fact rather than opinion. 
 
As a starting point, Hill addressed the distinction between the work of a laboratory 
worker and of a clinical researcher. In the clinical setting, the researcher could not control 
the many factors and multiple causes that influenced treatment effects (Hill, 1937, 3). Hill 
used the example of children who were in contact with measles, only some of whom had 
received a serum injection. Possible influences such as age, sex, social class, body 
weight, and state of health would need to be taken into account to determine whether the 
treatment prevented the illness. The researcher would need to either physically or 
statistically equalize the groups in every possibly influential or relevant respect, except 
for the serum treatment. The key problem was that no statistician would be aware of all 
the relevant factors.  
“If we find that Group A differs from Group B in some characteristic, say, its 
mortality-rate, can we be certain that that difference is due to the fact that Group 
A was inoculated and Group B was uninoculated? Are we certain that Group A 
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does not differ from Group B in some other character [sic!] relevant to the issues 
as well as in the presence or absence of inoculation?” (Hill, 1937, 5) 
 
Hill concluded that one can never be certain of not having overlooked relevant factors 
due to a “complex chain of causation” (ibid., 5). Hill then suggested “random allotment” 
of patients to treatment and control groups, so as not to introduce conscious or 
unconscious bias and to equalize the distribution of all characteristics. Hill had to make a 
general case for both concurrent controls and for randomization in particular (Armitage, 
2003, 926). The practice of making fair treatment comparisons in medicine was not 
widely implemented and accepted by medical professionals (Chalmers, 2001, 1157); nor 
were the theoretical foundations established. Later, Hill recalled that he purposefully 
avoided the terminology of randomization, “because I was trying to persuade the doctors 
to come into controlled trials in the very simplest form and I might have scared them off” 
(Hill, 1990, 77). Although Hill tried to ease doctors’ fear of statistical concepts, he 
anticipated resistance of medical professionals to controlled experiments.  
 
Hill advocated randomization for pragmatic reasons due to selection bias: “Any 
deliberate choice of individuals to be treated may lead, unconsciously, to the treated 
group differing from the untreated group in some characteristic which, known or 
unknown, has an influence upon the results” (Hill, 1937, 8). He argued for concealed 
allocation schedules based on random numbers so that recruiters would not be able to 
influence assignment of patients to treatment and control groups (Chalmers, 2001, 1156). 
As a pragmatist, Hill’s writing was concerned less with the theoretical foundation of 
RCTs, and more with difficulties in clinical practice and experimentation. For example, 
Hill addressed ethical issues such as whether treatment could be justifiably withheld from 
patients (Hill, 1937, 7). He specifically pointed out that one cannot treat human beings 
like laboratory animals. To withhold from a patient a treatment that is likely to benefit 
him is morally wrong (ibid., 173).These issues are also important for the fields of 
education and international development. Hill argued that any new therapeutic measure 
should be given a trial period before coming into general use. Hill hoped that RCTs 
would effectively shorten the period of evidence generation and would prove to be time- 
and cost-effective by abbreviating the historical process of unsystematic observations 
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(ibid., 173). Hill cautioned that the new measure typically would have a relatively small 
effect that, even if important, might go undetected with small-scale tests. Therefore, a 
well-planned and extensive trial would be necessary to introduce new therapies. One 
issue for the researcher was determining when it was acceptable to withhold treatment to 
a patient for whom such treatment could possibly be beneficial, versus probably be 
beneficial (Hill, 1937, 173). Determining how much evidence is needed before initiating 
an RCT continues to pose serious challenges to researchers, both in the medical and 
social sciences. 
 
Hill was also concerned with the generalizability of results. If one wished to argue from a 
sample to the “general run of patients,” one would need to carefully consider whether the 
sample was fully representative of all patients, and not in any way biased or selected 
(Hill, 1937, 9). For example, if treatment was restricted to children with measles who 
managed to be in hospitals, results would not be representative of the “general run” of 
children who tended to be less ill and maybe of a lower social class (ibid., 11). 
Volunteers or self-selected individuals would not be a random sample of the general run 
of patients either. Hill thus foreshadowed many issues that would become important 
during the regulatory institutionalization of RCTs in the drug approval process; these 
issues would also confront RCTs in education and international development. 
 
The Streptomycin trial on Tuberculosis as milestone in promoting RCTs 
The Streptomycin trial was funded by the British Medical Research Council (MRC), 
which was the major public institution for medical research in the United Kingdom at that 
time. The council had been established in the context of the National Insurance Act of 
1911 to make public research funding available and to “place in our hands new and more 
effective means of combating [these] diseases” (British Medical Journal, 1913, 1382). 
Medical researchers, epidemiologists, and statisticians teamed up to investigate new 
therapies, and ultimately they were able to convince their professional colleagues of the 
possibility for a clinical science (Kaptchuk & Kerr, 2004, 247; Armitage, 1995, 150)). 
A.B. Hill was one of these medical statisticians, and he was able to put randomization 
into practice with several medical experiments in the 1940s and 1950s, of which the 
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Streptomycin trial is the most well known. In his memoirs, Hill referred to the period as a 
“new era of medicine” (Hill, 1990, 78). 
 
The investigators of the Streptomycin experiment called it the “first controlled 
investigation of its kind to be reported” (Medical Research Council, 1948, 780).6 The 
trial worked toward a cure of pulmonary tuberculosis with the newly discovered 
antibioticum streptomycin, discovered in 1943. However, despite some clinical evidence, 
the MRC report found the evidence of effectiveness still “inconclusive” (Medical 
Research Council, 1948, 769). A trial with concurrent controls would therefore be 
justified. Hill would later justify randomization on different grounds—namely, the 
limited supply of the U.S. produced streptomycin in post-war England (Hill, 1990, 78). 
This justification would not have been necessary by true clinical equipoise, where the 
treatment outcomes would be unknown. However, the shortfall argument seemed 
necessary to convince physicians in charge of the Streptomycin trial to implement a 
control group without treatment, which gives an indication of the resistance to control 
group designs in the medical profession. 
 
The research question was categorical: “Is streptomycin of value in the treatment of 
pulmonary tuberculosis?” (Medical Research Council, 1948, 780). The patients were 
randomly assigned for bed rest with streptomycin administration or bed rest alone, which 
would have been the normal treatment for this type of tuberculosis. Hill provided the 
randomization scheme. The trial was not blinded for doctors or the treatment patients. 
The control patients were not informed about the trial, an ethically questionable decision 
by today’s standards. 
 
For the Streptomycin experiment to be successful, an extended infrastructure was 
necessary. To gain access to sufficient patients, several hospitals and their physicians had 
to be recruited. For each site, a trial coordinator was trained on how to determine whether 
patients fit the research scheme based on certain inclusion and exclusion criteria. For 
example, the trial restricted the patients’ age and type of tuberculosis (i.e., acute, fast 
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progressing, bilateral, not suitable for other therapies). Between January to September 
1947, 107 patients were recruited. For six months, the streptomycin patients received four 
daily injections, whereas the control patients were only prescribed bed rest. The trial 
itself lasted for 15 months. The research team systematically collected and reviewed data 
from regular examinations and observations of toxic reactions. 
 
The findings of the streptomycin study were positive. The measure of whether the patient 
died within the six months yielded a significant difference of 7% dead in the treatment 
group versus 27% dead in the control group. Based on more qualitative measures, 51% of 
the streptomycin patients improved considerably, in contrast to only 8% of the control 
patients. Both of these outcome measures were statistically significant at the .01 level. 
The report concluded that “streptomycin was the agent responsible for this result” 
(Medical Research Council, 1948, 780). More specifically, “streptomycin therapy was 
effecting [sic] what the patient’s tissues alone could not do—checking the spread of the 
tubercle bacillus” (780). 
 
Streptomycin was neither found to be a miracle drug nor did its absence prevent 
improvement. A control group was therefore warranted. Although the average treatment 
patient was better off, Streptomycin did not fully produce “clinical cures,” and most 
patients still had the bacillus in their body. Deaths and radiological deteriorations 
happened especially toward the end of the trial. The authors attempted to explain why 
this could be the case. The infections, for instance, might have been too advanced in the 
first place. However, the authors were not able to systematically investigate this theory. 
Conversely, several control patients naturally improved their symptoms with combined 
bed rest due to the “natural recuperative power” (Medical Research Council, 1948, 781). 
 
Challenges of the Streptomycin trial 
I delineate several challenges of the trial from the report (Medical Research Council, 
1948, 780): First, no answers about optimal dosage or duration could be given. Second, 
the selection of a homogeneous group of patients led to narrow findings. Third, trial 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 It is to be noted that although the MRC’s 1944 Patulin trial had already used a randomization scheme, its 
results were published after the Streptomycin trial’s article, probably due to its negative findings (Kaptchuk 
& Kerr, 2004). 
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procedures were changed midway, but its effect was unclear. Fourth, negative effects 
were not adequately captured. 
 
First, although the trial could positively answer the general question of whether 
streptomycin was effective in treating pulmonary tuberculosis in a certain population, the 
trial could not answer questions about optimal dosage, duration, or degree of 
effectiveness for different variations of the illness. The report acknowledged that much 
additional research would be required “to determine the precise indications of 
streptomycin and the best schemes of dosage in pulmonary tuberculosis” (ibid., 781).  
 
Second, the authors acknowledged that this one clinical trial was insufficient to fully 
determine the effect of streptomycin in different populations. They purposefully 
eliminated “as many of the obvious variations as possible” (ibid., 770) and instead 
followed closely defined criteria: “acute progressive bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis of 
presumably recent origin, bacteriologically proven, unsuitable for collapse therapy, age 
group 15 to 25 (later extended to 30)” (ibid., 770). The trial excluded, for instance, older 
and chronically ill patients. Selecting a homogenous patient group was based on 
expecting smaller variations in outcomes, which had the advantage of reducing the 
sample size and creating more precise results. The disadvantage was less generalizable 
results beyond the clearly defined group.  
 
Third, the researchers made several adjustments to the Streptomycin trial in progress. 
Some control patients became eligible for a different treatment (i.e., collapse therapy) 
based on the course of their illness. The duration of the treatment was shortened from six 
to four months based on information from other clinics in the United States. The age 
requirements were changed. In general, adjustments allowed ethical treatment of patients 
(e.g., not withholding available alternative treatment when indicated), integration of new 
insights from other trials, and adequate recruitment numbers. These changes, though, 
may have affected the trial findings. 
 
Fourth, negative effects of streptomycin presented further challenges. Toxic reactions 
were observed in most patients, especially physical coordination and vision (Medical 
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Research Council, 1948, 781). Systematic testing these reactions would have required 
additional trials. Weighing and balancing the positive and negative effects of the drug 
was an issue early on in medical trials. 
 
Another challenge was streptomycin resistance, which the majority of treated patients 
developed. The report suggested adding another drug to decrease resistance (Medical 
Research Council, 1948, 781). Follow-up trials tested a combination of those drugs and 
found decreased resistance. The RCT approach allowed for efficiently introducing 
effective tuberculosis treatment and finding better dosages and drug combinations to 
avoid resistance in a fairly short period of time. However, clinical practice was slow to 
adopt the RCT findings (Cochrane, 1971, 80). In the 1970s, Archibald Cochrane 
complained that the medical profession continued to enjoy considerable freedom in 
treatment decisions without taking scientific findings into account (Cochrane, 1971, 82).  
 
According to Valier and Timmermann, the success of the Streptomycin trial elevated the 
RCT to international prominence (Valier & Timmermann, 2008, 493). They identified 
key conditions as contributing to the rise of RCT, including: availability of funding; a 
well-developed infrastructure; and new organizational techniques that utilized 
interdisciplinary specialists and allowed for central data collection and review across 
multiple trial sites. All of these conditions held in the Streptomycin trial. The MRC’s role 
was key in promoting and organizing cooperative trials. The question remained as to 
whether this new RCT technology would gain traction beyond the small group of medical 
academicians commissioned by the government (Meldrum, 2000, 1234). The MRC work, 
published in the widely disseminated British Journal of Medicine, soon gained a 
following in the United States at Harvard, Cornell, the National Institutes of Health, and 
the Veterans’ Administration, among other places (Kaptchuk & Kerr, 2004, 250). Indeed, 
the new randomized approach eventually unified medical research (Valier 
& Timmermann, 2008, 494).  
 
The popularization of the RCT in the U.S. Poliomyelitis trials 
The Polio trials were among the largest and most publicized RCTs ever undertaken, and 
they demonstrated the “superior credibility” of the RCT approach inside and outside the 
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medical field (Meldrum, 2000, 1234). As mentioned above, the education researcher 
Raudenbush referred to the Salk trials as having helped produce a “sea change” in the 
medical science (Raudenbush, U.S. Department of Education Working Group, February 
2, 2002). 
 
A crucial fact has often been overlooked by researchers from other fields: Initially, the 
original Polio trial’s design included only observed, non-randomized controls (Meldrum, 
1998, 1234). In fact, Jonas Salk himself, the developer of the vaccine, did not advocate an 
RCT from an ethical point of view. Convinced that the vaccine would be effective and 
safe, Salk thought the trial was unnecessary. Denying the children the vaccine would 
have violated the Hippocratic Oath (Oshinsky, 2005, 180). The public health departments 
of thirty-six states also promoted observed controls (Meldrum, 1998, 1235). Statisticians 
and virologists, however, were against the observed control approach due to possible 
selection bias. Children from high-income and well-educated families were known to be 
more susceptible to Polio infection, but they were also more likely to volunteer for such a 
trial (Oshinsky, 2005, 177). Ultimately, the researchers reached a compromise and 
conducted two trials with two separate protocols—one using randomized assignment and 
one using non-randomized, observed controls. The RCT included approximately 400,000 
children, and the one using non-randomized controls included approximately 950,000 
children (Brownlee, 1955). To avoid possible public censure, researchers intentionally 
avoided the term “experiment” (Oshinsky, 2005, 191). 
 
A year later, the results found the Salk vaccine to be 71 percent effective for the 
prevention of Poliomyelitis, with 60 to 90 percent variation depending on the strain 
(British Medical Journal, 1955). The larger, observational trial yielded similar results. 
Despite the results being positive overall, they were nonetheless disappointing. 
Ultimately, Albert Sabin replaced the Salk vaccine with a more effective vaccine a few 
years later (Oshinsky, 2005, 261). According to Oshinsky, pharmaceutical companies in 
the United States found the Sabin vaccine more profitable, and they successfully lobbied 
for its common use in the 1960s (Oshinsky, 2005, 325). In 2000, however, the United 
States passed a policy to only allow distribution of the Salk vaccine due to safety 
concerns (Hecht, Babcock, & Heymann, 2009, 59). Although scientific evidence played a 
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role in the history of Polio vaccines’ implementation, other factors were important, 
including commercial interest, public sector planning, and scientific convictions.. 
 
Challenges of the Salk Poliomyelitis trials 
The challenges of the Poliomyelitis trials were multifold: First, the prevention trial 
required a large machinery of operation. Second, researchers felt that the RCT was 
introduced prematurely and could only indirectly measure its effectiveness. Third, 
replication of findings proved difficult. 
 
First, the struggle to commit to an RCT reflects the controversial status of random 
assignment among medical researchers. Much of this controversy stemmed from the 
sheer difficulty of conducting RCTs, given its large size and high costs. The Polio trial 
cost approximately five million dollars (unadjusted) (British Medical Journal, 1955, 
1006). The large size of the RCT required a vast machinery of operational planning and 
execution, with 312 State and local health officials, 20,000 physicians and 40,000 nurses 
(Oshinsky, 2005, 189). Furthermore, the prevention RCT required a large population 
because the likelihood of contracting polio was only one in 2,000. Because children who 
were already vaccinated clearly no longer qualified as research subjects for additional 
trials, the possibility of holding additional Polio trials in the United States was reduced. 
This was one reason why Albert Sabin had to choose other countries such as the Soviet 
Union to test his vaccine. In fact, the Salk trial pointed to a general problem for human 
RCTs: the availability of research subjects for conducting RCTs. The rarer the condition 
being studied, the more difficult it is to secure sufficient numbers of research subjects. 
 
Second, another important twist was that many Polio researchers felt that the trial was 
introduced prematurely. Salk had taken a controversial approach to vaccination. The 
findings from initial small experiments in disabled children had not yet been published or 
reviewed by outside experts (Oshinsky, 2005, 182). His main outcome was the rise in 
Poliomyelitis antibodies rather than permanent immunity, which would have been the 
only meaningful measure (Meldrum, 1998, 1234). Permanent immunity, however, could 
technically only be measured by purposefully exposing vaccinated children to the 
Poliomyelitis virus, an ethically questionable approach. At that point of research, 
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virologists found the safety risk to be too high, whereas the effectiveness of the vaccine 
remained questionable. The issue of the timing of a randomized trial has had a long 
history, of which the Salk trials are an illustrative case. Those safety concerns led to the 
British Medical Council deciding against an experiment on Poliomyelitis (British 
Medical Journal, 1955).  
 
Third, upon review, the Salk vaccine was found to be safe and effective. In the 
subsequent year, however, the vaccine caused polio infections (Brownlee, 1955, 1005). 
Apparently, the testing and safety measures used in the production of the vaccination 
were relaxed compared to the measures used in the tested vaccine; they allowed virulent 
strains to enter the vaccine. This case illustrates the difference between experimental 
contexts and non-experimental contexts, the latter of which would have equaled 
distributing the vaccine to the general public. The experimental results were of relevance 
only insofar as the same product would have been produced and applied in non-
experimental settings. Since the two products differed, the experimental findings were 
proven less relevant, ultimately leading to the replacement of the Salk vaccine. 
 
Lastly, the Poliomyelitis trials used public schools as trial sites. Schools proved to be a 
logistically efficient way to recruit volunteers for the experiment. By utilizing public 
schools, the Polio trial became a “public experiment,” garnering a large audience in the 
general public. The desperate need for a Poliomyelitis vaccine and the vaccine’s 
ultimately positive results helped foster the public’s acceptance of randomized trials as an 
evaluation tool. This also led education researcher Raudenbush to remember the Polio 
trials fondly and to promote RCTs in education (cf., Raudenbush 2002). Although formal 
RCTs had been practiced in medicine since the 1940s, RCTs were not required for the 
approval of new drugs until 1970. 
 
2. The legal institutionalization of the RCT by the FDA 
Thus far, medicine is the only discipline where RCTs have been publicly institutionalized 
and are legally mandated for evaluation purposes. Since 1970, regulations by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) have required proof of effectiveness through two 




The following four citations illustrate how education officials and researchers sometimes 
viewed the powerful role of the FDA as a model to which educational science should 
aspire. They saw the RCT as a key ingredient in making education policy as effective as 
the drug approval process. 
 
An early example is the 1999 Brookings Institution’s conference “Can We Make 
Education Policy on the Basis of Evidence?” The conference chair Paul Peterson from 
Harvard University made an interesting observation about federal education policy: 
We don't have anything like FDA. In medicine, FDA says you don't get approval 
unless you have survived the gold standard [the RCT]. We have yet to have any 
agency of the federal government, whether it is Congress or the executive branch 
agency or in any of our state governments, say in the field of education, yes, 
before you innovate, you've got to show that you've got an effective program here 
that deserves implementation on a wide scale. So FDA is the powerful instrument 
by which the concept of randomized experiment has shaped our whole 
understanding of what is the appropriate way of evaluating innovative procedures 
in medicine (Peterson, Brookings, presentation, December 8, 1999). 
 
Peterson characterized the Food and Drug Administration as the “powerful instrument” 
that regulates drug approval via the RCT as the gold standard. Peterson envisioned a 
similarly powerful function for the U.S. Department of Education, but possible only if it 
had a similar gold standard for determining an education program’s effectiveness. As the 
discussion later showed, Peterson saw the RCT as an equally suitable standard for 
education policy. 
 
A few months later, during testimonies in the House Committee on Education and 
Workforce, Representative Michael Castle asked Reid Lyon about the possibility of 
restructuring of the U.S. Department of Education’s research arm. Lyon had been in 
charge of the National Reading Panel’s work on identifying effective reading programs 
(cf., chapter 3): 
Michael Castle: My question to you is because you have done hard-core 
scientific, medical research—can those same standards—the ones you look to in 
dealing with the FDA and various other hoops you have to go through to get 
medical research approved and then into usage be applied to education, or is that 




G. Reid Lyon: Absolutely, they can be applied.  
(Lyon, testimony, May 4, 2000) 
 
There was a general optimism that the research arm of USDOE would be able to 
implement rigorous evaluation standards in education similar to what the FDA did for 
drug evaluations in 1970.  
 
The “No Child Left Behind” law of 2002 and its push for scientifically based education 
raised hopes in certain groups that the national Institute of Education Sciences could 
become an equivalent of the FDA for education. In 2002, at a policy forum with the 
Education Secretary Rod Paige, Jon Baron’s opening remarks likened the newest 
developments at federal education to the history of FDA.  
So, is No Child Left Behind the 2002 equivalent of the 1962 Food and Drug 
Administration amendments? We believe that the education policy community 
today is in a position that is similar to that of the medical community 40 years 
ago. You have a new law which says that funded activities shall be backed by 
scientifically based research including the preference for randomized trials. We 
believe that federal government's effective implementation of that concept has the 
potential to transform a field that has seen almost no progress in 30 years and 
create a new dynamic for evidence driven progress (Baron, presentation, 
November 8, 2002). 
 
Baron interpreted the newest developments in education policy as important milestones, 
but lagging 40 years behind medicine. In 1962, FDA had demanded drugs to be effective, 
but it had not yet spelled out the standards of proof. It took another eight years for the 
RCT to become this standard in medicine. Baron implied that NCLB had not yet reached 
the breakthrough to transform education into a modern science as medicine had in 1970; 
but Baron was hopeful that the RCT would equally propel the field of education forward. 
 
Lastly, in an interview, Grover (Russ) Whitehurst, the Director of USDOE’s Institute of 
Educational Sciences, modeled the design of the What Works Clearinghouse after the 
FDA. It would be a government-sponsored registry for effective education programs:  
If you look at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as a model, what's required 
to get FDA approval to market a product are two randomized trials. So, we will 
privilege randomized trials. We will provide a registry of those trials as related to 
particular Ps [products, practices, policies or programs].” (Whitehurst, T.H.E 




These quotations in four contexts illustrate how much education officials and 
stakeholders desired the U.S. Department of Education to mimic the FDA and adopt its 
RCT standard. However, there is the question of to what degree discrete drug compounds 
and multilayered education programs could be evaluated with the same standards of 
evidence. Furthermore, even if they could, the FDA of 1970, which served as the 
reference point, was different from the FDA today. As shown in the final part of this 
chapter, the FDA Commissioner has been seeking to broaden the concept of medical 
standards—the standards which education officials try to emulate. RCT advocates in 
education seem to lag behind these newest developments.  
 
The quest for “substantial evidence” in drug approvals 
The Drug Efficacy Amendment of 19627 was an important step in the RCT history, 
because it strengthened the government’s regulation for approving new drugs. The FDA, 
rather than the manufacturers, now decided when a new drug was introduced into the 
market. Notable physicians had testified that doctors in clinical practice could not 
evaluate the efficacy of drugs and that doctors often relied on a collection of impressions 
(Temin, 1980, 122). As a criterion for approval, the new law required “substantial 
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports” before pharmaceutical companies 
could market the drug (PL 87-781, sec 5005d). “Substantial evidence” of effectiveness 
was legally defined as:  
Adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by 
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and 
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it 
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof (sec 
505d).  
 
On one the one hand, this definition was expert driven, insofar as experts would decide 
what kind of evidence was needed. The FDA no longer saw the market as protector of its 
consumers, and it delegated the authority to choose among drugs from doctors to the 
government’s medical experts.  
 
                                                 
7 Public Law 87-781, October 10, 1962. Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 
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On the other hand, the definition of “substantial evidence” did not require agreement 
among experts for approval of a new drug. It was also unclear what should be concluded 
when a “weighty body of inconclusive or negative evidence” existed (National Research 
Council, 1969, 8). The definition of “substantial evidence” included the term “well-
controlled investigation.” Yet there was no agreement as to what constituted a well-
controlled investigation (National Research Council, 1969, 8). It was not further defined 
until 1970, when two RCTs would be required for drug approval. Although the new 
standard still had unclear concepts, it was still more rigorous than the rule established by 
the Supreme Court’s 1910 judgment, which had held that the basis of therapeutic 
effectiveness would be a matter of opinion (Temin, 1980, 125). 
 
The FDA Commissioner decided that the Drug Efficacy Amendment of 1962 should be 
applied retroactively to all drugs approved between 1938 and 1962. Approximately 4,000 
drugs with 300 distinct chemical formulas were on the market (National Research 
Council, 1969, 1). This resulted in the Drug Efficacy Study of 1969 by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. They assigned to each drug’s 
therapeutic claim a categorical rating about the substantial evidence of effectiveness 
(ibid., 6).  
 
The panel used the rating “effective, but …” to indicate the inferiority of a drug, despite 
its effectiveness, when they found drugs to be less effective than other drugs for a given 
indication (ibid., 9). Clinical investigations infrequently compared the effectiveness of a 
new drug with an old drug. Relative effectiveness between therapeutic agents thus went 
beyond the assigned task of the panel—an issue to be addressed in the Comparative 
Effectiveness Research movement (cf., end of chapter). The relation between safety and 
effectiveness presented another challenge. The panel did not offer firm guidance at that 
point, because the acceptable balance between benefit and risk would vary greatly with 
the use of the drug (National Research Council, 1969, 44). 
 
The panel could not find well-controlled studies for many drugs despite the fact that these 
were widely accepted in medical practice. The pharmaceutical manufacturers only 
provided uncontrolled observations and testimonial-type endorsements as support for 
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their effectiveness claims. The panel had to decide how much weight they should give the 
“opinion of the marketplace” (ibid., 9). The report stated: “The final arbiter of the value 
of a drug is the consensus of the experience of critical physicians in its use in the practice 
of medicine over a period of years” (ibid., 9). The observational approach rather than the 
experimental approach still dominated medical practice. 
 
The results of the investigation were that the panel rated seven percent of drugs as 
ineffective. Any drug not rated effective had to provide additional evidence to be 
continued. Some pharmaceutical manufacturers who had to discontinue their drugs went 
to court against the FDA. For example, the manufacturer of Panalba, a combined 
antibiotic, filed a court claim because the FDA had withdrawn its approval despite 
commercial success (Temin, 1980, 134). In this context, the FDA issued additional 
regulations defining the term “substantial evidence” (Food and Drug Administration, 
1970). The FDA no longer advocated an expert model, but a clinical procedure model. 
Evidence could not be based on clinical observations alone. Historical controls were only 
allowed for diseases with high and predictable mortality (ibid., 7252). Instead, evidence 
had to be based on clinical trials with a treatment and control group combined with a 
systematic selection process. The method of selecting subjects “assigns the subjects to 
test groups in such a way as to minimize bias” and “assures comparability in test and 
control groups of pertinent variables.” Steps had to be taken to “minimize bias on the part 
of the subject and observer” (ibid., 7251). Although random assignment was not directly 
mentioned in the regulation, it was implicit via minimizing bias. The United States 
government decided on the RCT approach to establish regulatory law for drug approval 
based on scientific rather than political authority. 
 
The process from initial RCTs in medicine to the formal legal incorporation took several 
decades. The RCT mandate now requires the manufacturers to create an infrastructure 
that allows those trials. Although the U.K. Medical Research Council was publicly 
funded and had direct access to academic scientists, private sector manufacturers had no 
such infrastructure in place. The National Research Council attributed the lack of well-
controlled studies to the industry’s difficulty in commanding the needed clinical facilities 
and the services of experienced investigators in the United States (National Research 
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Council, 1969, 13). They felt that more national support in therapeutic research should be 
given, both in the programming and the management of trials (ibid., 13). 
 
Since the 1970s, an RCT industry has developed in the United States in order to meet the 
changed regulatory requirements (Meldrum, 2000). From the 1980s onwards, medical 
research has relied on an almost exclusive use of RCTs (Brody, Miller, & Bogdan-Lovis, 
2005, 517). Any U.S.-led clinical trial must be recorded publicly on the U.S. 
government’s trial website. ClinicalTrials.gov recorded over 100,000 medical trials as of 
2011. 
 
Current drug regulations requiring RCTs 
When applying for FDA approval to market a new drug, companies will find that the 
current regulations explicitly refer to randomization: “Ordinarily, in a concurrently 
controlled study, assignment is by randomization, with or without stratification” (Code of 
Federal Regulations 21, 314.126). The FDA requires two positive RCTs with “substantial 
evidence” for drug approval. 
 
Currently, clinical trials of new drugs are commonly classified into preclinical testing and 
four phases of clinical research. For approximately every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that 
enter preclinical testing, only one is approved for marketing (Klees & Joines, 1997). The 
successful completion of RCTs of phase three is required for a New Drug Application 
(NDA) at the FDA (cf., Figure 1). 
 
Before pharmaceutical companies can legally conduct clinical trials in humans, they need 
to submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the FDA (Code of Federal 
Regulations 21 312.20, 4-1-2003 edition). The IND must include results from animal 
studies measuring preliminary toxicity, pharmacodynamic activity (i.e., what the drug 





FIGURE 1: Phases of drug evaluation 
 
 
Phase 1 trials typically include 20 to 80 healthy volunteers to assess the safety and 
tolerability of the drug. Phase 2 trials investigate safety in a selected group of up to 300 
patients. Phase 3 trials are what we consider the classical drug trials, involving 
cooperative multi-center studies with up to 5,000 subjects. Their goal is to determine the 
drug’s efficacy, i.e., its effectiveness in the tested population. Phase 4 trials belong to 
post-marketing safety surveillance, and they address drug effectiveness, i.e., beyond the 
original test population—what A.B. Hill would call the “general run of patients” (cf., 
above). 
 
One should note that there is an important distinction between the concept of “efficacy” 
and “effectiveness.” Before 1970s, the terms “efficacy” and “effectiveness” had been 
often used interchangeably (cf., the Drug Efficacy Study). These two terms have acquired 
specific meanings in the current regulatory setting in the distinction of trial phases. 
Efficacy is the narrower term, referring to positive results within a restricted group of 
subjects often with homogeneous characteristics. Effectiveness refers to the concept of 




The FDA requires “substantial evidence,” not exclusive evidence. Two separate phase 3 
trials need to show evidence of statistically significant positive results against a placebo 
treatment. Issues of effect size and comparator drug are secondary in the FDA approval 
process. The FDA focuses on internal validity; questions about generalizability and 
comparative effectiveness are secondary. These particular requirements influence how 
trials are designed in the first place. For example, pharmaceutical RCTs tend to be 
stronger regarding internal validity, the actual FDA focus, but less concerned with other 
possible biases. 
 
Sources of bias in drug studies 
Although in general RCTs minimize selection bias, they are not necessarily immune to 
other types of biases. Ernest House argued that despite the obvious advantages of RCTs, 
randomized drug trials are “among the most biased evaluations being conducted” (House, 
2008, 416). Drug manufacturers would have an interest in producing positive findings 
because of their commercial interests. Trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies and 
conducted by for-profit contractors were found to be three times more likely to have 
positive findings than trials sponsored by non-pharmaceutical, unaffiliated organizations 
(Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & Clark, 2003). In oncology studies in particular, 38 
percent of studies funded by drug companies reached favorable conclusions, compared to 
five percent of studies from non-profit organizations (Friedberg, Saffran, Stinson, Nelson, 
& Bennett, 1999). This would lead to the conclusion that investigators have some control 
over the direction of the findings. House identified 14 sources of bias that would result 
from opportunistic choices in drug studies (cf., Table 2). The sources of bias do not pose 
threats to internal validity; thus no bias or systematic error in the narrower sense would 
exist. House used the term “bias” in a wider sense, applying it to threats to external 
validity and conflict of interest, whereas Howard Brody used the term “commercial bias” 
to describe such distortions (Brody et al., 2005, 578). This commercial bias can be found 
in opportunistic choices of comparison group, dosage, administration, sample, and time 
scale—all of which can affect external validity of findings. For instance, using a less 





TABLE 2: Opportunistic choices in pharmaceutical RCTs 
Opportunistic choices Examples Domain 
Choice of comparison Placebo rather than state-of-the-art 
drug as comparator 
External 
validity 
 Choice of dosage Less effective dosage for comparator 
drug  
Choice of administration Less effective administration of 
comparator drugs 
Choice of sample Homogenous sample; subjects with 
fewer comorbidities 
Choice of time scale Chronic-use drugs tested for short 
periods 
Redefining outcomes after 
findings to achieve success 




 Choices in data analyses Providing researchers with 
incomplete data sets 
Favorable interpretations “This drug is now the treatment of 
choice.” 
Choice of outcomes Choosing outcomes most favorable 
to hypothesis 
Underreporting of negative effects  Reporting 
bias Underreporting of unfavorable 
data 
 
Control of authorship Company employees, rather than 
researchers, writing reports 
Selective publishing Publishing only positive findings 
Deceptive publishing Publishing positive findings 
repeatedly under different authors 
Adapted from House, 2011, 70. 
 
Drug testing—as any other evaluation activity—typically starts with a confirmation bias, 
i.e., the assumption that the drug to be tested would be effective. Clearly the sponsors 
would not invest the necessary resources if they believed the likelihood of effectiveness 
to be low. Confirmation bias may guide decisions involved in the planning, designing, 
and interpreting of an RCT. Even without financial incentives, individual researchers 
who are vested in their research trial are likely to have some confirmation bias. In the 
Polio testing, for instance, Jonas Salk did not regard an RCT necessary as he was already 
convinced of the drug’s beneficial outcome (cf., above). Such preconceived expectations 
would then influence the particular outcomes and findings of a trial; i.e., what a 
researcher is looking for seems to affect the research outcome (cf., Kaptchuk, 2003, 
1454). The internal validity of the result itself may not be affected, but the validity of the 
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experiment may be limited in other ways, e.g., with respect to generalizability and 
relevance to non-clinical settings.  
 
Researchers have to make many decisions about the design of RCTs. As Fisher had 
pointed out, many considerations go into the design of an experiment beyond statistical 
expertise (cf., previous discussion). These considerations will influence the outcomes to 
some degree. For example, the choice of what a drug is compared to may influence 
findings. Placebo trials do not allow for comparative effectiveness research. From a 
comparative effectiveness perspective, head-to-head studies with the standard-of-
treatment drug would be preferable. Pharmaceutical companies, however, like to use a 
placebo instead of the standard-of-treatment drug as comparator (House, 2008, 417). The 
likelihood of positive results is higher with a placebo, because the comparator situation is 
the natural progress of the disease rather than a drug already established to be effective. 
The choice of placebo as comparison treatment would only be ethically legitimate when 
no standard of treatment existed. This was the case with the Polio trial and the 
Streptomycin trial. If there were an alternative treatment, such as in the antipsychotic 
example discussed below, then a placebo group would not be ethical. 
 
Even if the standard-of-treatment comparator drug is used, a dosage that is too high or too 
low for standard treatment may be disadvantageous. For example, a second-generation 
antipsychotic was tested using the standard treatment of Haloperidol as comparator. 
However, the dose was unreasonably high, leading to increased side effects and making 
the new drug look more tolerable (Carlat Psychiatry Report, 2009).  
 
Another way to increase the chances of positive findings is by reducing sample 
heterogeneity and by choosing low-risk patients, the latter of which are more likely to 
respond positively to the drug. Thus study entry criteria may be very strict. For example, 
the clinical trials that led to the FDA approval of Seroquel for bipolar depression 
disorders excluded all patients who had comorbidities and who had been through at least 
two treatments of antidepressants; even though patients diagnosed with bipolar II who 
were seen in clinical practice were likely to exhibit such comorbidities (Thase, 
Macfadden, Weisler, Chang, Paulsson, Khan et al., 2006). It is therefore hard to conclude 
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that Seroquel would be effective for patients such as those excluded (Ashih, 2009, 1–2), 
because the clinical subjects were not representative of the target population seen on a 
daily basis. 
 
Sources of bias may also enter in the publication phase. Positive findings are more likely 
to be published, whereas negative findings are more likely to be suppressed. Although 
companies must submit all clinical results to the FDA, the company can choose which 
results to publish. Selective publishing involves either under-reporting or over-reporting 
findings. Underreporting happened with the use of antidepressants among children. In 
2004, a pharmaceutical company was accused of suppressing results of four trials that 
showed an increased risk of adverse effects among children using antidepressants 
(Lancet, 2004). Conversely, bias in over reporting took place with the antipsychotic 
Risperidone. One trial was reported in six different publications with different authors’ 
names for each (Pearson, 2007). Furthermore, positive results for only certain subgroups, 
rather than the entire trial population, may be published in academic journals. These 
practices would not affect the FDA approval process, but it would influence medical 
practice, as medical professionals might assume an independent trial for each publication. 
 
The point I wish to underscore is that although these choices and practices by evaluators 
do not influence the narrow concept of internal validity, they do influence the results of a 
trial and how they are perceived. Opportunistic choices in the design and the 
interpretation of RCTs may lead to more positive findings, but such choice may also 
decrease the relevance of the findings for—as A.B. Hill put it—the “general run of 
patients.” 
 
3. Evidence-Based Medicine and the RCT reference standard 
In the 1990s, RCTs were further mainstreamed through the Evidence-Based Medicine 
(EBM) movement. Although the RCT was widely anchored in medical research as the 
preferred evaluation approach, medical practitioners still tended to rely on unsystematic 
observations based on clinical experience. The EBM group emphasized the RCT standard 
in medical practice and training. They recognized that they could not prove their own 
claim via an RCT of the superiority of evidence-based medicine over traditional 
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approaches (Evidence-Based Medicine Work Group, 1992, 2424). This fact illustrates 
limited applicability of RCTs in different evaluation domains. Evidence-based systematic 
reviews provided professional physicians with tools to make evidence-based choices. 
Howard Brody referred to a power shift within medicine, where the medical scientist 
guides the medical practitioner (Brody et al., 2005, 572). The legal institutionalization of 
the RCT was finally brought to the doctor’s office. 
 
Archibald Cochrane, a British physician who had studied medicine under the influence of 
Austin B. Hill, observed that Hill’s ideas of randomization had only made small gains in 
medical practice. In his book “Efficiency and Effectiveness” (1971), Cochrane deplored 
the notion that clinical opinion, the oldest form of medical evidence, would hold more 
weight than an experiment. Cochrane’s ideas in 1971 could be seen as a prototype for the 
evidence hierarchy that would come later, which was based on the RCT as reference 
standard. According to Cochrane, the double-blind RCT would solve the problem, in that 
patient characteristics would be randomized between the two groups; neither the doctor 
nor the patients would know which of the two treatments was given (Cochrane, 1971, 22–
23). For Cochrane, clinical opinion would be the worst type of observational evidence; it 
lacked quantitative measurement or any attempt to discover what would have happened if 
the patient had received no treatment (Cochrane, 1971, 21). In such instances, opinion 
was followed by observations with no control group. Comparison groups were the next 
step, but those without randomization were often prone to selection bias. Cochrane 
referred to comparison groups as a “mixed lot” (Cochrane, 1971, 21). For example, 
people who refused treatment could end up in the control group. Therefore, an RCT was 
warranted. 
 
Based on Cochrane’s ideas, an international group from the McMaster University in 
Ontario, Canada, formed the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group in 1992. The 
purpose of the group was to promote putting clinical medicine on firmer scientific 
footing. They proclaimed a “NEW paradigm for medical practice” in the Journal of the 
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American Medical Association—a journal widely read by medical clinicians (Evidence-
Based Medicine Work Group, 1992).8 
 
The group defined EBM as “the process of systematically finding, appraising and using 
contemporaneous research findings as the basis for clinical decisions” (Rosenberg & 
Donald, 1995, 1122). The group suggested a new way for medical practitioners to access 
medical literature. The idea was that a physician would systematically move from a 
problem statement about an individual patient to the process of critically appraising the 
literature to arrive at a relevant, statistically valid answer. This would ultimately result in 
superior patient care and better patient health (Evidence-Based Medicine Work Group, 
2424). Medical residents would be trained to understand the methodological criteria to 
systematically evaluate the validity of the clinical evidence and to use quantitative 
techniques for summarizing the evidence (Evidence-Based Medicine Work Group, 1992, 
2421). The 1992 article gave the ideal example of how this method would look in 
practice: After examining a patient, a resident went to the library searching for and 
retrieving articles about seizures; upon finding the answer, she then conveyed the answer 
to the seizure patient. 
 
The EBM group did not regard the RCT as the only way to establish evidence, yet it 
identified the RCT as the reference standard. The group arranged levels of evidence in a 
hierarchy, in which the RCT constituted the top, optimal approach to evaluation.  
Different hierarchies of evidence have been developed including the U.K. Clinical 






                                                 
8 One might ask whether they truly introduced a paradigm in Kuhn’s tradition, which would have required 
a shift in the conceptual world view that determined methods, research questions, problems considered 
relevant to solve, and new standards of evidence (Kuhn, 1962). They seemed rather to be applying medical 




TABLE 3: Hierarchy of medical evidence 
Grade Type of Evidence: Evidence from... 
I a 
  b 
Systematic review of RCTs 
Individual RCT 
       II a 
           b 
One controlled study without randomization 
One other type of quasi-experimental study 
             III Observational studies 
                 IV Expert committee reports or experts 
Adapted from http://www.eguidelines.co.uk. 
 
The grading of medical evidence is based on the methodological approach of an 
evaluation. Randomization is the distinctive difference between grade 1 and grade 2 
evidence. The best evidence for a medical treatment would be a comparative review of 
RCTs. First-grade evidence relies on at least one RCT. Grade 3 and 4 evidence includes 
observational studies and expert opinions. Because these do not include a comparison 
group, they are considered biased and generally insufficient grounds on which to base 
clinical decisions. For many clinical questions, however, high-quality evidence is not 
available; such questions would need to consider weaker evidence (Evidence-Based 
Medicine Work Group, 1992, 2424). Other medical guidelines consider systematic 
reviews of RCTs also as the highest form of evidence. In 2011, the University of 
Oxford’s Centre for Evidence-based Medicine9 revised their hierarchy, in which they 
distinguished high-quality and low-quality RCTs. Low-quality RCTs belong to Level 2 
evidence and fair worse than systematic reviews of cohort studies. 
 
To put EBM into practice, the International Cochrane Collaboration (ICC) was founded 
in 1993.10 Its goal was to provide medical practitioners with ready-made analyses of the 
effectiveness of health interventions. ICC has produced systematic reviews in the form of 
high-level overviews of primary research on a particular research question. To answer the 
research question, a systematic review attempts to identify, select, synthesize, and 
appraise the available RCT evidence. A review could generate aggregate evidence of 
                                                 
9 Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine, http://ww.cebm.net, accessed June 14, 2011. 
10 International Cochrane Collaboration, http://www.cochrane.org/, accessed June 13, 2011. 
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several small-scale studies that might not be statistically significant on their own. One 
drawback of the systematic review is that it can only rely on existing primary studies. It is 
not able to add more substantive information than that which is provided by the 
individual studies. 
 
An example of an ICC review concerns the use of antibiotics for a sore throat. The 
review found 27 experimental studies with a total of 12,835 cases of sore throat that met 
the researchers’ selection criteria. The review determined an average reduction of 
symptoms by 16 hours, but it also cautioned against the side effects of antibiotics 
(Spinks, Glasziou, & Del Mar, 2006). Therefore, absolute benefits of antibiotics use were 
modest. A similar review of antibiotics for acute laryngitis found merely two RCT studies 
with a total of 106 patients with few benefits (Reveiz, Cardona, & Ospina, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the prescription of antibiotics for these symptoms was discouraged, based 
on the limited RCT evidence. 
 
ICC developed a protocol for how to extract and weigh evidence from different sources. 
The “Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Review” (revised in March 2011) laid out how 
to determine the validity of results. Risk of bias was regarded as a key concern. Bias as 
systematic error could appear in multiple ways: selection, performance, detection, 
attrition, and reporting (cf., TABLE 4). 
 
TABLE 4: Classification scheme for bias 
Type of bias Description Relevant domains 
Selection bias Systematic differences between 
baseline characteristics of the groups 
that are compared 
Sequence generation, 
Allocation concealment 
Performance bias Systematic differences between groups 
in the care that is provided, or in 
exposure to factors other than the 
interventions of interest 
Blinding of participants and 
personnel 
 
Detection bias Systematic differences between groups 
in how outcomes are determined 
Blinding of outcome 
assessment 
Attrition bias Systematic differences between groups 
in withdrawals from a study 
Incomplete outcome data 
Reporting bias Systematic differences between 
reported and unreported findings 
Selective outcome reporting 




TABLE 4 is meant as a tool for systematic reviewers to gauge the quality of an individual 
RCT, with a focus on internal validity. RCTs may still exhibit several biases despite 
using randomized assignment. First, selection bias occurs when systematic differences 
exist between baseline characteristics of the groups that are compared. Randomization of 
participants typically minimizes this bias; however, if randomization is not properly 
performed due to irregularities in the sequence generation or weak allocation 
concealment, selection bias may still prevail. Second, performance bias can happen when 
no blinding is used, which means that participants and personnel know who is in the 
treatment group and who is in the control group. However, blinding is often not possible 
for invasive treatments such as surgery. Blinding is hardly feasible for educational and 
international development interventions, and thus perception bias could result. Third, 
detection bias may arise from not blinding outcome assessment data, which could result 
in recorders observing outcomes more favorably for treatment subjects than for control 
subjects. Forth, attrition bias could occur due to the withdrawal of participants who are 
different from the average person in the treatment and control groups. Therefore, the 
original average similarity of characteristics between treatment and control subjects 
would not hold, thereby reducing the internal validity of findings. Finally, reporting bias 
arises from selectively reporting outcomes. Systematic differences between reported and 
unreported findings exist. These differences suggest that significant findings are more 
likely to be reported. 
 
Note that TABLE 2 was concerned with biases beyond those regarding internal validity, 
including external validity. Recall that the evaluation theorist Ernest House argued that 
randomized drug trials had been among the “most biased evaluations” (House, 2008, 
416). Commercial pharmaceutical trials are more likely to exhibit such biases to enhance 
positive findings and reporting. For example, RCT usage did not prevent drug sponsors 
from engaging in opportunistic choices that might favorably influence RCT findings. 
 
Such a classification scheme of biases is useful for determining the evidence level of 
medical findings beyond just internal validity, which has been shown to be the primary 
indicator of efficacy in federally approved drugs. Such schemes would also be beneficial 
 
 57 
when using RCT findings in the fields of education and social development. Due to the 
impossibility of blinding, for instance, performance bias is of great concern for any RCT 
in the evaluation of educational and social programs. The study subjects may change their 
perceptions and behaviors based on the fact of whether they were selected to be in the 
treatment or control group. Randomization at the community or school level may 
mitigate the problem of changing self-perception. Then, however, the sample size must 
be increased several times to obtain statistically significant results, based on fewer, 
randomly assigned units. The number of research units directly affects p-values and 
effect sizes. Therefore, careful considerations of the pilot size are required to obtain valid 
and policy-relevant results. 
 
4. Relaxing the medical RCT model to influence future regulatory 
policy? 
In the field of medicine, discussions about RCTs have encompassed both negative and 
positive reactions from academics and clinicians since their occurrence in the 1940s 
(Straus & McAlister, 2000, 387). The resistance to using RCTs for determining 
effectiveness, however, has been weaker in medicine than in other policy areas. 
Nevertheless, there has still been a sizable group within the medical profession that has 
been skeptical about the privileged status of RCTs.  
 
The following section first reviews criticisms of the RCT model raised by ethicists, 
philosophers, and clinical professionals. It then features voices from regulatory agencies 
in the United Kingdom and the United States that have distanced themselves from the 
privileged status of RCTs and that argue for a more integrated approach to medical 
science. The section concludes by describing how the Comparative Effectiveness 
Research movement illustrates the practical need for a more comprehensive science in 
medicine to answer fundamental questions—especially regarding personalized medicine 
tailored to an individual patient’s needs. 
 
Critical responses to the RCT model in medicine from within 
Even RCT-supporters caution against the uninformed use of RCTs. Archibald Cochrane, 
for example, praised the RCT as a “beautiful technique, of wide applicability, but as with 
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everything else there are snags” (Cochrane, 1971, 22). For example, by its very nature 
statistical significance may lead to wrong conclusions; a significance level of five percent 
would necessarily generate one misleading result out of twenty. In addition, large studies 
with large sample sizes may achieve statistically significant results with only small 
effects, which may be clinically unimportant (ibid., 23). Those considerations would be 
important in the critical appraisal process of the literature. 
 
In particular, there has been much subjective judgment surrounding the selection of 
research subjects or surrounding the measurement categories of drug effectiveness. Table 
2 summarized the different opportunistic choices in pharmaceutical RCTs, such as when 
choosing a comparison treatment or patient characteristics. The oncologist W. Hilbe 
highlighted the potential for optimizing results via inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
patients to participate in clinical trials (Hilbe, 2010, 1). It is known that narrowly targeted 
treatment groups typically improve the efficacy and precision of RCT results. In 
particular, younger subjects tend to participate in trials whereas the elderly are often 
excluded in RCTs (Simon, 2001, 940). The narrower the target group of an RCT, the less 
its results can be extrapolated to other individuals (Simon, 2001, 940). This practice of 
excluding certain populations could lead to a point where the tested drugs could only be 
applied to a minority of patients unless clinical physicians engaged in off-label 
treatments. 
 
The occurrence of biological variation within the human species has hampered attempts 
to extrapolate evidence from the study population to other individual patients (Straus 
& McAlister, 2000, 388). Clinical uncertainty exists about applying the right treatment to 
the right patient at the right time (Conway & Clancy, 2009, 328). Which interventions are 
most effective for which patients under which circumstances? Conversely, how is an 
individual’s response different from the average patient in a trial? RCTs are not the best 
tool to answer these questions of “particularization” because they deal with the “average 
patient” and they do not generate an understanding of the reasons for the differences in 
outcomes within the study group (Bluhm, 2005, 537). In order to make an informed 
decision about a particular patient, the medical practitioner would need additional 
knowledge of biological factors that might influence drug effectiveness. The “bare 
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bones” approach of experimental methodology does not suffice for delivering this 
knowledge (Will, 2007, 87). This type of information about underlying biological 
mechanisms, however, comes from biological research and observational studies, which 
EBM typically ranks lowest on its evidence hierarchy. Thus, uncovering the “causal 
stories linking exposures with health outcomes” might become an important contribution 
to experimental research (Bluhm, 2005, 543). Based on this line of thinking, the theorist 
Robyn Bluhm favored a combination of experimental and observational laboratory 
research for providing additional evidence to understand drug and intervention effects. 
 
EBM, which has generally adhered to an experimental evidence hierarchy (cf., TABLE 3), 
faced critics from its beginnings in the 1990s. From a more ethical-institutional 
perspective, the medical ethicist Howard Brody and his coauthors reviewed arguments of 
“enemies” and “friends” of evidence-based medicine (Brody et al., 2005). Brody and 
coauthors identified one major criticism—i.e., that EBM had shifted the focus of 
medicine from the individual patient to a larger population (Brody et al., 2005, 570). 
Population research is primarily concerned with average results obtained from large 
groups of people. Although the unit of analysis is the individual, RCTs produce average 
effects for the average patient rather than for the individual patient. The estimation of a 
drug’s effect in a study population does not necessarily translate to one individual. It is 
therefore often unclear whether an RCT finding can be applied to a particular individual 
patient. 
 
Regarding RCTs and individual decision-making, Brody and colleagues outlined the 
common argument that the EBM model favoring RCTs does not offer the choice of 
treatment to the individual patient as research subject. In particular, the nature of 
randomization does not allow individuals to make a choice as to whether to be in the 
treatment or the control group. Few physicians want to randomly assign treatment to 
patients, to forgo the individualization of therapy, or to withhold promising new therapies 
from a particular patient (Kaptchuk, 1998, 1723). 
 
From a profession’s point of view, the increased focus on RCT evidence had denigrated 
clinical expertise and undermined the shared physician-patient decision-making process 
 
 60 
(Brody et al., 2005, 574; Straus & McAlister, 2000, 389). Brody and colleagues argued 
that shifts in power and authority triggered certain criticisms of EBM. Medical clinicians 
had trusted first-hand clinical experience and had sometimes favored interventions 
without strong reliable evidence to support the interventions. They tended to overestimate 
the actual variations among individual cases when they made judgments based on 
individual clients (Brody et al., 2005, 571). The EBM model does not favor clinician’s 
opinions and observations—a fact Cochrane had already stated in 1971.  
 
Brody and colleagues observed that some EBM practitioners, sponsors, and bureaucrats 
uncritically accepted the RCT as a sole source of evidence, while rejecting all other forms 
of evidence (Brody et al., 2005, 570). This so-called “crude EBM model” elevated the 
RCT to a nearly sacrosanct status served as a straw man for critics (Brody et al., 2005, 
573). This meant that supposed allies of EBM misrepresented the EBM model and 
opened it to criticism. Brody and colleagues stated correctly that EBM supporters might 
have simplified and misrepresented the true nature of EBM, and therefore, critics easily 
pointed out the deficiencies in the currently practiced EBM and its reliance on 
experimental evidence. However, Brody et al. do not sufficiently address shortcomings of 
EBM in their article. In particular, they left out the issue of RCTs’ inability to address 
questions surrounding the causal mechanisms of the treatment process.  
 
New developments in regulatory medicine: a shift away from the privileged RCT? 
The U.K. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has been a major 
trend-setter in medical research and policy. Its chair, Sir Michael Rawlins, pointed out 
several limitations of randomized controlled trials (Cuthbertson, 2008). Rawlins argued 
that RCTs have limited external validity because they are typically used for "specific 
types of patients for a relatively short period of time." In medical practice, however, 
treatments would be needed for a wider variety of patients and for longer periods. For 
example, RCTs would often exclude comorbid patients, despite the fact that the average 
patient often has more than one illness. RCTs with patients having heterogeneous 
characteristics, however, were more likely to produce insignificant results. Restricting 
RCTs to a narrow set of patient characteristics would increase the likelihood of finding 
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statistically significant positive results. Drug sponsors would therefore have minimal 
incentive to choose more heterogeneous populations. 
 
Rawlins stated that RCTs had been put on an "undeserved pedestal" (Cuthbertson, 2008). 
He questioned the status of RCTs at the "top of hierarchies.” His metaphor of the pedestal 
refers to a vertical concept of evidence assessment, in which there would be a clear 
winner at the apex. As Rawlins argued, "hierarchies are illusionary tools for assessing 
evidence" (Cuthbertson, 2008). A danger was that "hierarchies would attempt to replace 
judgment with an over simplistic, pseudo-quantitative assessment of the quality of the 
available evidence." As a result, decision makers would adopt an "entrenched position 
about the nature of evidence," which would influence and dominate how medical 
decisions are made. Rawlins suggested that the concept of hierarchies should no longer 
be used as a heuristic tool. In a similar way, Bluhm had argued against an experimental 
hierarchy of evidence generation. She suggested different hierarchies for different types 
of clinical questions, and she argued that observational studies should be given more 
attention. Rather than lumping those into one sub-standard level, Bluhm argued for a 
more distinctive categorization of observational evidence, such as cohort studies and 
case-control studies (Bluhm, 2005, 536). Likewise, Rawlins recommended that RCT 
hierarchies “should be replaced by a diversity of approaches that involve analyzing the 
totality of the evidence base" (Cuthbertson, 2008). For example, observational studies 
including historical controlled trials and case-control studies could be important sources 
of evidence. Rawlins, who is from the U.K. Institute of Health, may well become a 
trendsetter for modifying the RCT-laden evidence hierarchy. Similar concerns can be 
heard in the United States. 
 
Voices within the U.S. Food and Drug Administration had also questioned the current 
dominance of RCT in medical innovation in several speeches. Margaret Hamburg, the 
U.S. Commissioner of Food and Drugs, expressed an interest in a personalized medicine 
in which the right therapies are tailored to the right people (Hamburg, speech, February 
25, 2010). Personalized medicine is about understanding that people differ in their 
genetic makeup, their environment, and their lifestyle; and these differences are critical 
factors in the individuals’ diseases and how these individuals respond to therapies. For 
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example, genetic markers can indicate possible benefits of certain therapies, as in cancer 
patients. 
 
In the context of personalized medicine, Hamburg rethought the level and kind of 
evidence needed for drug approval and design of drug trials (Hamburg, speech, February 
25, 2010). She called for more flexible standards of product evaluation and optimization 
of clinical trial designs (Hamburg, speech, May 15, 2010, Hamburg, speech, October 13, 
2010). For Hamburg, a science-based regulatory agency, such as the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, would need to rethink its currently inefficient drug approval procedure. 
Results of unsuccessful clinical randomized trials in the past might be revisited through 
the lens of new biomarkers. New diagnostics might turn such RCTs into positive findings 
for subpopulations of responders with certain genetic markers (Hamburg, speech, 
February 25, 2010). In a speech to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Hamburg remarked that “to strengthen the international clinical trial 
paradigm” would also mean to look “beyond the randomized controlled trial” to 
additional approaches for ascertaining safety and efficacy (Hamburg, speech, September 
27, 2010). Hamburg quoted observational studies that rely on the use of a medical 
product in the course of a medical practice, as well as meta-analyses, post-marketing 
surveillance, and data-mining techniques (Hamburg, speech, September 27, 2010). 
Hamburg pointed out new clinical trial methodologies that could balance methodological 
rigor with the need for more rapid and more targeted answers. For example, Hamburg 
suggested studying smaller populations than those studied in traditional RCTs. This 
would be possible by using modeling and simulation techniques and by applying 
statistical methodologies and protocol designs for using real-world data from registries 
and healthcare databases (Hamburg, speech, October 13, 2010). 
 
The call for observational studies and statistical modeling of real-world data reflects a 
shift within scientific thinking in medicine. As FDA Commissioner, Margaret Hamburg 
has been a frontrunner in what might become commonly accepted standards and 
knowledge in the future. This could go hand in hand with a devaluation of the RCT, or, 
expressed positively, in a reconsideration of other methodologies—including 
observational studies– that the RCT movement had dismissed in the past. New advances 
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in alternative methodological approaches might have contributed to the renewed interest 
of these methodologies. For example, new insights into genetic markers that directly 
influence patients’ reactions to certain therapies might not need to rely on results from 
large-scale clinical trials. 
 
There is a general question of how to produce knowledge in medicine. Policy makers and 
researchers in the United States consider Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) as 
potentially being a more relevant approach to knowledge generation and dissemination in 
medicine than RCT-centered EBM research with zero-treatment control groups. The 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included in the U.S. economic stimulus 
supported CER and led to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Centered Research Act of 2009 
(Conway & Clancy, 2009, 328, 330). CER is a variety of Evidence-Based Medicine 
(EBM), but with important differences. CER precludes an immediate adoption of an 
evidence hierarchy, and it does not necessarily privilege RCTs over all other methods. 
CER thus provides greater methodological flexibility and includes pragmatic trials in 
routine clinical practice, observational findings, and modeling. CER also focuses on 
subgroup analysis; RCT researchers, in contrast, avoid subgroup analysis in most cases, 
or they might only use it cautiously because the original random assignment did not take 
place according to those subgroups (Simon, 2001, 942). The goal of CER is to ensure 
external validity by focusing on characteristics of subgroup populations (Tanenbaum, 
2009, 976, 977). CER also attempts to address the common exclusion of heterogeneous 
patients from RCTs (Tanenbaum, 2009, 977).  
 
It is too early to judge whether the new movements of personalized medicine and 
comparative effectiveness research will have a lasting impact on the medical science and 
policy. In general, the renewed attention to the value and challenges of RCTs has been a 
productive process that addresses relevant policy questions relating to individual patient 
care. 
 
Outlook: Learning from the medical field about RCT use 
Many stakeholders in education and international development policy view the privileged 
status of the RCT model in medicine as a desirable situation for their own discipline, thus 
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hoping to gain more credibility and authority for their own actions. However, they tend to 
overlook the challenges of the RCT model even within medicine, though they could 
potentially benefit from understanding how the medical field addressed such challenges. 
 
One challenge, for instance, is the appropriate timing of RCTs, thought they have had a 
long tradition in the medical sciences. If all chemical compounds were tested by an RCT, 
the medical scientists would rarely find positive results. Instead, they are tested in 
preclinical, then phase 1, and phase 2 trials, all of which often rely on non-experimental 
observations. Only then, the few promising chemical compounds will be tested in large-
scale RCTs (phase 3). Medical RCTs are thus timed in later stages of the evaluation 
process. In education and international development, however, timing is often a neglected 
issue. This may result in premature RCTs, similar to what occurred in the Salk 
Poliomyelitis trial, where initial observational results were not available. Therefore, 
sufficient pretrial indications of a program’s possible effectiveness are needed before an 
RCT could be deliberated for determining program effect. 
 
A second challenge is evaluating negative side effects. Early on, medical RCTs have not 
only been concerned with effectiveness, but also with safety and side effects. The 
Streptomycin trial of 1948 did not yet systematically assess the negative side effects such 
as impaired physical coordination and vision. But since the 1962 Drug Efficacy 
Amendment, the FDA has been equally concerned with drug safety and drug efficacy. 
Evaluating negative effects of interventions, however, has not been at the forefront in 
education and international development.. Their underlying assumption is that 
interventions have either a positive or zero effect, but not a negative effect. This is a 
mistaken belief, especially when an intervention is compared head-to-head with another 
intervention, which is rarely done.  
 
A third challenge, which occurs in invasive medical treatments such as surgery, is dealing 
with an unblinded study population. Knowledge about what group the patients belong to 
may affect their perception and spontaneity and thus influence trial results. Blinding is 
hardly feasible for educational and international development interventions. As I 
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illustrate in the next chapter, the Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) trial was 
not blinded, a fact which could have influenced the teachers’ motivation to teach.  
 
These three challenges are examples of how applying RCTs in medicine could also 
inform RCT evaluations in education and international development. In the next chapter, 
I analyze how the U.S. education system has attempted to make the RCT the privileged 
method for evaluating federal education programs. Certain challenges of medical RCTs 
apply even more to the educational field, where the tested population comprises students 
instead of patients, and the treatments are comprehensive programs instead of drugs. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE MEDICAL RCT MODEL IN EDUCATION 
POLICY 
RCT advocates in education often point to important successes of clinical trials in 
medical research, such as the Streptomycin and Poliomyelitis trials (cf., chapter 2). 
However, their portrayals of these uses of RCTs typically gloss over challenges important 
to these methods even in their best cases. These challenges prove to be even more 
difficult in education. I show that, in particular, the limited representativeness and 
generalizability (cf., appendix) of RCT findings have posed major roadblocks to policy 
development in education.  
 
In this chapter, I take a closer look at three areas where the RCT model influenced 
education research and policy: first, the Student Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment 
in Tennessee; second, the National Reading Panel’s adaptation of the RCT-based medical 
model; and third, the Reading First initiative’s struggle to implement RCT-backed policy. 
In all three cases, applying the RCT model proved to be difficult. Providing a more 
nuanced view of these cases may help policy makers discern appropriate lessons for 
education policy and inform their future quests for scientifically-based policy making. 
 
I begin in the first section by considering the influence of the Student Teacher 
Achievement Ratio (STAR) experiment in Tennessee, which has been the poster child for 
the possibility of successful RCTs in education. As a pilot, STAR faced challenges in 
producing policy-relevant findings and in applying these findings to other contexts. The 
California Class Size Reduction Program illustrates how the extrapolation of findings 
from the STAR pilot failed in the new context of a statewide initiative. Despite these 
setbacks, policy makers and researchers have cited the STAR experience in the quest to 
champion rigorous RCT research in education policy. 
 
In the second section, I shed light on the federally-mandated National Reading Panel 
(NRP) and its attempts to adapt the medical RCT model for evaluating reading research 
from 1998–2000. NRP’s work inspired RCT-based meta-reviews in education and in the 
work of the federally funded What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) in order to guide local 
decision making in education. The direct influence of the WWC on educational practice, 
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however, proved to be minimal, which raised questions for federally-imposed standards 
in the schools. 
 
In the third section, I discuss the Reading First initiative, which was dogged by political 
and commercial biases. These setbacks demonstrate how a scientific policy basis does not 
automatically guarantee scientific implementation. Like the California class-size 
reduction program, the federal Reading First initiative illustrates the difficulties in 
applying evidence-based research in education practice. The micropolitical realities that 
stemmed from the RCT movement resulted in an ineffective federal policy. 
 
In all three cases, the use of the RCT model in education was less successful than in 
medicine. This was due in part to the nature of the education field, which includes the 
complexity of educational interventions and their context, and the inability of blinding 
the trial participants. 
 
I conclude the chapter by discussing the controversy over the Federal Priority of RCT 
designs in evaluating education projects between 2003 and 2005. The controversy 
illustrates that the move toward RCTs was not without resistance. In particular, 
professional organizations such as the American Evaluation Association saw a need to 
curb this movement because they anticipated negative consequences, such as ideological 
redirection of funding. Although initially their resistance was unsuccessful, the federal 
government eventually moved to a more inclusive approach. This example shows how 
the methodological pendulum, which had swung far from the center, ultimately returned 
to a less polarized position. I argue that the limited relevance of RCT results for policy 
makers was the primary motivating factor in steering to a more inclusive position. 
 
1. The Tennessee Student Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment: 
how a pilot trial influenced state policy and its unintended consequences 
Many education researchers regarded the Tennessee Student Teacher Achievement Ratio 
(STAR) trial in 1985–89 as a prominent example that RCTs would be useful in 
identifying effective educational interventions. Donald Orlich from Washington State 
University called STAR “one of the most significant educational research [projects] done 
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in the U.S. during the past 25 years” (Orlich, 1991, 632). The statistician Frederick 
Mosteller found that STAR was “one of the most important educational investigations 
ever carried out and illustrates the kind and magnitude of research needed in the field of 
education to strengthen schools” (Mosteller, 1995).  
 
STAR findings had a large influence on policy-making as well. Eighteen states including 
California showed a great interest in the STAR findings and implemented changes based 
on the findings (Boruch, de Moya, & Brooke, 2002). Even the federal government 
supported class size reductions; its 1999 federal budget contained 12 billion dollars over 
seven years for class size reduction purposes (Hoxby, 2000, 1239). The important role 
that the STAR trial had in research and policy warrants a closer look, raising questions as 
to what lessons could be learned in the current debate about the value of RCTs. 
 
The context of STAR: Policy and science 
The STAR experiment took place in the wake of new federal and state interests in 
reducing the achievement lag of economically disadvantaged students. For the first time 
in U.S. history, Congress appropriated federal funds for local school districts serving 
disadvantaged children through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 
1965.11 The goal was to alleviate educational disparities as part of the “Great Society” 
and “War on Poverty” (Vinovskis, 2002, 122). Until then, education had been funded 
primarily at the local level through property taxes, levies, and bonds. To stem public 
criticism that states would squander these newly appropriated funds, ESEA mandated the 
evaluation of newly implemented education programs. States had to demonstrate that the 
federally-funded programs promoted educational achievement by submitting reports 
containing “information relating to the educational achievement of students participating 
in [federal] programs” (ESEA, sec 206a6). How states developed evidence for 
educational achievement and what methods of data gathering and analysis they used were 
left to their discretion. 
 
                                                 
11
 89th United States Congress (April 11, 1965). Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Public Law 89-
10, 79 Stat. 27. 
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Around the same time, the psychologists Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley formalized 
the RCT approach for the social sciences in their monograph, “Experimental and Quasi-
experimental Designs for Research” (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Oakley, 2000). 
Campbell and Stanley acknowledged the difficulty of applying purely experimental 
designs to social interventions. They cited the Perry Preschool project in the 1940s as a 
successful use of RCTs to assess educational outcomes. Campbell and Stanley 
established a classification system of research designs based on the degree of internal 
validity, i.e., the ability to attribute causal effect of interventions without bias. The 
authors argued that any deviation from the RCT would reduce internal validity, and they 
therefore recommended making every effort to design research studies that adhered as 
much as possible to the RCT specifications. 
 
In the widely-distributed handbook “Evaluation: A Systematic Approach” (1979), the 
evaluation theorists Peter Rossi, Howard Freeman, and Sonia Wright made strong use of 
Campbell and Stanley’s approach. They characterized the randomized or “true 
experiment” as the optimal evaluation design, which reflected prevailing beliefs in the 
evaluation profession. The authors noted how great their impact was in establishing 
RCTs as the sine qua non in experimental research:  
There is almost universal agreement among evaluation researchers that the 
randomized controlled experiment is the ideal model for evaluating the 
effectiveness of public policy. If there is a Bible [sic!] for evaluations, the 
Scriptures [sic!] have been written by Campbell and Stanley (1966), along with a 
revised version by Cook and Campbell (1976). The “gospel” of these popular 
texts is that all research designs can be compared more or less unfavorably to 
randomized controlled experiments, departures from which are subject to varying 
combinations of threats to internal and external validity (Rossi, Freeman, & 
Wright, 1979, 183). 
 
In the Campbell and Stanley tradition, researchers argued that non-randomized trials in 
education had led to misleading results in the past; they blamed unscientific evaluation 
designs for compromising policy makers’ ability to determine program impact 
(Brookings Institution, 1966; Rossi, 1972). They concluded that educators had been 
largely left in the dark as to which classroom and school-wide practices would lead to 




The “Nation at Risk” report by the National Commission of Excellence in Education 
called for the need for rigorous education planning (The National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983). The controversial report argued that mediocrity in 
education had led the United States into decline in economic competition with other 
countries, especially the Soviet Union. Based on the report, the U.S. Department of 
Education released an annual wall chart showing how well each state was doing in 
education (Vinovskis, 2002, 130). The perceived decline in schooling quality led to state 
reforms, including more school days, longer days, more tests, stricter graduation 
requirements, merit pay, and higher teacher qualifications, inter alia (Cuban, 1988, 342). 
The Tennessee education legislation was part of these education reform efforts. However, 
there was not enough political support for funding class-size reduction across all 
elementary schools—a feat that would have cost the state $42 million a year (Ritter 
& Boruch, 1999, 115). The sponsor of the bill, Representative Steve Cobb, suggested a 
pilot, which reduced the costs from $42 to $5 million a year (ibid., 116). In May 1985, 
the Tennessee legislature passed a bill authorizing the funding for a “demonstration 
project … in order to study effects of a reduced pupil-teacher ratio on the achievement of 
students in public schools.”12 According to the STAR project leader, STAR “was almost 
a way of putting off spending the money” required for class size reduction (Ritter 
& Boruch, 1999, 119). This intuition may have been correct because Tennessee never 
actually enacted the class-size change, despite the positive STAR findings four years 
later. 
 
Design and findings of the STAR experiment 
The version of the bill signed into law made no reference to an RCT (Ritter & Boruch, 
1999, 117). The Tennessee Education Agency gave researchers from four Tennessee 
universities the freedom to design the study according to their ideas. In the spirit of 
Campbell and Stanley, STAR researchers Finn and Achilles pointed out the confounding 
issues present in previous correlational studies and non-randomized controlled studies on 
class size (Finn & Achilles, 1990). Several meta-analyses of class-size reduction had 
reported only small-scale studies that were primarily observational (Glass & Smith, 
                                                 
12
 An Act to amend the Tennessee Code Annotated (1985), Title 49, Chapter 3, relative to incentives for 
class size reductions, Section 1. 
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1979). These analyses triggered an extensive debate over the class-size effect. The STAR 
researchers saw a need for evidence for substantial and consistent positive outcomes and 
argued that, on the issue of class size, ultimately “only randomized experiments can 
provide a definitive answer” (Finn & Achilles, 1990, 558). Thus, they designed STAR as 
a large-scale, longitudinal RCT involving 11,600 students. Seventy-nine elementary 
schools participated, which equaled approximately one-sixth of all Tennessee elementary 
schools.  
 
The STAR authors found that a within-school design was an effective way of controlling 
for sources of variability between school settings (Finn & Achilles, 1990). Within each 
school, children entering kindergarten were randomly assigned to three class types: small 
classes (13–17 students); regular classes (22–25 students); or regular classes with a 
classroom teacher and a teacher aid. Teachers were also assigned at random to these 
classes. Every class remained the same type for four years from 1985 to 1989. After the 
third grade, all students returned to regular-size classes. To alleviate parents’ concerns, 
half of the regular-class students in kindergarten were randomly reassigned to teacher-
aide classes when they entered first grade, which confounded the teacher-aid classes with 
regular classes. The state did not mandate special training for teachers, and schools 
continued to operate as usual.  
 
The researchers used the Stanford Achievement Tests (SATs) in reading and mathematics 
as outcome measures. They also administered an academic motivation and self-concept 
instrument for evaluating small groups of students. A state-developed test for basic skills 
in reading and math was added beginning in first grade (Finn & Achilles, 1990, 561).  
Although the data stemmed from individual students, the class was the unit of analysis. 
The analysis included the calculation of means on each outcome measure for each class, 
followed with a disaggregation for white and minority students. According to the 
researchers, small classes in all four grade levels achieved higher test scores, and the 
effect of class size was similar across school locations (Achilles, report, January 1993, 3). 
The increased student achievement was both statistically and educationally significant. 
The “educational” significance derived from the “effect size,” i.e., how much the 
difference was relative to the standard deviation of student achievement. Generally, the 
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positive effect size for students in small classes ranged between .20 and .27 of the 
standard deviation (ibid.). Effect sizes favoring small classes ranged from .08 (in K) to 
.40 (in grade 3) for minority students. The advantage of being in a small class was greater 
for non-white students than for white students, with average effect sizes of .35 instead of 
.15. STAR reduced the achievement gap between white and non-white students from 14 
percent to 4 percent in the STAR pilot (Finn & Achilles, 1990, 568). The small-class 
advantage was 1.5 months for reading and 2.5 months for mathematics on the grade 
equivalent scale (Finn & Achilles, 1990, 567). The study also found that the positive 
effects from early student participation in small classes remained pervasive two years 
after the students had returned to regular-size classes, with an effect size of .11 to .22 of a 
standard deviation (Achilles, report, January 1993, 4–5). The economist Alan Krueger 
reanalyzed the STAR data and found that a 10 percent reduction in class size for three 
years raised scores by about 13 percent of a standard deviation (Krueger, 2000).  
 
Discussion of the STAR experiment 
The STAR experiment posed several challenges: self-selection of schools, unblinded 
assignment to treatment and control classes; narrow scope; and no explanation of why 
reduced class size was more effective. All these challenges most likely affected the 
generalizability and usefulness of the results. Despite these challenges, undue 
generalizations about class size reductions were made. 
 
First, the schools did not represent a random sample of Tennessee elementary schools. As 
in medical trials, STAR used volunteers and exclusion criteria, and suffered from 
attrition. Only one-fourth of the schools volunteered to participate. Schools with a higher 
percentage of minority students elected to participate, introducing a self-selection bias. 
Schools had to serve at least 57 students at a grade level and had to provide sufficient 
physical space (Achilles, report, January 1993, 2). Thus, small and overcrowded schools 
were excluded from the STAR experiment (DeAngelis, 2003, 3). Only 55% met the 
eligibility requirements. Furthermore, approximately 20 percent of students in STAR quit 
each year, leaving less than half of the original student body by the end of the four years 
(Hanushek, 1999). Attrition was correlated with disproportionately low performing 
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students and thus may have positively affected the sample. Self-selection and attrition 
had implications for the population to which those results could be generalized. 
 
Second, unlike many medical experiments, the assignment to treatment groups was not a 
blind process. Instead, teachers knew what class size they taught; that is, the actors in the 
experiment were knowing participants. According to the economist Caroline Hoxby, the 
participants’ knowledge was the biggest flaw of the study and hence tended to work 
towards achieving desired outcomes. The problem of participant knowledge occurs if 
participants support one intervention over another, which might influence their way of 
participation. As Hoxby wrote, “the schools in the class size experiment may realize that 
if the experiment fails to show that the policy is effective, the policy will never be 
broadly enacted” (Hoxby, 2000, 1241). Even if schools did not intend to influence policy 
making, teachers and principals might have expected that students in smaller classes 
would perform better, and thus their prior expectations may have affected their own 
participation. Classroom-teacher motivation may have influenced teaching efforts. Also, 
parents had a clear preference for smaller classes, and some may have lobbied to have 
their children transferred to the smaller classes (Hanushek, 1999). Pilot projects, such as 
STAR, may appear to have productivity effects that they might not occur if fully enacted 
(Hoxby, 2000, 1241). Hoxby claimed that natural experiments were superior because 
they varied class size, but would not vary incentives. The main advantage would be that 
participants would not be aware of being evaluated. It would be important that research 
mimicked the incentives that exist under real policies (Hoxby, 2000, 1281). 
 
Third, the STAR findings were narrow in scope: the study used average class sizes of 16 
versus 24. Conclusions whether other degrees of reductions would increase student 
achievement could not be made. While the overall result suggested a move toward 
smaller classes, it was unclear what the ideal number would be in terms of pairing the 
size of the instructional unit and the teaching task (Achilles, report, January 1993, 8). 
Benjamin Bloom had posed the “two-sigma problem, ” which assumed that one-on-one 
tutoring was most effective for knowledge acquisition and that a decrease in one-student 
increments also increased the learning effectiveness (Bloom, 1984a; Bloom, 1984b). The 
question was where the ideal cut-off was for maximizing student learning and minimizing 
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resource allocation—a question that the STAR experiment could not answer. This 
problem is similar to the dosage issues of medications in clinical trials. The concept of 
optimal dosage to maximize benefits and minimize harm translates to education as 
maximizing student achievement versus minimizing costs. In either case, policy makers 
must judge how to balance the two sides. As in the Streptomycin trial, one RCT alone 
could not answer the question about optimal dosage; more trials would be needed.  
 
Fourth, the experiment was not able to answer the question of why and under what 
instructional conditions small classes work best (Finn & Achilles, 1990, 575). Possible 
explanations were teacher enthusiasm and satisfaction, more individual teacher attention 
to students, and higher engagement of students in learning activities. The so-called black 
box remained in place regarding the processes underlying class-size reduction. 
Qualitative-interpretive approaches could have helped open the black box. 
 
Despite these challenges, STAR became a “poster child” of RCTs. Hanushek argued that 
too much emphasis was placed on one single experiment (Hanushek, 1999, 149). One 
principle of scientific experimentation is that results should be confirmed several times in 
different contexts before being accepted (Mishes & Rothstein, 2002, 2). This is especially 
true when the evaluation has not determined the underlying processes of the effects. Even 
if the STAR results had been valid, policy conclusions were drawn that go beyond what 
STAR alone could show. In Hoxby’s mind, STAR interpreters extrapolated the results 
unduly (Hoxby, 2000, 1241). 
 
The STAR results, however, did not result in the intended policy change, such as state-
wide class-size reductions. Tennessee lawmakers implemented smaller classes for K–3 
students in merely 17 small rural districts and, later in 1992, mandated class sizes of a 
maximum of 20 for K–3 grades—not the 16 student maximum used by STAR (Ritter 
& Boruch, 1999, 119). According to the 2002 book “The Class Size Debate,” the STAR 
experiment did not ultimately settle the debate over class size (Mishes & Rothstein, 
2002). As author Jennifer King Rice noted, even with the STAR experiment, the 
literature had offered little closure or clear directions for policy makers who considered 
investments in smaller classes (King Rice, 2002, 90). Although the quality of the 
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statistical results of STAR was high, divergent interpretation of the results and of their 
implications arose. The debate illustrated how the same evidence could lead to different 
conclusions. On the one hand, researchers confirmed the intuition of teachers that class 
size mattered, and some argued that the added cost was worthwhile. On the other hand, 
some researchers argued that the gains would not justify the costs. John Folgers, one of 
the key STAR investigators, argued that the 25 percent added cost in educating 
elementary students would not justify the achievement gains. He referred to other school 
reform efforts, such as “Success for All,” that were more cost-effective than reducing 
class size. Even the original sponsor of the bill, Steve Cobb, found the results 
disappointing. Given the resource constraints, Cobb asked: “How much for how much?” 
(Ritter & Boruch, 1999, 120) Eric Hanushek lamented that the costs of broad class-size 
reductions were rarely compared to other potential uses of funds (Hanushek, 1999, 144), 
which would have followed the tradition of the medical comparative effectiveness 
research (cf., chapter two). Hanushek argued that grades 1 to 3 did not benefit much from 
class-size reduction, and thus STAR as implemented was an inefficient use of funding 
(Hanushek, 2002). Hanushek concluded that class size reduction was a political decision 
based on voter support and preconceived policy proposals, but that it was not based on 
scientific evidence (Hanushek, 2002, 62). Hanushek’s method of meta-reviewing prior 
research was controversial, however, and his criticism should only be taken cum salo 
granis. 
 
These debates lead to questions about how much evidence policy decision makers need 
before they apply findings to help improve schooling (Zigler, 1992). There is indication 
that class size reductions help, but two questions remain surrounding the implementation 
of smaller classes: With what costs, and under what circumstances is class-size reduction 
advised? The STAR experiment could not readily answer these questions. More 
interpretive-observational and cost-effectiveness approaches were needed to adequately 
address these questions. 
 
California’s Class Size Reduction initiative and its unintended consequences 
STAR-results inspired California lawmakers who were concerned about their students’ 
performance on the 1994 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Fourth 
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graders ranked last place in reading among 39 states that participated in the NAEP 
(Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 2002, 4). At that time, California elementary schools had the 
largest class size in the country, averaging 29 students. A task force assembled by the 
California Department of Education called for smaller classes—a move strongly favored 
by teachers’ unions and parents alike. New tax revenue from the dot-com boom allowed 
the implementation of these changes. The state legislature passed Senate Bill 1777 in 
1996, which aimed at cutting class size from an average of 29 students to a maximum of 
20 (Mishes & Rothstein, 2002, 3). School districts that chose to participate in the 
program, which was voluntary, received about $850 for each K–3 student enrolled in a 
small class. In addition to funding at the student level, the state also offered facility grants 
(Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 3). The school districts implemented the Class Size 
Reduction (CSR) program quickly, with urban, high-minority districts lagging behind due 
to facility constraints (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 5). The state of California phased in 
the initiative over three years to K–3 classes, starting with first grade. 
 
The California Education Department established an evaluation consortium, which 
included the American Institutes of Research and the RAND Corporation. They 
attempted to retroactively determine whether CSR had increased student achievement. 
Their challenge was to analyze observational data. Although STAR was an RCT, the 
statewide implementation of CSR did not allow for a randomized control study, and 
comparisons could only be made to previous years. During these years, California also 
implemented other policy changes, such as a stronger system of accountability. Therefore 
achievement changes could not be attributed solely to class size reduction. California 
used the Stanford Achievement Test 9, initiated a few years prior. The evaluators found 
an increase in achievement across the board. However, the evaluators determined that the 
relationship between average achievement scores in the new statewide testing program 
and the CSR initiative was inconclusive. Researchers expected test score increases after 
the implementation of a new test (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002). 
 
Despite the missing evidence on academic improvement, the evaluators reported that the 
CSR initiative in California was an enormously popular program among elementary 
parents and teachers (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 8). Local educators and parents 
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seemed to value reduced class sizes for reasons beyond improved achievement as 
measured by statewide test scores (Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 2002, 8). 
 
The evaluation reported several shortcomings and recommendations. The evaluators were 
not able to determine what type of changes in classroom teaching would be needed to 
maximize the benefits of the reform. Therefore, they suggested more research 
determining which classroom practices were most effective in small classrooms, and 
whether these practices differed from best practices in larger classes (Stecher 
& Bohrnstedt, 2002, 11). The evaluators recommended calculating the real cost of CSR 
and that the state provide adequate resources for CSR (Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 2002, 9). 
They also recommended improving the effectiveness of the CSR program by integrating 
and aligning it with other reforms, such as the state’s new standards-based policies 
(Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 9). Based on the evidence from the Tennessee STAR 
experiment, they recommended targeting additional resources to urban, high-minority 
schools (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 10). They suggested creating and evaluating pilots 
with smaller class sizes (e.g., 15 students). Moreover, the state could compare the 
effectiveness of the current CSR program with alternative CSR designs by allowing a 
small number of school districts to use their CSR funding to create randomized trials of 
other small class size arrangements (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 11). The CSR 
evaluators promoted the idea of comparative effectiveness research in class-size 
evaluation. 
 
Discussion of education policies based on pilot experiments 
The Tennessee STAR project directly inspired the California Class Size Reduction 
initiative (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 3). However, there were significant differences 
between STAR and California’s CSR, which may explain the differences in impact. The 
CSR evaluators advised against regarding CSR as a replication of the STAR experiment; 
they advised judging CSR on its own terms (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 3). A key 
difference was that the California initiative was not a pilot project, but a statewide 
program. Whereas STAR involved 6,500 students per year, CSR served 1.8 million 
students statewide. As a result of CSR, the number for K–3 teachers in California 
increased by 46 percent. The demand for credentialed teachers outpaced their supply and 
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led to an inequitable distribution of credentialed teachers (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 
6). The number of teachers with less than three years of experience increased 
significantly from one out of five to one out of three teachers (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 
2002, 40). The proportion of teachers without full credentials increased from 1.8 percent 
before the initiative to 15 percent in 2000–01 (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 2). In schools 
with economically disadvantaged students, on average 21 percent of teachers were not 
fully credentialed in 2000–01. In contrast, all of the new teachers hired for the STAR 
experiment in Tennessee were fully certified (Finn & Achilles, 1990). Another possible 
difference may have stemmed from teach education and training, given that many 
teachers had graduated from universities within their respective state.  
 
Whereas STAR reduced class sizes from 24 students down to an average of 15, 
California reduced class size of 29 to 20 students. The STAR research could not 
determine the gradation level necessary to improve academic achievement. It only 
provided answers to a decrease of 7 students from a class size of 24. It was unclear 
whether a decrease of 9 students to 20 students had a similar effect, as in the case of 
California. STAR had confirmed through prior research that a class size of 15 students 
was more effective than a class size exceeding 20 students (Glass & Smith, 1979). The 
student populations between STAR and CSR students also differed significantly: 
California served a much more ethnically and linguistically diverse student population 
than did Tennessee.  
 
Another important difference was the funding levels between STAR and CSR. Whereas 
Tennessee carried the full cost of teachers, California only gave an $850 supplement to 
each individual student. This amount did not cover the cost of the added hires. Schools 
and districts had to reallocate funds from other programs to support the implementation 
for CSR (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 2). Two-thirds of districts reported that the state 
reimbursement for CSR was insufficient to cover actual district costs. Funding was 
reallocated from music and arts, gymnastics and sports, professional development, 
computer labs, libraries and after-school programs (Stecher & Bohrnstedt, 2002, 8). In 
addition, many California schools did not have the necessary space available for the CSR 
program. They had to reallocate space such as libraries, stages, and other rooms used for 
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various purposes. CSR was a more realistic scenario than STAR, because some schools 
had to reallocate existing funds rather than benefit from new added funds. Had CSR 
allowed for randomization across schools, this condition would have allowed for 
comparative effectiveness research. For example, one could have answered the question 
as to whether financial resources would have been more effectively used in reducing 
class size rather than, say, providing professional development for teachers. 
 
The STAR experiment compared class-size reduction to regular classrooms. It did not 
concurrently compare multiple interventions which would require the same amount of 
funding, such as providing a fixed amount for class size reduction versus for increasing 
the school year. Therefore, comparative cost-effectiveness analysis was not possible, 
which would help policy makers answer the question how to spend a fixed amount most 
effectively—in light of limited and competing public budgets. 
 
Furthermore, calculations of the benefits of class-size reduction, given the estimated 
changes in future earnings, were difficult. For instance, given that all Tennessee 
graduates would be better educated if the pilot were to be implemented statewide, the 
earning levels might not change much. Expanding the program to a larger population may 
not result in the expected earnings due to other variable changes, such as increased 
supply of better-educated workers. 
 
The California initiative illustrated how statewide programs differ from pilot projects. 
Had Tennessee implemented their pilot experiment statewide, a shortage of teachers and 
space would have been anticipated. The experiment excluded overcrowded schools. The 
state did not provide additional funding for facilities in their pilot experiment. Therefore, 
it is unclear how STAR would have fared as a statewide initiative. California was 
inspired by Tennessee, but did not implement STAR findings. One reason for this was 
that California’s average class size was five students higher than Tennessee’s. A 
reduction to 15 students would not have been financially feasible, as costs of education 
would have increased by maybe as much as another billion dollars and would have 




The examples of Tennessee and California illustrate the difficulties with extrapolating 
findings and applying them from one setting to another. Just the fact that California 
serves a much larger and more diverse student population than Tennessee makes a 
comparison difficult. The philosopher Nancy Cartwright pointed out that the California 
initiative produced unintended negative consequences, concluding that generalizations 
from experimental settings, such as STAR, might end up in deficient policy solutions 
(Cartwright & Munro, 2010). Cartwright highlighted the difficulties of generalizing from 
RCTs in the way STAR had: Too often, the temporal-spatial and contextual constraints of 
an RCT barred generalizations to different geographical and temporal settings. 
 
Unfortunately, California decided not to implement a pilot study. However, a pilot study 
would not guarantee that findings would produce meaningful results. For one, a pilot 
study would not have triggered resource problems such as teacher shortage, as STAR 
illustrated. Therefore, extrapolating findings from a pilot intervention to a large-scale 
program is not straight forward. The problem of generalizability from a pilot project to 
the general population had been illustrated in the 1950s by the Salk trials (cf. chapter 2). 
The oversight of the vaccine production process was less stringent, given the exponential 
increase in demand for that vaccine. As a result, the vaccine products used in the Salk 
trial and in the general distribution differed. This problem of re-applying pilot findings is 
even larger in educational systems with more factors to consider. The composition of a 
drug is much less complex and subjective than the composition of a teaching 
environment. Drugs can be produced more quickly than teachers, school buildings, or 
other infrastructure. A vaccine can be administered in minutes, whereas a teaching 
intervention takes months. Facility requirements are different as well. All these additional 
factors in education make the application from a select pilot population to a general 
population much more difficult in education than in medicine. 
 
Note that within the field of education, class-size reduction is a comparatively simple 
intervention, because only the student-teacher ratio is changed. No immediate changes in 
the curriculum, teaching methods, or teacher training took place in the STAR experiment. 
The following discussion of reading interventions demonstrates the greater challenges of 
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2. The National Reading Panel’s RCT-guided standards of evidence: 
how the medical model influenced research standards in education 
One of the primary debates in education policy during the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administration was how students should be taught to read. As with the debate over class-
size reduction, researchers and policy makers looked to RCT findings to settle the debate. 
In contrast to a class-size intervention, a reading intervention is more complex, because it 
requires a substantial change in the student-teacher interaction: Different instructional 
approaches, new teaching materials, and professional development for teachers may be 
necessary ingredients to implement a reading program. There are also many different 
ways for constructing a curriculum, teaching reading, or training teachers. It proved to be 
challenging to determine what type of reading programs would improve reading 
achievement most effectively. 
 
Reading First was a product of the increasing culture of accountability in education as 
enforced by statewide student achievement tests. In 1994, the newly implemented 
National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP) found that 69 percent of African 
American and 64 percent of Hispanic-American fourth graders tested below basic reading 
levels set by NAEP.13 The statistics sent a message to policy makers that a reading 
problem existed among America’s school children (Song, Coggshall, & Miskel, 2004, 
446). The concern for the problem of reading ability spanned partisan divides (Song et 
al., 2004, 449). In his 1997 State of the Union address, President William J. Clinton 
suggested a “national crusade for education standards” (Clinton, February 4, 1997). He 
stated that forty percent of eight-year-old students could not read and, therefore, that “we 
must do more to help all our children read.” To respond to the so-called “national reading 
crisis,” in 1998 the U.S. Congress passed the Reading Excellence Act (REA).14 As part 
                                                 
13
 National Report Card, retrieved from www.http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard. 
14
 105th United States Congress (October 21, 1998) Reading Excellence Act. A part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations and Emergency Supplemental Act. Public Law 105-277. 112 Stat. 2681. 
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of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, the U.S. 
Congress allocated $260 million for competitive grants to state education agencies for 
local low-income schools to implement scientifically based reading instruction (Sweet, 
2004, 21). REA included a definition of scientifically based research (SBR), synthesized 
from various sources by staff from the House Education and Workforce Committee 
(Eisenhart & Towne, 2003). The final bill defined SBR as “systematic, empirical 
methods that draw on observation or experiment” (112 Stat. 2681-393). The law regarded 
experimental and observational methods as scientific. Conversely, the federally mandated 
National Reading Panel’s report of 2000 limited the concept of “scientific” to 
experimental and quasi-experimental research, which then influenced the 2001 NCLB 
law. 
 
The National Reading Panel’s utilization of the RCT-guided medical model 
In 1997, the U.S. Congress mandated the establishment of a National Reading Panel 
(NRP) “to assess the status of research-based knowledge, including the effectiveness of 
various approaches to teaching children to read” (NICHD, 2000, 1-1). Congress asked the 
National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), part of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), to convene such a panel.15 NICHD had produced 
reviews on reading difficulties in the past (Coles, 2003, 12), and NIH had a long history 
of using scientific panels to resolve empirical controversies. It was the first time in 
history that such a panel was created for education research (Shanahan, 1999). NICHD 
was a natural choice in convening and managing such a panel for an education 
controversy. The charge left open what to base the assessment on.  
 
When the NRP bill was introduced in the Senate, Duane Alexander, NICHD director and 
medical doctor by training, testified with the following: 
“I think that it is important to point out that our [NICHD’s] intensive research 
efforts in reading development and disorders is motivated to a great extent by our 
seeing difficulties learning to read as not only an educational problem, but also a 
major public health issue. Simply put, if a youngster does not learn to read, he or 
she will simply not likely to [sic] make it in life” (Alexander, testimony, June 19, 
1997). 
                                                 
15
 The justification for increasing funding for NICHD in Congressional Record House (November 7, 2007). 
Conference report on H.R. 2264, Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and 





Alexander made the case that a reading problem is a public health issue. In a legislative 
hearing, Reid Lyon from NICHD argued, that “NICHD considers reading failure a 
national public health problem,” (Lyon, testimony, October 26, 1999). In another 
instance, he argued that “NICHD considers that teaching and learning in today’s schools 
reflect not only significant educational concerns but public health concerns as well” 
(Lyon, testimony, March 8, 2001). Both Alexander and Lyon from NICHD compared 
reading problems to health problems, and reading interventions to health interventions.  
 
Similarly, when NRP chair Langenberg presented the NRP report to Congress, he 
testified that:  
“No physician would normally subject a patient to a treatment or a drug whose 
efficacy had not been proven in rigorous scientific testing, and we should expect 
no less of a teacher subjecting a student to the curricular content or a teaching 
methodology” (Langenberg, testimony, April 13, 2000).  
 
Langenberg drew parallels between education treatments and medical treatments, 
teachers and physicians, and education testing and medical testing. From this perspective, 
it made sense to use the methodological standards of medicine also in the field of 
education. 
 
In NRP’s inaugural meeting in April 1998, one agenda point was the “review of models 
of methodological approaches” for analyzing research (NRP meeting minutes, April 24, 
1998). Alexander described two medical models for reviewing and evaluating research 
findings—the Cochrane Collaboration Model and the Best Evidence Synthesis Model. He 
emphasized their possible relevance for analyzing literature outside the medical field. 
Both models put the RCT at the top of the evidence hierarchy, in line with the approach 
of Evidence-Based Medicine (cf., chapter 2). 
 
The NRP explicitly adopted the medical model to evaluate research. Like medical 
research, the panel developed a set of rigorous methodological standards for searching, 
selecting, and analyzing research. In the panel report’s own terms: “The evidence-based 
methodological standards adopted by the Panel are essentially those normally used in 
research studies of the efficacy of interventions in psychological and medical research” 
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(NICHD, 2000, 5). In a similar vein, the panel’s chair, Donald N. Langenberg from the 
University of Maryland, stated the following during the official presentation of the NRP 
report to the Committee on Appropriations on April 13, 2000:  
“I think the most important thing the Panel did was what it did next, and that was 
to develop a set of rigorous methodological standards to help them screen the 
research literature relevant to each topic. Those standards are essentially those 
normally used in medical and behavioral research to assess the efficacy of 
medications, medical procedures, or behavioral interventions” (Langenberg, 
testimony, April 13, 2000). 
 
As evaluators had determined in the case of the medical model, the Panel determined the 
RCT to be the best evaluation design in education. Following the RCT, quasi-
experimental methods were judged to be a merely “acceptable” standard to answer causal 
questions. In contrast, the panel found descriptive and correlational research ill-suited for 
making any causal claims (NICHD, 29). Qualitative studies would primarily deepen the 
understanding of how things worked (Shanahan, 2004, 244). The report’s addendum 
stated accordingly: 
“The highest standard of evidence for such a [causal] claim is the experimental 
study, in which it is shown that treatment can make such changes and affect such 
outcomes. Sometimes when it is not feasible to do a random experiment, a quasi-
experimental study is conducted” (NICHD, 2000, 29).  
 
Therefore, the panel included in their review process only reading programs that used an 
RCT or a quasi-experimental design with a control group (ibid., 5); they automatically 
screened out evaluation designs using interpretive and qualitative methods. The Panel 
thus distinguished three grades of evidence: 
 
TABLE 5: Hierarchy of evidence of the National Reading Panel (2000) 
Grade Type of Evidence 
Highest standard of evidence Experimental studies [=RCTs] 
Acceptable standard of evidence Quasi-experimental studies 
No claim of evidence Correlational and descriptive studies 
Source: Adapted from the NPR summary report (2000, 29) 
 
In their attempt to review existing literature on effective reading instruction, the reading 
panel’s underlying assumption was that a dichotomy existed between experimental 
studies, on the one hand, and observational and qualitative studies, on the other hand. The 
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panel member Timothy Shanahan granted that medical researchers had also used 
correlational evidence for some determination of causal claim (e.g., the relationship 
between cigarette smoking and lung cancer). These correlations would not serve, 
however, as the only evidence for lung cancer. Animal studies, for example, had 
experimentally tested the causal connection between smoking and lung cancer as well. 
Shanahan also argued that those medical correlations were produced in much more 
“sophisticated” ways than traditionally done in reading research (Shanahan, 2004, 247). 
He justified the exclusion of qualitative studies on the grounds that, without persistent 
observations, these studies were generally not rigorous, and only exploratory in nature 
(Shanahan, 2004, 243). 
 
Alexander argued that the methodology developed for the literature analysis was a major 
contribution to the field of literacy research (NRP meeting minutes, October 19, 1998). 
The NRP saw their emphasis on how to systematically construct evidence as a major 
advancement over previous reviews such as the National Research Council’s (NRC) 
review on summarizing effective reading research (Snow, Burns, & Griffin, 1998). The 
NRC consensus report “Preventing Reading Difficulties in Young Children” did not 
include clear guidance on selecting methods for their review. According to the NRP 
member Timothy Shanahan, reading policy and practitioners’ choices had been an 
“idiosyncratic affair—with each researcher or practitioner making his or her own 
decisions about the implications of research” (Shanahan, 2004, 235). 
 
In 2000, NRP released their review “Teaching Children to Read—An Evidence-Based 
Assessment of the Scientific Research Literature on Reading and Its Implications for 
Reading Instruction” (NRP, 2000). They concluded that instruction in phonemic 
awareness, phonics, fluency, vocabulary, and comprehension—as well as increased 
teacher education—all improved a student’s reading achievement. The panel found 
insufficient evidence to conclude positive effects for reading technologies and for 
strategies of encouraging children to read, and thus they recommended conducting more 




Discussion of the National Reading Panel’s findings 
Although the National Reading Panel attempted to use the medical model for producing 
scientific standards and findings, they struggled with adapting it to the field of reading 
research. First, they selected the review topics without clear guidance; second, they 
screened out 99 percent of the existing reading literature; third, they struggled to make 
meaningful recommendations based on the few studies; and finally, they were not 
protected from commercial bias. 
 
Difficulties in applying the medical model to the education model stemmed from inherent 
differences between the two fields themselves. Medical interventions are often discrete. 
The Tuberculosis trial of 1948, for example, only involved Streptomycin as an active 
drug and addressed a biological problem, i.e., the spread of a bacterium (cf., chapter 2). 
In education, however, an intervention comprises many components that are often 
difficult to standardize. The teacher has a special role, not only in deciding on the 
particular treatment like a physician, but in directly influencing a child’s learning. There 
are infinite amounts of variations in teaching how to read.  
 
First, NRP selected the review topics without clear guidance. Granted, their task was 
almost unmanageable. Whereas Drug Efficacy Study in 1969 had struggled in reviewing 
300 distinct chemical formulae (National Research Council, 1969; cf., chapter 2), the 
National Reading Panel was faced with more than 100,000 studies due to the 
heterogeneity of reading interventions. To make the task manageable, the panel had to 
limit their work to a few topics. This process of selecting topics was less systematic and 
much more qualitative-interpretive in nature than the establishment of the evidence 
standards. The meeting archives demonstrate that the panel considered approximately 30 
topics for review at the beginning (Shanahan, 2004, 237). The panel then voted which 
topics to examine and settled on the eight topics that received the highest number of 
votes, but “those selections were not uniformly agreed to” (NRP meeting minutes, 
October 29, 1998). These topics resembled the areas identified by the 1998 National 
Research Council report, which the NRP attempted to supersede (Snow, Burns, & 
Griffin, 1998). The panel’s focus on phonemic awareness as an important component, for 
example, was a claim based on the convictions of just a few panel members (NRP 
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meeting minutes, September 10, 1998). Later, the panel identified an additional twelve 
areas to possibly include in the review, but then dropped their proposal due to limited 
time (NPR meeting minutes, November 9–10, 1998). What subgroups and topics were 
selected in the first place, however, influenced the final panel findings. A more 
systematic selection process would have made the final pillars of literacy instruction less 
accidental in their choice. 
 
The panel member Joanne Yatvin pointed out that many areas were left out, such as 
research on the relationship between reading and writing, language development or the 
understanding of print (Yatvin, 2000). Other researchers also had concerns about 
excluded topics, especially the influence of writing, motivation, and home experiences on 
reading (Shanahan, 2004, 240). Granted, the panel report stated that it did not consider 
the chosen topics to be the only topics of importance in learning to read; the omission did 
not mean that those topics were irrelevant for reading instruction (NICHD, 2000, 3). The 
panel simply lacked the resources and time to study all possible issues in reading 
(Shanahan, 2004, 241). This statement is of high concern given that the choice of topics 
would influence the nature of the findings. Had the panel picked other topics, the report 
would have most likely found pillars of reading instruction different from the ones 
recommended. Furthermore, some studies were not meta-analyzed because they were so 
diverse that the panel “lacked the time to provide the kind of detailed analysis that they 
deserved” (Shanahan, 2004, 253). Resource and time constraints are common in a policy 
context. This situation raises the question, however, of whether additional time and 
resources would have changed or would have just refined the final findings of the review. 
If time and resource constraints affected the findings, the panel could only produce 
recommendations, constrained by and subjected to contextual demands. Such constraints 
might lead to less than “objective” findings. 
 
Second, by using the medical RCT model, the panel’s review was reduced to a small 
percentage of existing studies. Their focus on (quasi-)experimental studies pruned the 
number from 100,000 possible studies to approximately 320 studies, which amounted to 
less than one percent of the eligible studies. The fact that most qualitative studies seemed 
flawed did not justify their untested exclusion. In the end, the process excluded a large 
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branch of educational research prematurely. Although the (quasi-) experimental lens 
made the reading panel’s task manageable, the large amount of excluded literature might 
raise questions about whether a different selection process may have changed the panel’s 
findings. One problem was that RCTs were unevenly spread across the range of reading 
interventions. Whole-language and balanced reading approaches had undergone fewer 
RCTs than phonics programs (Sweet, 2004, 29), a problem pointed out by The Economist 
(Economist, February 28, 2002, 73). These RCT-sparse programs were automatically 
excluded from the review process. The panel did not recommend interventions with 
insufficient RCT evidence, which did not mean that these interventions were ineffective; 
they were simply unproven. One important question for policy makers is: What evidence 
and how much of it do they need for promoting a policy intervention? Does it have to be 
experimental evidence of the most rigorous nature? Or would it be sufficient to relax the 
definition of evidence? 
 
Third, the NRP was unable to identify why certain reading strategies were successful. 
Such information was necessary for making evaluation results relevant for wider use. 
They reviewed RCT studies that primarily compared average effects of final outcomes, 
but not why those took place. Studies under review sometimes varied several variables at 
once. In one case, the treatment group had a lower student-teacher ratio than the control 
group, so the study might have demonstrated effectiveness in reducing class size rather 
than in a specific reading intervention (Coles, 2003, 47). In another study, the treatment 
group received individual tutoring on learning word skills and writing, while the controls 
were tutored as a group without learning word skills and without writing (Coles, 2003, 
81). The different intervention outcomes could be attributed to one of several factors, and 
the reviewed evaluation study could not identify which causal claims were correct. In 
these cases, the so-called black box of the underlying processes of reading 
comprehension was not opened. The inclusion of more qualitative studies might have 
answered questions about why certain types of instruction were more successful than 
others. As pointed out in chapter 2, this problem of black-box evaluations also 
accompanies medicine. RCTs drug studies cannot determine why a drug is effective. 
However, since the interventions are much more discrete, i.e., a single drug is tested, the 
question about why a drug works is less relevant. Since reading interventions usually 
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combine many components, it would be important to identify the underlying process of 
how they work in order to successfully replicate them. 
 
A related criticism about relevance was that the panel ignored contextual factors, which 
made their findings less relevant. The panel member Yatvin complained that in most 
cases they did not consider “school and classroom realities” that would make certain 
types of instruction difficult to implement (Yatvin, 2002). She argued that many research 
findings were abstract, and it was unclear whether they were immediately useful in the 
classroom. Austin Bradford Hill had already recognized the problem that RCT findings 
might not be easily applied to the “general run of patients” (cf. chapter 2). 
 
Despite their insistence on using an experimentally rigorous approach, the NRP made use 
of qualitative-interpretive reasoning in their review process. Meta-analysis itself required 
qualitative reasoning, especially when the materials were heterogeneous, hard to 
compare, and scarce: “Where there were too few studies that satisfied the panel’s criteria 
to permit a meta-analysis, the panel made a decision to conduct a more subjective-
qualitative analysis to provide the best possible information about an instructional topic” 
(NICHD, 2000, 5). Contrary to critic Elaine M. Garan’s claim that the studies themselves 
were of qualitative design (Garan, 2002), it was the meta-analysis itself that was of a 
qualitative-interpretive nature. The panel relied on interpretive skills to come to its 
conclusions. This was especially the case in the area of reading comprehension, where 
the reviewed study findings were not homogeneous (NICHD, 2000, 5). The NRP did not 
explain, however, how they utilized qualitative reasoning to arrive at their conclusions. 
 
Finally, some argued that the findings were predetermined—a criticism similarly levied 
at the commercial bias in medical evaluations (cf., chapter 2). The panel member Joanne 
Yatvin found that “all the scientist members held the same general view of the reading 
process” and that they agreed on a “hierarchy-of-skills model” of learning to read without 
debate (Shanahan, 2004). Another widely-held reading model was the constructivist or 
holistic view of reading, which only one of the fifteen panel members supported. 
NICHD’s preference for “experimental” researchers may have stemmed from the medical 
context, within which NICHD operated (such as being an entity of the National Institutes 
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of Health). Yatvin, Garan, and others pointed out some panel members’ ties to 
commercial reading programs such as McGraw-Hill’s Direct Instruction and thus had 
vested interests in the outcome of the report, professionally and financially (Garan, 2002, 
77). Garan drew the lines of influence among panel members, the Bush Administration, 
and the publisher McGraw-Hill, who had been a major publisher of reading textbooks. 
Harold McGraw, the chairman of McGraw-Hill, had close ties to Bush’s Texas 1994–
2000 governorship and was on the board of the Barbara Bush Foundation, and McGraw-
Hill authors helped guide the Texas reading initiative.16 McGraw-Hill was able to 
increase its market share to 37 percent of the Texas market in K–3 literacy textbooks and 
enter other states such as California, where his textbooks served half of the schools under 
the Reading First program (Garan, 2002, 80; Coles, 2003, 77). Although these financial-
political ties would not automatically lead to biased evaluations, they coincided with the 
panel’s findings. 
 
The NRP’s influence on the What Works Clearinghouse 
The National Reading Panel’s summary report became a model for research syntheses on 
other topics (Olson & Viadero, Education Week, January 30, 2002). In 2002, the U.S. 
Department of Education established the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC), a public-
private partnership institution to be a source and tool “to provide educators, policy 
makers, researchers, and the public with a central, independent, and trusted source of 
scientific evidence about‚ what works in education” (Institute of Education Sciences, 
May 17, 2003). WWC attempted to promote the “coordination, development, and 
dissemination of scientifically valid research in education” (Cook & DeMets, 2008, 8). 
The WWC was designed as a tool similar to the review process of the Federal Drug 
Administration. In the legislative hearing on the authorization of DOE’s research arm, 
Grover (Russ) Whitehurst, the Assistant Secretary for Educational Research and 
Improvement, envisioned the revolution that had taken place in medicine in the last fifty 
year to “take substantially less than 50 years to get it accomplished in education” 
(Whitehurst, testimony, June 25, 2002). The proposed WWC would help in this effort. 
                                                 
16
 While Texas students increased their passing rate on the statewide reading test, they did not on the 
National Assessment for Educational Progress in reading (Coles, 2003, 117). This could be an indication 
that Texas was not the poster “education miracle,” but that schools might have taught to the statewide 
multiple-choice test to improve reading scores. 
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According to the frequently asked questions and answers on the early WWC website, 
NCLB moved the testing of educational practices toward the medical model (U.S. 
Department of Education, August 2, 2002). The WWC set clear criteria for including and 
excluding primary evaluations in the review. Similarly to the NRP’s review criteria (cf., 
TABLE 5), the handbook distinguished three grades of evidence, summarized in the 
following table: 
 
TABLE 6: Hierarchy of evidence of the What Works Clearinghouse (2008) 
Grade Type of Evidence 
Meets evidence standards (strong evidence) Well-designed and well-implemented 
RCTs with low attrition 
 Meets evidence standards with 
reservations (weaker evidence) 
RCTs with high attrition17 or 
designs with equivalency and low attrition 
Does not meet evidence standards 
(insufficient evidence) 
Designs with equivalency and high 
attrition or designs without equivalency 
(regression discontinuity and single case 
studies not determined yet) 
Source: Adapted from the What Works Clearing House Handbook (2008) 
 
The handbook identified RCTs as the only type of evidence to meet the highest level of 
evidence: “Currently, only well-designed and well-implemented randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) are considered strong evidence, while quasi-experimental designs (QEDs) 
with equating may only meet standards with reservations.” 18 The core concern was the 
equivalence of a comparison group. The evidence hierarchy automatically excluded non-
experimental evaluations, i.e., evaluations without equivalent comparison group. 
 
The DOE’s WWC has functioned as a review filter for (quasi-)experimental evaluation in 
education since 2004. In general, the WWC has been a catalyst in distributing RCT 
findings in theory, rather than acting as an authority on education policy at the state and 
local level. The WWC may not have influenced educational practices as strongly as they 
had originally hoped to. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) surveyed 
                                                 
17 
High attrition is defined as an effect size of 0.05 of a standard deviation or more on the outcome variable. 
18
 Quasi-experimental designs make the assumption that the intervention and comparison groups are 
equivalent, based on observable characteristics. Their equivalency may not hold due to unobserved 




several states, their school districts, and schools on their utilization of the WWC reviews 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2010). One core problem was that WWC 
only found a few programs to be effective when employing the experimental evidence 
hierarchy. Therefore, school districts and education practitioners did not find the reviews 
useful for their curriculum planning. The experimental legacies of No Child Left Behind, 
the USDOE experimental priority, and the WWC reviews have made marks in the 
evaluation discourse in the United States and may also have fanned RCT movements in 
European countries such as the United Kingdom. 
 
The NRP members could not have anticipated the report’s significance in the creation 
and implementation of national policies. In fact, just when the NRP had started its work 
in 1999, panel member Timothy Shanahan stated:  
"Some of my colleagues think that the National Reading Panel is a kind of 
slippery slope—they fear that it creates a dangerous precedent that will be hard to 
live with. The NRP's reliance on quantitative, experimental results, they 
sometimes argue, makes it possible to conclude that only certain types of research 
evidence have value and, therefore, the federal government might decide to fund 
only work based on such research paradigms. I think this argument is far-fetched. 
In any event, the government has never explicitly set such methodological limits 
in the past, even in fields such as medicine, where research findings have long 
been used to establish standards of practice" (Shanahan, 1999).  
 
Shanahan’s cautionary statement illustrates that the NRP report’s influence was quite 
unpredictable. Although the panel did not set methodological limits for federally-funded 
education research, policy makers used its work as an exemplary way to generate 
evidence. In this way they justified the new demands for experimental research design. 
 
3. Reading First: how the call for evidence-based research 
materialized in practice 
The Reading First initiative was a central piece of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
legislation.19 Reading First attempted to utilize the evidence provided by the National 
Reading Panel and implement their findings in the classrooms. However, the ideal of 
scientifically based reading instruction manifested itself as commercial bias. 
                                                 
19 
107th United States Congress (January 8, 2002). No Child Left Behind Act of 2001; Public Law 107-110, 




Scientifically based research and government control: the context of the Reading 
First initiative 
NCLB, the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,20 
focused on, among other things, the achievement lag experienced by economically 
disadvantaged and minority students. The overarching goal of Reading First was to 
improve students’ reading achievement. Like many preceding initiatives, the program 
intended to close the achievement gap in reading among schools serving economically 
disadvantaged students. The stated goal was to help these low-income schools adopt 
strategies “that have been proven to prevent or remediate reading failure,” grounded on 
scientifically based reading instruction. As mandated by the NCLB (Title I, Part B, 
Subpart 1), Reading First provided grants to states for establishing reading programs in 
kindergarten through third grade. The legislators expected that these reading programs 
would help students make significant progress on standardized tests toward state-defined 
reading proficiency by third grade.  
 
The implementation of Reading First cost five billion dollars in its five years of operation 
from 2002 to 2006. To justify these expenses, states had to demonstrate that their 
programs were anchored in scientifically based research. NCLB and its Reading First 
program regarded scientific evaluations as a means to uncover ineffective education 
programs, contributing to the achievement gap. Through its legislation, the federal 
government attempted to fund only scientifically based education programs. What NCLB 
meant by scientifically based research (SBR) was initially unclear. At one place, the law 
defined SBR as 
 “research that is evaluated using experimental or quasi-experimental designs in 
which individuals, entities, programs, or activities are assigned to different 
conditions and with appropriate controls to evaluate the effects of the condition of 
interest, with a preference for random-assignment experiments, or other designs to 
the extent that those designs contain within-condition or across-condition 
controls.” (Sec. 9101) 
 
Within NCLB, the Reading First section did not include this experimental definition of 
what counts as SBR in education, but instead refers to “empirical methods that draw on 
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observation or experiment” (Sec 1208). Based on the different definitions in the NCLB 
legislation, the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) commissioned the National 
Research Council to publish a report about the meaning of the term “scientifically based 
research.” The report concluded that the experimental nature of science in education and 
of science in other fields was substantially similar:  
”Ultimately, we failed to convince ourselves that, at a fundamental level beyond 
the differences in specialized techniques across the individual sciences, a 
meaningful distinction could be made among social, physical, and life science 
research, and scientific research in education. At times, we thought we had an 
example that would demonstrate the distinction, only to find our hypothesis 
refuted by evidence that the distinction was not real” (Shavelson, Towne, & 
Committee On Scientific Principles for Education Research, 2002, 51). 
 
The USDOE used the more rigorous interpretation of scientifically based education in 
their Reading First implementation, based on NRP’s medical model. According to a 
USDOE guidance document, reading instruction was “an area where some of the best and 
most rigorous scientifically based research is available” on “what works” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2002, 1). USDOE further stated that “program effectiveness 
has been shown through an experimental design that includes experimental and control 
groups created through random assignment or carefully matched comparison groups” 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2002, 44). This call for experimental methods influenced 
the way states implemented Reading First. 
 
Reading First was a tricky initiative. The 1979 Department of Education Organization 
Act upheld the state and local sovereignty principle that did not allow the federal 
government to interfere with state-level and local decision-making. 21 This meant that 
USDOE officials were forbidden to exercise any control over the curriculum (DEOA, 
3403b). However, the federal government put the Reading First initiative in place to 
improve reading achievement via reading initiatives. How could the federal level not 
exercise any control, while at the same time counseling on evidence-based reading 
programs? Michael Sweet stated that it was unclear how to promote findings of scientific 
research without imposing the use of a specific textbook (Sweet, 2004, 25). Reading First 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 
89th United States Congress (April 11, 1965). Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Public Law 89-
10, 79 Stat. 27. 
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and No Child Left Behind were considered the “most prescriptive of any federal 
education law to date” and “pretty close to the edge of what the law allows” (Education 
Week, September 7, 2005). The U.S. Office of Inspector General confirmed the suspicion 
that the federal government overstepped their role in implementing reading programs in 
classrooms when upholding the state and local sovereignty principle. 
 
The Inspector General’s criticism of the implementation of evidence-based policy 
Based on public concerns about the federal interference in Reading First, Education 
Week made an open-records request to examine correspondence and documentation in 
the grant-approval process. They found federal interference in the process. Later, Robert 
Slavin, the co-founder of the education program Success for All, helped launch a federal 
investigation about the management of Reading First (Manzo, Education Week, March 6, 
2007). The federal Office of the Inspector General investigated the issue and then 
published several reports pointing out flaws in the implementation of scientifically based 
reading research (Office of Inspector General, 2006; 2007). First, the final report found 
that federal officials did not screen contractors for potential bias and conflict of interest. 
It also found that grant reviewers had significant professional connections to a teaching 
methodology that required the use of specific reading programs, in particular the Direct 
Instruction model and its Reading Mastery program (Office of Inspector General, 2006, 
17). Reading First contractors received royalties from private-sector textbook companies. 
This private-sector involvement biased Reading First consultants towards recommending 
literacy products to which they were financially tied. Michael Grunwald, from the 
Washington Post, characterized Reading First as a “pilot project for untested programs 
with friends in high places” (Grunwald, Washington Post, October 1, 2006). Reid Lyon 
from NICHD stated that the Reading First contractors were “actively working to 
undermine the NRP [National Reading Panel] Report and the RF [Reading First] 
initiatives” (Office of Inspector General, 2006, 18). Commercial bias guided the 
implementation of the Reading First initiative. 
 
The Inspector General’s investigators found the USDOE had influenced certain states’ 
selection of reading programs (Office of Inspector General, 2006, 2). Similarly, a report 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 
96th United States Congress (October 17, 1979). Department of Education Organization Act (DEOA). 
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from the U.S. Government Accountability Office also found that state officials reported 
receiving suggestions from federal education officials or contractors to adopt or eliminate 
reading programs (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). States did not always 
understand the monitoring procedures and the federal expectations. Kentucky and 
Georgia officials complained that a federal consultant had suggested they adopt a list of 
core reading programs to improve their chances of getting the Reading First grant 
(Education Week, 2005). The federal education department held seminars for state 
officials to help them understand the grant requirements. Three Reading Leadership 
Academies included panel discussions on reading research, where the majority of 
panelists represented Direct Instruction (Office of Inspector General, 2007, 8). Audience 
comments referred to the Academies as a “sales job,” a “sales pitch,” and a showcase for 
Direct Instruction (ibid., 9). Textbook companies who perceived themselves as not 
having federal approval complained that they were losing business because of the states’ 
misconception (Manzo, Education Week, March 6, 2007). According to the Inspector 
General, many states were under the perception that the Education Department had an 
approved list of commercial texts for implementing Reading First.  
 
The state of Michigan was the first state approved for Reading First funds. Michigan had 
proposed to adopt the five best-selling textbooks on the market (Michigan Department of 
Education, July 1, 2002). They used the University of Oregon’s “Consumers Guide for 
Evaluating a Core Reading Program Grades K–3,” which the Institute for the 
Development of Educational Achievement had developed. The main focus was on the 
five pillars of the National Reading Panel’s report: phonological awareness, phonics, 
fluency, vocabulary, and comprehension (ibid., 36). Similarly, a Reading First guidance 
document from the U.S. Department of Education explicitly stated that Reading First 
programs sought to “embed the [five] essential components of reading instruction into all 
elements of the primary, mainstream K–3 teaching structures of each State” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2002, 2). Federal officials recommended Michigan’s list to 
other states to use in their applications (Grunwald, Washington Post, October 1, 2006). 
As a result, the majority of the 4,800 Reading First schools had adopted one of five top-
selling commercial textbooks, according to the Washington Post (ibid.). There was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Public Law 96-88, 93 Stat. 668. 
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the hoped-for “dramatic shift” or “new generation” of evidence-based reading instruction, 
as devised by NCLB (Manzo, Education Week, December 12, 2006). Reading First 
schools favored products of large commercial publishers, seemingly because those were 
fastest to formally respond to the NCLB’s requirements (Grunwald, Washington Post, 
October 1, 2006). The previously market-dominant publishing companies were able to 
expand their market share. The publishers McGraw-Hill, Houghton Mifflin, Hartcourt, 
and Pearson accounted for 72 percent of the Reading First funding (Manzo, Education 
Week, December 12, 2006). The textbooks of those companies, however, provided little 
scientifically based research backing, as defined by NCLB, despite the federal call for 
evidence-based reading instruction. None of the textbooks had been evaluated using 
RCTs. 
 
The Inspector General pointed out a general problem of the Reading First initiative: How 
could the states establish the necessary “scientific base” of research, despite the fact that 
most reading programs had not demonstrated such a solid scientific base? The approval 
process worked via the adoption of the five key elements of effective reading instruction, 
endorsed by the National Reading Panel in 2000 (Sweet, 2004, 25). As long as the 
publishers emphasized their compliance with those key elements, they could make their 
case of being evidence based. States then recommended textbooks that demonstrated 
adherence to the five required essential literacy components (Manzo, Education Week, 
December 12, 2006). The idea behind Reading First, however, was that States not just 
check off the alignment with the key program components, but that they consider the 
scientific evidence of program effectiveness when evaluating reading research (Office of 
Inspector General, 2007, 17). Ultimately, the Reading First initiative attempted to 
implement a premature policy. It was as if the Federal Drug Administration had asked 
doctors in the 1950s to only prescribe RCT-based pharmaceuticals, despite the fact that 
pharmaceuticals had not yet been tested in that manner. Only a limited number of reading 
programs themselves had been tested and proven to be effective based on RCTs when the 
Reading First program began in 2002. The NRP found only one experimental evaluation 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of McGraw-Hill’s Open Court program. Ironically, 
Success for All later proved to have the strongest record of RCT evidence, but it was 
excluded from the Reading First initiative (Grunwald, Washington Post, October 1, 
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2006). Scripted, standardized textbooks like Open Court or Direct Instruction did not 
incorporate motivational and teacher-driven learning. However, these textbooks had been 
recommended by the subgroup report of the National Reading Panel, but they were not 
part of the five pillars of NRP’s summary report. In its subgroup report, the Reading 
Panel had cautioned that many phonics programs tended to “present a fixed sequence of 
lessons scheduled from the beginning to the end of the school year,” although early grade 
students varied greatly in their skills (NICHD, 2000, 2-97). Elaine M. Garan argued that 
commercial programs such as Open Court would be incompatible with the NRP 
recommendations due to their scriptedness (Garan, 2002, 32). Despite its quest for a 
scientific basis, the RCT movement seemed to have negatively affected the micropolitics 
of education by promoting commercial textbooks to local school districts without much 
evidence. 
 
Despite its problematic implementation, did the Reading First initiative increase reading 
achievement? The federal government set aside 2.5 percent of the Reading First budget 
for an external evaluation (Gamse & Jacob, 2008). Its main question was: “What is the 
impact of Reading First on student reading achievement?” Abt Associates was contracted 
to perform a five-year rigorous, scientifically valid, quantitative study. Because Reading 
First was a nationwide initiative, an RCT design was not feasible. Abt Associates chose a 
regression discontinuity design as the strongest quasi-experimental method (cf., 
glossary). They capitalized on systematic processes that some school districts used to 
allocate Reading First funds. The evaluators found statistically significant impacts on 
instructional reading time spent on the five essential components of reading instruction 
promoted by Reading First. However, they did not find a statistically significant impact 
on reading comprehension as measured by the Stanford Achievement Test 10 (Gamse & 
Jacob, 2008). Ultimately, the Reading First legislation did not bring the expected change 
and turnaround for America’s 40 percent of second-graders who were struggling with 




4. The Federal Priority of RCT designs in evaluating education 
projects and its controversy 
As in medicine, various groups challenged the RCT primacy in education. The No Child 
Left Behind Law of 2001 and its Reading First initiative fanned a debate about how best 
to make methodological choices to determine program impact. In particular, the U.S. 
Department of Education (DOE) proposed a priority of scientifically-based evaluation 
methods in November 2003 that cited the RCT as the best design for evaluating impact. 
Representatives of the evaluation community produced several counterstatements, neither 
of which ultimately influenced the DOE’s Final Priority in January of 2005. Only several 
years and a leadership change later, USDOE began to foster more inclusive thinking in 
line with previous critics. 
 
The proposed Federal Priority of RCT evaluations 
The USDOE published a notice of the Proposed Priority, “Scientifically Based 
Evaluation Methods,” in the Federal Register on November 4, 2003 (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2003). It was a new funding priority, consistent with the NCLB Act and based 
on the RCT as the optimal evaluation approach. In the funding allocation process, RCTs 
received the so-called “competitive preference priority.” This meant that when two 
evaluation designs were of comparable merit, USDOE would select the RCT design over 
any other design to answer questions of effectiveness. In other words, all other things 
being equal, USDOE would favor an RCT design over any observational-qualitative 
design. 
 
The Proposed Priority stated the following:  
Evaluation methods using an experimental design are best for determining project 
effectiveness. Thus, the project should use an experimental design under which 
participants—e.g., students, teachers, classrooms, or schools—are randomly 
assigned to participate in the project activities being evaluated or to a control 
group that does not participate in the project activities being evaluated (62446). 
 
The department suggested that the most rigorous methods to address the question of 
project effectiveness should be randomly assigned RCT designs. Moreover, if random 
assignments were not feasible, then the project might use a quasi-experimental design 
with carefully matched comparison conditions or a regression discontinuity design. The 
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priority given to RCT designs also meant that other designs would be ranked as less 
valuable or invalid for determining effectiveness. The priority stated: 
Proposed evaluation strategies that use neither experimental designs with random 
assignment nor quasi-experimental designs using a matched comparison group 
nor regression discontinuity designs will not be considered responsive to the 
priority when sufficient numbers of participants are available to support these 
designs (62446). 
 
The one reason for not using experimental and quasi-experimental designs was when the 
number of observations was too small and such a design was not feasible. In educational 
programs, however, sufficient numbers of students and teachers were generally available. 
USDOE thus established a hierarchy of methodological choices when determining the 
effectiveness of an educational program (cf., TABLE 7). 
 
TABLE 7: Competitive preference priority by the U.S. Department of Education 
Design Preference 
Experimental design/RCT Competitive preference priority 
Quasi-experimental designs (matched 




 competitive preference priority 
Non-experimental design No preference 
 
The Proposed Priority was an attempt by USDOE to narrowly define “scientifically-
based” research and evaluation in RCT terms, which was already the case in parts of the 
NCLB legislation. The Proposed Priority did not go well with many different 
stakeholders. The next section takes a closer look at the evaluation community’s 
response, which in itself was not in agreement. 
 
Criticism of the proposed federal RCT Priority 
The Department invited the public to submit comments regarding the Proposed Priority 
for thirty days until December 3, 2003. During the USDOE response period, the 
American Evaluation Association’s electronic list sparked a discussion on proof of 
causation. Former AEA president, Michael Scriven, posted the following comment: 
“Randomized control group trials (RCTs), even when possible, are NOT always superior 
to other approaches (non-RCTs) in demonstrating causality” (Scriven, Evaltalk, 
November 12, 2003). Scriven used the example of the causal effect of cigarette smoking 
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on lung cancer, which researchers had not experimentally demonstrated, but which 
nobody would question. Non-RCT studies were capable in establishing causal attribution 
“far beyond reasonable doubt” (Scriven, Evaltalk, November 12, 2003). Scriven argued 
that RCTs might be the best choice in complex cases, where the researchers would 
otherwise have to exclude many potential possible causes in order to establish causal 
attribution beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
AEA’s president Richard Krueger informed AEA members that AEA had sent a response 
to USDOE (Krueger, Evaltalk, November 24, 2003). Several past AEA presidents, such 
as Michael Scriven and Nick Smith, endorsed the statement. They questioned the 
Department’s privileging of RCTs over other evaluation methods. The AEA statement’s 
major argument was that RCTs were not the only way to determine causality. It referred 
to epidemiological evidence, such as that found in cancer studies, which were not based 
on RCTs. The statement emphasized the equal validity of single-subject, observational, 
quasi-experimental, and RCT designs. The authors did not subscribe to a hierarchy of 
methodological approaches, which the Federal Priority had proposed. 
 
The AEA statement argued that “the proposed priority manifests fundamental 
misunderstandings about (1) the types of studies capable of determining causality, (2) the 
methods capable of achieving scientific rigor, and (3) the types of studies that support 
policy and program decisions” (American Evaluation Association, November 25, 2003). 
It found that the RCT priority could lead to “political, ethical, and financial disaster” 
(ibid.).  
 
In the following discussion, I offer some observations as to how the AEA statement may 
have judged the limitations of RCTs unfairly. First, I address the suggested methods. 
Second, I address the issue of laboratory experiments. Third, I discuss the use of mixed 
methods in general. 
 
First, the AEA statement argued that in order to identify whether, how, and why a 
program worked, evaluators would not be able to rely solely on RCTs, but would rather 
need to draw upon a range of social science methods. Such methods include observations, 
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interviews, case studies, surveys, and other strategies to understand causality (American 
Evaluation Association, December 3, 2003). Note that three of these suggested 
strategies— observations, interviews, surveys—were all data collection methods, and not 
data analysis methods or evaluation designs. Because the RCT is an evaluation design, 
and not a data collection method, AEA did not suggest alternatives to RCTs, but rather 
supplementary tools. 
 
Second, the AEA statement argued that RCT approaches would only “examine a limited 
number of isolated factors that are neither limited nor isolated in natural settings.” The 
authors pointed out the “complex nature of causality.” As a result, RCTs would be “less 
capable of discovering causality than designs sensitive to local culture and conditions” 
(American Evaluation Association, November 25, 2003). Erroneously, the AEA 
statement may have re-cast the concept of RCTs as laboratory experiments rather than 
field experiments that take place by definition in natural settings. Field experiments may 
still suffer from some level of artificiality due to the research component (e.g., selection 
process of study population, more frequent measurements and observations of study 
population). However, Ronald Fisher’s original quest for agricultural RCTs was 
prompted precisely out of a desire to deal with the heterogeneity of treatment units and 
the complexity of the environment. Fisher showed how experimental researchers did not 
need to make an exhaustive list of possible uncontrolled causes, but that they were 
relieved from the anxiety of estimating the magnitude of the innumerable causes (Fisher, 
1935, 21). Randomization of treatment and control units would guarantee the validity of 
the findings if the study sample were large enough (cf., chapter two). 
 
Third, AEA called for the use of mixed methods, which would serve both the discovery 
and examination of causal effects. RCTs are generally good at discovering causal effects, 
because they are set up to answer the question of what works in a particular case based on 
high internal validity. However, examining causal effects, in the sense of interpreting and 
understanding these effects, might require different approaches. For interpreting effects, 
qualitative-comparative data analysis and sensitivity to local culture and conditions 
would be needed. This new emphasis did not mean to replace RCTs, though, but to add 




The AEA counterstatement supporting the Education Department’s RCT Priority 
It would be misleading to conclude from the AEA statement that practitioners of 
evaluation were uniformly supportive of this stance. In fact, another group within AEA 
developed a counter-statement. Its spokesperson, the evaluation theorist Mark Lipsey, 
posted the statement on the AEA list, calling it “NOT the AEA statement on 
Scientifically Based Evaluation” (Lipsey, Evaltalk, December 3, 2003). Thomas Cook, 
Robert Boruch, Peter Rossi, as well as other important theorists who had shaped the 
emerging field of evaluation, signed the counterstatement. This internal split of the 
American Evaluation Association had old roots from when the Evaluation Research 
Society (ERS) and the Evaluation Network merged into AEA in 1986. ERS had followed 
the experimental evaluation tradition, whereas the Evaluation Network, composed of 
mostly practitioners in education evaluation, was less strict regarding methods choice. 
 
Lipsey and colleagues did not feel adequately represented by the so-called AEA 
statement. Thus, they provided counterpoints to the AEA statement and argued that the 
AEA statement’s opposition to the federal notice was “unjustified” and would 
“represent[] neither the methodological norms in the evaluation field nor the views of the 
large segment of the AEA membership with significant experience conducting 
experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of program effects” (Lipsey, Evaltalk, 
December 3, 2003). Instead, the AEA statement had been “proffered without prior review 
and comment by its members” (ibid.). 
 
Lipsey and colleagues argued that RCTs had been “essential to understanding what 
works, what does not work, and what is harmful among interventions” in various policy 
disciplines such as medicine and welfare (Lipsey, Evaltalk, December 3, 2003). They 
clearly supported DOE’s proposed notice for prioritizing experimental methods in 
educational evaluation, and, contrary to the AEA statement, regarded it as a positive 
development in education policy. The authors referred to the Campbell Collaboration 
Register, which had recorded nearly 13,000 RCTs in social, psychological, educational, 
and criminological trials. In contrast, nonrandomized trials had often led to misleading 




Mark Lipsey felt that methodological pluralism in the context of educational 
effectiveness evaluations implied “hostility of the educational research culture to the 
scientific epistemology on which experimental and quasi-experimental research methods 
are based on” (Lipsey, Evaltalk, December 11, 2003). In another message, Lipsey found 
that the “practical effects of AEA’s pronouncements in the policy arena” had an 
undesirable effect: “little likelihood of any actual influence on the final version of the 
USDOE Office for Innovation and Improvement’s review criteria” and “undermining 
AEA’s credibility with the Dept. of Education” (Lipsey, Evaltalk, December 18, 2003). 
 
The AEA-internal exchanges illustrate that its members were not able to reach an 
agreement as to whether or not to support the Federal Priority of experimental evaluation. 
On one side, the AEA board felt that the Federal Priority was too narrow in its definition 
of scientifically-based evaluation and limited the methodological choices to a degree that 
could be detrimental to policy decisions, which are purely based on RCT designs. On the 
other side, a group of AEA members stood in the experimental tradition and felt that the 
AEA board would promote a false and marginal belief in methodological equality. The 
back-and-forth debates on electronic lists between advocates and skeptics of experimental 
evaluations were not resolved; they seemed rather to reinforce an ideological gap 
between the two groups. As a consequence of this disagreement, some members left AEA 
altogether (Lipsey, email communication, October 3, 2011).  
 
Let us note, however, that differences between the two camps are slighter than they 
appear at first blush. Both sides might be able to agree on the statement that 
methodological pluralism could be beneficial in capturing multiple facets in a program 
evaluation, especially when expanding beyond the “what works” question. One could 
argue that both statements “RCTs are superior” and “Multiple methods are equal” could 
be true, if one carefully specifies the context of those statements. Even if experimental 
designs might be superior in theory with respect to internal validity, they might not be the 





The Education Department’s response to the criticisms 
The U.S. Department of Education published their final notice on Scientifically Based 
Evaluation Methods over one year after their Proposed Priority (U.S. Department of 
Education, Federal Register, January 25, 2005). USDOE did not change the proposed 
notice despite many critics, although it summarized the comments by critics and 
supporters. 
 
First, the Department found twenty-nine comments in support of the priority for random 
assignment studies, but quoted one hundred and eighty-three comments opposing the 
priority, most of which came from AEA members. Their main criticism was that random 
assignment was not the “only method capable of generating understandings of causality” 
(U.S. Department of Education, Federal Register, January 25, 2005). Other approaches 
such as observational and single-subject designs would be equally valid in determining 
causality. In response to the critics, the USDOE characterized the RCT as the most 
“defensible method in that it reliably produces an unbiased estimate of effectiveness.” In 
contrast, other methods could be misleading compared with experimental evidence—an 
idea explicitly addressed in the AEA counterstatement (Lipsey, Evaltalk, December 3, 
2003). 
 
Second, the Department disqualified the AEA statement’s argument for implementing 
“designs sensitive to local culture and conditions” in order to capture program effects. In 
response, USDOE recommended complementary case studies that would collect 
information on local culture and conditions within an RCT design. Those would provide 
a “deeper understanding of the conditions that may influence the effectiveness of the 
intervention” (U.S. Department of Education, Federal Register, January 25, 2005). 
However, these designs could not stand alone to determine causal effects. 
 
Third, USDOE agreed with the comments that the evaluation question must determine 
the method. However, they insisted that RCTs were best to answer impact questions. The 
key difference between USDOE and its critics was the granularity of the evaluation 
question. Whereas USDOE stated that any impact question would prioritize RCT designs, 
critics argued that causal questions did not automatically imply an RCT approach. The 
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methodological choice would depend on additional factors. For example, AEA had 
argued that interventions in complex environments would not favor an RCT approach, 
but a more qualitative-observational case-study approach. 
 
In sum, the Department did not respond to the cautions and criticisms of a RCT hierarchy 
of methods, which were brought forward by professional organizations, including AEA. 
USDOE concluded that RCTs would: a) provide an ideal form of rigorous impact 
evaluation, b) be able to produce “valid and reliable data,” and c) be the only method able 
to identify a program’s causal effect (U.S. Department of Education, Federal Register, 
January 25, 2005). In this framework, USDOE established a preference to funding RCT 
designs for evaluating impact. The critics brought forward important arguments for 
expanding the RCT primacy, which included the need for opening a program’s “black 
box” and investigating the questions of why, how, and in which context a program is 
effective. As I discuss in the next section, USDOE indirectly responded in incorporating 
some of these arguments in their statements about methodological choice just a few years 
later. 
 
Broadening of evidence-based evaluation methodologies 
Ultimately, Mark Lipsey was right in predicting that the internal debates within AEA did 
not produce a strong counterweight to DOE’s proposed experimental priority (Lipsey, 
Evaltalk, December 11, 2003). However, a few years after this incident, USDOE seemed 
to expand their definition of scientifically based evaluation methods and included 
quantitative single-case study designs for establishing causal evidence. 
 
A leadership change in the DOE’s Institute of Education Sciences made it possible to 
slightly broaden DOE’s definition of scientifically based evaluation methods. In June 
2010, the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) published the “single-case design 
technical documentation” (Kratochwill, Hitchcock, Horner, et al., June 2010). WWC 
specifically attempted to “expand the pool of scientific evidence available for review” 
(ibid., 2). The panel characterized single-case studies (SCS) as adaptations of interrupted 
time-series designs that could provide “a rigorous experimental evaluation of intervention 
effects.” SCSs were considered experimental because cases could serve as their own 
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control group. For example, evaluators would repeatedly measure the cases’ outcome 
variables at different points in time. The WWC expanded the concept of experimentation 
to within-case control designs. This change was a significant shift in experimental 
thinking, because subjects could become their own control group—an idea excluded in 
DOE’s original priority. To be scientifically based, a SCS would need to fulfill certain 
quantitative criteria, such as systematic manipulation of the independent variable; 
systematic measurement of outcome variables over time with inter-assessor agreement; 
and at least three phase repetitions with three data points each. Although the SCS 
guidelines advocated for quantitative approaches only, the document was an important 
step in moving towards a more inclusive approach of causal evaluation. The evaluation 
theorist Michael Scriven commented that the SCS guidelines finally brought single-case 
studies doing interrupted time series designs (ITS) the deserved classification on the 
evidence scale (Scriven, Evaltalk, May 1, 2011). Scriven also pointed out that there were 
“half a dozen other designs with credentials as good as ITS in suitable circumstances that 
have cost or ethical challenges in those circumstances, so, even if RCT is FEASIBLE, it 
may be a stupid waste of resources to use it” (emphasis by Scriven; Scriven, Evaltalk, 
May 1, 2011). The “half dozen other designs” referred to more qualitative-interpretive 
data analysis tools, which historical and forensic sciences had frequently used when 
establishing evidence of causal connections in the past. 
 
John Easton, Director of the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) since 2009, 
emphasized the relevance and generalizability of education research and evaluation 
(Easton, speech, March 28, 2011). Easton called for education research “to move beyond 
trying to discover ‘what works’ to learning about why, when, where, for whom and under 
what conditions” (Easton, speech, March 28, 2011, 3; cf. also 11). Easton’s voice 
resembled some of the critics’ arguments like the AEA statement to the 2003 Federal 
Priority. Rather than focusing on the “what works” questions, he demanded evaluation 
approaches capable of answering contextual questions. IES’s new chord was “to work 
more collaboratively with practitioners and policy makers and build partnerships that 




Furthermore, on November 1, 2010, the National Board of Education Sciences approved 
a new set of research priorities, especially “to understand causal linkages to the greatest 
extent possible by conducting or sponsoring rigorous studies that support such 
inferences” (Easton, speech, March 28, 2011, 5). Understanding causal relations would 
move beyond just identifying the causal effects, which RCTs are suited for. 
 
Easton expressed the importance of moving away from “simple black box or silver bullet 
approaches” towards investigating the mechanisms of school improvement (Easton, 
speech, March 28, 2011, 11). And finally, Easton summarized his quest: 
If we are asking our research to answer more complex questions, it also means we 
must expand our repertoire of rigorous methodologies. Moving forward, I believe 
IES [Institute of Education Sciences] should investigate mechanisms and 
moderators using data from randomized trials; allow for the analysis and use of 
quasi- and non-experimental evidence for studying schooling processes and 
context; and measure program implementation, fidelity and sustainability. We can 
apply the same effort to building rigor into these methods as we have to RCTs. 
 
Although Easton does not suggest non-experimental methods for establishing impact, he 
advocated for the use of non-experimental evidence for answering the questions of how 
schooling works. Answering “how it works” questions are policy relevant because they 
allow for applying evaluation findings to other contexts. This broadening of rigorous 
methodologies in education is an encouraging direction in the policy arena as it promises 
the production of more policy-relevant evaluations. Frustrated by unscientific evidence in 
education research, the National Reading Panel and the U.S. Department of Education 
had made the RCT the apex in the methodological tool box. Reading First tried to 
implement a scientifically based reading policy nationwide. However, RCTs did not 
provide much evidence (cf., the WWC struggle for finding effective interventions), and 
textbook companies found ways to circumvent the experimental demand. Professional 
evaluators such as from the American Evaluation Association argued that non-
experimental research can produce evidence that is not only scientific, but also policy 
relevant. The WWC took the first step by setting the standards for the single case study 
design in 2010. According to Easton, this venturing into new methodological approaches 
would continue and arrive at more inclusive methodological choices. Ideally, this process 
would build bridges between RCT critics and RCT advocates. The future will reveal 
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whether methodological rigor and policy relevance could further join forces to inform 
program evaluation designs, and make and implement better education policies. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The STAR experiment, the National Reading Panel, and the Reading First 
implementation illustrated several challenges in pursuing policies based on experimental 
evidence. They also demonstrated how the implementation of RCT-guided standards 
affected micropolitics in an unexpected—and mostly negative—way.  
 
With regard to the STAR experiment, the findings were internally valid for the tested 
population. However, due to self-selection, exclusion criteria, and attrition, findings were 
less generalizable than anticipated. STAR did not answer the question of how and why 
class-size reductions were effective. When the state of California tried to implement a 
similar class-size reduction policy, they faced a shortage of qualified teachers. California 
was unable to replicate the STAR miracle, and the state was left with unintended negative 
consequences, such as under-funded schools and an under-qualified teaching staff. 
Extrapolating findings from pilot settings, such as STAR, may lead to deficient policy 
solutions. The temporal-spatial and contextual constraints of an RCT often do not allow 
for generalizations to different geographical and temporal settings. 
 
In the example of the National Reading Panel, the application of experimental evidence 
to a particular policy area proved difficult. The process of selecting topics seemed less 
rigorous than the establishment of evidence-based standards. The choice of topics, 
however, would already influence the nature of the findings. One problem was that the 
RCTs were unevenly spread across the range of reading interventions. The panel 
members then chose to review studies in areas where sufficient experimental evidence 
existed. The NRP did not find sufficient experimental evidence to determine best 
practices in several areas of reading research, as might occur in more holistic reading 
interventions. Many reading approaches, thus, were deemed unproven. Although the NRP 
attempted to move away from politics toward a scientific consensus, the unevenness of 
the findings led to the questioning of its academic integrity. As a result, the debates over 




Similarly, the quest for policies based on science did not pay off in the way planned in 
Reading First. Its goal was to exclude potential political bias by endorsing the RCT as 
unbiased methodology to select effective reading programs. The shortage of RCT 
evaluations led textbook companies to align their curricula with the five NRP pillars of 
literacy, thereby circumventing the original quest for rigorous evaluation. Ultimately, 
commercial biases rather than a scientific quest for truth dominated the implementation 
of Reading First. 
 
The section on the Federal Priority provided an example of the debate over the RCT 
primacy between the U.S. Department of Education and professional organizations. 
DOE’s proposed 2003 Federal Priority considered the RCT as the best design for 
evaluating impact. Although the AEA and other professional organizations criticized the 
planned priority and suggested alternative designs, USDOE did not change its priority. 
Several years later, however, USDOE became more open to alternative designs due to the 
promise of greater policy relevance. 
 
In sum, the RCT model in U.S. education policy faced major challenges. First, a shortage 
of RCT evaluations in many areas such as motivational learning led to the exclusion of 
these areas in policymaking. Second, policy makers were overly reliant on already-
existing RCT findings, such as class-size reduction or phonics instruction, and used their 
findings beyond the original scope. Because education interventions are less discrete than 
the administering of drug treatments, more knowledge is needed about their context and 
underlying processes. RCTs simply do not provide this knowledge when applying 
findings outside the experimental population.  
 
Ultimately, the use of RCTs in the field of education was less successful than in 
medicine, due in part to the specifics and complexities of the schooling context. The 
multitude of factors that influence programs and their contexts make RCT findings much 
less valuable in education than in medicine. Even if an RCT yields positive findings 
(such as in STAR), little knowledge is gained. Policy makers need information about the 
underlying processes of why an education intervention works and how to adapt it to 
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different contexts. John Easton from the Institute of Education Sciences advocated for 
such studies, often non-experimental in nature, that would explain such processes. A look 
at the newest developments in medicine, such as Personalized Medicine, could guide the 





CHAPTER 4: THE MEDICAL RCT MODEL IN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
As in education policy, there has been a renewed interest in the role of RCTs in 
international development. Advocates of RCTs often refer to Progresa, Mexico’s 
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, as a prime example of a successful RCT in 
development. In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the Progresa trial and argue 
that, despite a decade of RCT studies on Progresa, many important policy questions 
remain unanswered. A major outstanding issue, for example, is whether conditionality—
i.e., program participants receiving money only when certain conditions are met—is 
indeed needed to obtain the desired impact. 
 
The second section starts by examining the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), which 
USAID adopted in 1971 and exported to other bilateral and multilateral institutions. I 
show how the LFA established the need for capturing development impact via a results 
chain, despite failing to suggest the best means for doing so. I argue that this 
indeterminacy may have later triggered the debate over the role of RCTs in measuring 
development impact. In reference to RCT evaluations used in drug testing, the Center for 
Global Development (CGD) published a controversial report in 2006 calling for rigorous 
impact evaluations. 
 
In the third section, I analyze the RCT debate illustrated by the Network of Network on 
Impact Evaluation (NONIE), which was a multilateral response to the CGD report. 
NONIE attempted to establish policy-relevant methodological guidelines for impact 
evaluations. I discuss how and why NONIE members could not agree on the role of 
RCTs or how they should figure in a decision-tree of methodological choices. Although 
the final draft of the document integrated various views, not all members accepted the 
document. Furthermore, the European Evaluation Society vocalized criticism against the 
final NONIE draft (cf., section 4). Finally, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) felt compelled in 2011 to publish an evaluation policy, which 
celebrated the diversity of methods for evaluation in general. At the same time, USAID 
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gave special value to RCTs in impact evaluation. In sum, the influence of the RCT debate 
is apparent in official documents, which show great caution with respect to the role of the 
RCT in impact evaluation. I demonstrate that the methodological pendulum, which had 
been swinging towards the RCT side, is moving back to more middle ground. This trend 
is arguably due to the fact that RCT findings have not been sufficiently relevant for 
policy makers and need to be supplemented or even supplanted by other methodologies. 
 
1. The RCT of Mexico’s conditional cash-transfer programs and 
some unanswered questions 
Advocates of the RCT model often refer to successful examples of RCTs in order to 
demonstrate the model’s superiority. The 1997–1999 RCT evaluation of Mexico’s 
Progresa, a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, functions as a poster child of a 
successful RCT for development evaluation—much like the Tennessee Teacher Student 
Achievement Ratio (STAR) trial functions for RCTs in U.S. education (cf., chapter 
three). Economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, for example, cited Progresa as one 
of the “first demonstrations of the persuasive power of a successful randomized 
experiment” (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, 79). The Evaluation Gap Working Group of the 
Center for Global Development considered Progresa a good example of a high-quality 
RCT evaluation (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 3; 18; 25). They pointed out that 
the RCT evaluation was able to put to rest serious concerns from political opponents who 
argued that giving funds to poor mothers might increase their vulnerability to domestic 
abuse. (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 23). Furthermore, Thomas Vinod, director 
of the Independent Evaluation Group at the World Bank, stated that the Progresa 
experiment provided evidence “when these [types of] programs were being dismissed by 
development practitioners” and helped to “depoliticize” decisions to some extent (Vinod, 
presentation, February 20, 2008).  
 
Given its role as a poster child, Progresa warrants a closer look. Researchers must 
consider what lessons should be reviewed in the current debate over the value of the RCT 
model in development. I conclude that despite Progresa’s prominence, many questions 
are still unanswered; in particular it is unclear how representative the findings are and 
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what the necessary components of the program are. In fact, it is still unclear whether 
conditionality—Progresa’s core component—is necessary for program success. 
 
Background of Progresa’s RCT evaluation 
The RCT evaluation of Progresa stands in the tradition of medical trials, having expanded 
from developed to developing countries early on. The U.K. Medical Research Council, 
for example, not only conducted the Streptomycin trial in the United Kingdom, but also 
implemented subsequent Tuberculosis trials in India through testing the necessity of bed 
rest (Dawson, 1966;Valier 2008, 659). Albert Sabin chose the former Soviet Union and 
other parts of Eastern Europe as sites for his Poliomyelitis trials starting in 1955 
(Oshinsky, 2005, 252). Since the 1960s, researchers have tested the effects of nutritional 
intervention on the stunting of individual’s growth in developing countries (Behrman, 
2009, 1372). Following the tradition of clinical trials in medicine, such nutrition 
interventions were typically accompanied by an RCT. One major difference to medical 
trials was that randomization was often not feasible at the individual level due to 
contamination. Instead, the community became the unit of randomization. The nutritional 
intervention in Guatemalan villages (1969–1977), for instance, demonstrated the use of 
randomization at the community level to evaluate program effectiveness (Scrimshaw, 
2010; Martorell, 1995a; Matorell at al., 1996; Matorell, Habicht, & Rivera, 1996). RCTs 
were later expanded to anti-poverty programs in developing countries—Progresa being 
one of the first. 
 
Progresa was initiated in 1997 by the Mexican government as a pilot program that 
provided conditional cash transfers to improve educational attainment, health, and 
nutrition for poor rural households (Progresa, 1999; Progresa, 2000). The ultimate goal of 
the program was to reduce intergenerational poverty. Prior to Progresa, food subsidies 
had been the primary means of targeting poverty. 
 
Through Progresa, the Mexican government initiated a pilot project with two features that 
broke with traditional social programs: first, conditionality of monetary assistance, and, 
second, the built-in RCT evaluation. First, the assistance consisted of direct monetary 
transfers instead of food supplies, and the beneficiaries only received the money on the 
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condition that they assumed responsibilities for a series of tasks. For example, women 
were required to get free regular medical check-ups during pregnancy and lactation. They 
were also required to send their school-age children to school. If she fulfilled the 
conditions, a mother of a ninth-grade daughter would receive 255 pesos a month, which 
equaled approximately sixty-seven percent of what her daughter would have earned if she 
worked instead of attending school and 20 percent of a household’s average monthly 
income. Active citizenship and comprehensiveness were key features of the program’s 
design. Progresa’s architect, Santiago Levy, stressed that “shared responsibility and 
respect” in a democratic society link the cash benefits to concrete actions of household 
members (Levy & Rodríguez, 2004). Families would take direct action to improve their 
own nutrition, education, and health (Behrman, 2007). According to Lucy Luccisano, 
Progresa represented the concept of “government through freedom”—that is, a shift from 
paternalistic governing to governing through the active and responsible choice of 
individual citizens (Luccisano, 2004)., A centralized distribution of funds to local 
communities encouraged local agency and promised a reduction in the opportunities for 
corruption. The use of local service providers was a desirable concept for policy makers 
in the context of decentralization thinking.  
 
The second feature that set Progresa apart from other social programs was the RCT 
evaluation for testing the effectiveness of the novel design. In a 2009 keynote address, 
former President Ernesto Zedillo stated he and others had designed Progresa using 
scientific evaluations and measurements already built in from the outset (Zedillo, speech, 
April 17, 2009). At the time of the design, a major concern was what would happen to the 
program during the change of Mexico’s political leadership. In 1997, the program 
designer gathered political buy-in by obtaining the state governors’ approval before 
Progresa had even started. The Mexican Government contracted with International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to conduct an independent, external, and quantitative 
evaluation (International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999). To make randomization 
feasible and reduce possible contamination effects, communities rather than individual 
households were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups using a pipeline 
approach with a 20-months lag. The data from the control group provided a natural 
benchmark against which to judge how the treatment group would have fared without 
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Progresa. IFPRI surveyed 24,000 households in 506 villages on five occasions between 
1997 and 1999. Later, the Mexican Instituto de Nutrición y Salud Pública performed 
further evaluations, conducting 160 qualitative focus group interviews in 88 sites (Adato, 
Nov 24, 2008). President Zedillo reported that they were able to attract excellent 
researchers worldwide (Zedillo, speech, April 17, 2009). The Mexican government 
shared Progresa data with other scholars. As a result, Progresa became one of the most 
studied programs in the developing world (Lustig, 2011, 8). 
 
Results of the Progresa RCT 
The evaluation results came in between presidents and were strategically primed to 
influence program survival. The program survived the transition from the seventy-year 
ruling of the socialist Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to Vincente Fox’s 
center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). According to Alan Krueger, the concept of 
conditional cash transfer survived the change of party leadership, possibly due to its 
rigorous evaluation (Krueger, New York Times, May 2, 2002). The attribution to 
Progresa’s survival is hard to make, however, because it consisted of several new features 
apart from the RCT evaluation. It also represented a new way of social programming. 
 
The evaluation results of Progresa showed a statistically significant increase in school 
attendance in Progresa villages compared to control sites. The randomized evaluation 
found an eight percent increase of girls from 67 to 75 percent and a four percent increase 
of boys from 73 to 77 percent to attend secondary schools (Schulz, 2004). However, the 
evaluators expected a higher increase: “The inelasticity of the demand for schooling still 
poses a puzzle” (Schulz, 2004, 222). The RCT could not pinpoint the reasons for this 
modest increase. 
 
Despite rather small findings, Progresa became a model for social interventions 
worldwide. As such, academics, multilateral organizations, policy makers, and the media 
celebrated Mexico’s Progresa program as a model of successful antipoverty 
programming. According to the economist Nora Lustig, the factors that accounted for 
Progresa’s success were that well-trained scholars transformed into influential 
practitioners who then played a fundamental role in promoting the new conceptual 
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approach of poverty reduction (Lustig, 2011, 2). These scholar-practitioners ensured the 
technical soundness and effectiveness of the program’s design, incorporating rigorous 
impact evaluations in the program’s design and ultimately persuading politicians to 
implement and keep the program in place.  
 
The expansion of conditional cash transfer programs 
Policy makers in the development arena regard the conditional distribution of cash as one 
preferred method in social development, as opposed to unconditional cash transfers such 
as assistance payments or pensions. The 2009 World Bank synthetic review on 
conditional cash transfers characterized CCT programs as “modernization of social 
assistance” (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 100). Instead of “pure handouts,” political 
decision makers favorably regard conditionalities as “co-responsibilities” in a social 
contract with the poor (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 10). The introduction of conditions 
would increase the overall budget available for redistribution due to acceptance across the 
political spectrum (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 60). 
 
Based on such positive perception, CCT programs exponentially expanded within the 
next decade. In 1997, three CCT programs existed in three countries: Mexico, Brazil, and 
Bangladesh. In 2008, 28 CCT programs were in place across the globe, such as in 
Nicaragua, Jamaica, Chile, Malawi, Zambia, and Indonesia (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). 
In the United States, Opportunity NYC in New York, and the Capital Gains Program in 
Washington, DC have been experimenting with conditional cash incentives to high 
school students and their parents for attending school, involvement in parent-teacher 
meetings, and passing standardized tests. The New York Mayor’s office explicitly 
modeled Opportunity NYC after Progresa and traveled to Mexico to learn about the 
program in action. RCTs accompanied the U.S. programs (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 
144). 
 
The culture of evaluation around CCT programs has been strong beyond traditional 
practice in social policy areas (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 7; 94). Similar to Progresa, 
CCT programs most often include a rigorous experimental or quasi-experimental 
evaluation, using “credible counterfactuals” (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 7). Several CCT 
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programs used government-external—and even country-external—evaluators. In the case 
of Nicaragua, the very IFPRI that had conducted the Progresa evaluation a few years 
earlier conducted an RCT (Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Maluccio, 2005). IFPRI also 
included an ethnographic case study in six Nicaraguan sites. Fieldworkers lived with 
households in the community for three to five months, observed those households, and 
interviewed all household members (Adato, Nov 24, 2008). Despite the fact that survey 
data suggested that mothers gave iron supplements to their children, ethnographers found 
that parents had not administered the iron (Adato, Nov 24, 2008). 
 
Discussion: Conditional cash transfers programs and their results 
Despite the fact that CCTs have been evaluated so widely and extensively—often 
utilizing RCTs—there remain major open questions for policy makers. These include 
questions about excluded populations, long-term impact, necessary components 
(especially regarding conditionality), unintended consequences, and transferability of 
findings. 
 
The 2009 World Bank synthetic review called CCTs an “effective way of redistributing 
income to the poor” (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 30). However, despite the “accumulating 
evidence of positive impacts” (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 41), the report found that many 
details were not yet known. For example, the majority of evidence stemmed from middle-
income countries in Latin America (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). The CCT adaptability to 
diverse country settings was still understudied.  
 
Questions about excluded population: In order to be implemented, CCTs require certain 
structures in place. Such structures include basic national and local coordinating 
structures for implementing the distribution of funds, for the monitoring of conditions 
met, and for the provision of the services offered in health and education. To meet the 
conditionality, poor households needed easy access to health clinics and schools, which 
might not be the case in remote areas of developing countries. The Progresa program 
excluded communities from participating when they did not provide health or education 
services. This criterion meant that all poor households who lived in communities without 
the minimum service capacity were excluded from the CCT program (Fiszbein 
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& Schady, 2009, 75). In Columbia, 15 percent of communities were automatically 
excluded because of infrastructure deficits. This problem is similar to the “general run of 
patients” argument, where only hospitalized patients participated in a certain medical trial 
(cf., chapter 2). Just as it was unclear how other patients outside of the hospital setting 
would fare in the medical program, it is unclear in the CCT case how households in 
communities without infrastructure would fare on the program. 
 
Questions about long-term impact: One of the major goals of CCT programs is to have 
an intergenerational effect. Ideally, policy makers should be able to determine whether 
CCTs affect years and quality of schooling completed by adults. By design, Progresa’s 
pilot results focused on short-term effects as the pipeline design introduced conditional 
cash transfers in the control communities twenty months later. So far, one long-term 
evaluation of Progresa showed that students finished an average of one-fifth of a year of 
more schooling (Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2005). Researchers did not find an impact on 
learning outcomes. In general, CCT evaluations showed increased household 
consumption and increased use of education and health services. However, most RCTs 
did not study long-term impact. If they did, evaluators found only modest effects on final 
outcomes in years of schooling completed, cognitive development, health condition, 
learning outcomes of children, as well as the impact on long-run autonomous family 
incomes and poverty reduction (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 21; 96; 127).  
 
Questions about necessary components: CCT programs are comprehensive, 
multidimensional programs, with multiple conditionalities, short-term objectives, and 
long-term goals. They are packages that have several components, as illustrated in Table 
8. Many of these components might be highly context specific and dependent on various 
factors. 
 
It is unclear which program components are important in achieving the particular 
outcomes (Gaarder, presentation, May 4, 2010). Which households should be selected? 
How large should the payment be in proportion to the household income? Should school 
attendance be monitored? These and other questions need to be asked when designing a 
CCT program. In principle, the particular results (e.g., increased school grades) could 
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stem from the income effects associated with the transfers (e.g., the child no longer needs 
to work and could dedicate time to homework), or they could stem from the condition of 
school attendance, or both. The issue of why the program is effective is important for 
program design. Understanding why would help determine factors such as optimal size of 
transfer, what conditions to use, how to monitor them, and how to penalize non-
compliant beneficiaries. Social, cultural, and economic factors might affect and be 
affected by the CCT program. Program impacts are typically mediated by social 
processes in households and communities of individuals with their own culture, beliefs, 
experiences and interests (Adato, Nov 24, 2008). Understanding and influencing these 
social factors could lead to increased impact. 
 
TABLE 8: Components of conditional cash transfer programs 
Component Examples 
Eligibility based on selection 
criteria 
e.g., threshold of household income 
Community characteristics e.g., required minimum infrastructure of service 
provision in communities 
Payee e.g., male or female head of household; teenage 
child 
Size of payment e.g., as a proportion of household income 
Form of payment e.g., cash in form of wire transactions, debit cards, 
bank account transfers;  
Timing of payment e.g., monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly 
Conditions e.g., school attendance, passing grades, health 
check-ups, child immunizations, health education 
Timely monitoring of compliance e.g., monthly to yearly or none 
Enforcement and sanctions  e.g., no monitoring, warnings of social workers 
before terminations, immediate termination 
 
Is the conditionality necessary? Policy theorist Carolyn Heinrich pointed out that most 
impact evaluations have not answered the conditionality question (Heinrich, presentation, 
April 18, 2009). Are conditions needed? The comparison group typically consists of a no-
treatment condition, as in the case of Progresa. Only preliminary research exists that 
compares the treatment communities receiving conditional cash with control 
communities receiving unconditional cash transfers. Small-scale experiments in Malawi 
and Morocco have thus far incorporated comparative treatment arms with conditional and 
unconditional transfers (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, 80). In both instances, researchers 
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found that the conditional program did not significantly outperform the unconditional 
program, though it did much better than the no-treatment group (Benhassine, Devoto, 
Duflo, Dupas, & Pouliquen, 2010; Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, 283). Ideally, more of these 
designs would be needed to tease apart the effects of the transfer from the effects of the 
conditions. 
 
Further preliminary findings indicated that conditionality was not required for a cash 
transfer program to have an impact on child well-being. Ecuador’s Bono de Desearollo 
Humano program originally included conditions in the design, and a public campaign had 
emphasized the human capital goals of the program (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, 156). The 
program dropped those conditions in the implementation process (Paxson & Schady, 
2007). In the RCT conducted on the program, Paxson and Schady found that the 
unconditional cash transfer program raised household consumption levels; furthermore, 
physical, cognitive, and socio-emotional development of preschool children were higher 
than in the control group (Paxson & Schady, 2007). No data were collected for school-
age children.  
 
Questions about unintended consequences: Conditional cash transfers are by design only 
intermediate means of poverty reduction. Giving cash to people would not be an ultimate 
policy solution to social programs, especially when one regards market-driven economic 
growth as an ideal means of poverty reduction. Heinrich raised the question as to whether 
CCT programs encourage individuals and households to raise their own productivity and 
income, which ultimately would make government-provided cash assistance superfluous 
(Heinrich, presentation, April 18, 2009). A further issue is what other unanticipated 
effects the CCT programs might have on the household. For example, given the increase 
in household income from the CCT, labor force participation might drop, distribution of 
labor within families could be reconfigured, and in general, household economies might 
be significantly altered. Finally what are other spillover effects such as socioeconomic 
status within the community? (Heinrich, presentation, April 18, 2009; Fiszbein 





Questions about transferability of findings: Even if the findings in Mexico were 
promising, that does not mean that the program would work in other countries. In 
Mexico, where almost universal primary-school attendance had already existed in the 
1990s, the policy focus was on participation in secondary education. In the United States, 
the CCTs in Washington, DC and New York focused on learning outcomes rather than 
school attendance, because secondary school participation was already high (Fiszbein 
& Schady, 2009, 179). Consequently, CCTs might not be the right choice for income 
distribution and poverty reduction in certain contexts. CCTs are only one option within 
the range of social assistance programs. They might also not be a stand-alone program, 
but would benefit in tandem with other programs.  
 
Even after 10 years of experimentally and rigorously evaluating CCT programs, the 
World Bank review concluded: “We cannot tell at this time whether the current wave of 
CCT programs will be successful in unleashing a sustainable transformation” (Fiszbein 
& Schady, 2009, 203). In order to find out whether CCTs are more than just promising 
policy solutions and not a mere fad, further evaluations are necessary. Evaluators will 
need to open the so-called “black box” of the process underlying how CCTs produce the 
intended results (Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007). 
 
2. The Evaluation Gap Working Group’s report: call for rigor in 
impact evaluation methodology 
In 2006, the Center for Global Development published a report calling for rigorous 
impact evaluations, which triggered debates about the role of RCTs in development 
evaluation. The group did not reach a conclusion as to whether the RCT should be the 
best method for impact evaluations. 
 
Historical background: Aid Accountability and the Logical Framework Approach 
Foreign aid assistance started to grow after the Second World War as did the 
congressional call for accountability. In 1971, Leon Rosenberg, a private contractor, 
developed the LFA for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to 




The LFA consisted of a 4 x 4 matrix (cf., Figure 2). The first column described the 
program activity, which included: impact, outcomes, outputs, and inputs. Other elements 
were indicators (i.e., measures of the program activity), means of verification (i.e., 
procedures to collect information about indicators), and assumptions (i.e., underlying 
assumptions about the link between the LFA elements in the first column).  
 
FIGURE 2: Illustration of a Logical Framework Approach 
Project Structure Indicators Means of 
Verification 
Assumptions 
Impact or goal How the 
achievement of 










Outcome or purpose How the 
achievement of 








output to outcome 
linkage 
Output How the output 







input to output 
linkage 
Input How the input 








Adapted from USAID (2005) 
 
Consider the following example of conditional cash transfer: Inputs (financial and human 
resources; e.g., cash and teachers) were expected to produce certain outputs (e.g., 
students attend school), which were expected to lead to certain outcomes (e.g., students’ 
successful graduation), and which in turn would generate long-term impacts (e.g., finding 
employment, increased consumption, better life). 
 
The assumptions column lists all assumptions that would need to hold in order for the 
impact chain to occur. For example, the schools would need to employ teachers, students 
need to be present at schools and pay attention. Rosenberg regarded the links among 
levels of output, outcome, and impact as always hypothetical: “It is a hypothesis that 
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achieving the results expected at each level will lead to achieving the results expected at 
the next higher level” (Rosenberg, report, July 24, 1970, 2). 
 
In the original LFA reports to USAID, Leon Rosenberg asked the project staff in the field 
to formulate their projects: 
“Think about your project as an experiment in economic development. The 
project has been undertaken because of our conviction that the results will justify 
the resources provided; however, we want to be explicit about the impact 
expected of the project and our hypothesis that our inputs will tip the scale to 
cause that impact” (Rosenberg, report, July 24, 1970, 19). 
 
When Rosenberg used the term “experiment,” he did not refer to an RCT, but more of a 
thought experiment: What would happen if one designed projects a certain way? 
Rosenberg did not provide insights on how to determine whether the project caused the 
impact. He only generally suggested testing the hypothesis by generating evidence in 
support of the hypothesis (Rosenberg, report, July 24, 1970, 20). 
 
In 1987, Richard Solem from USAID reviewed the use of Rosenberg’s LFA. Logical 
frameworks in the USAID tradition became the preferred conceptual approach for most 
multilateral and bilateral aid institutions to guide the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of their development interventions (Solem, April 1987, 16pp.). They adapted 
the system, and there was fluency in the terminological choices. 
 
Solem described the idea behind the LFA as pretending to be “chessmasters”—that is, to 
be able to see beyond the immediate actions, to project consequences, and ultimately to 
project impacts (Solem, April 1987, 27). The LFA provided a “common playing field and 
language” for its multiple players, including project managers and policy makers (Solem, 
April 1987, 28). Solem found the LFA’s “basic power” to be the ability to show causality 
in the project structure column and dependency on exogenous variables in the 
assumptions column (Solem, April 1987, 17). He pointed out a tendency to precisely 
determine inputs and outputs to many intervention efforts, but he saw little clear linkage 
to specific outcomes and impacts (Solem, April 1987, 24). Furthermore, Solem found that 
assumptions were often enormously speculative, leading to un-substantiated predictions 
(Solem, April 1987, 30). The input-output-outcome-impact chain tended to break after 
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the input-output linkages. Although goal-oriented terminology was already present in 
international development since the 1970s, methodological means to determine whether a 
project truly achieved impacts were not yet the central focus.  
 
The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) provided a common framework for 
communicating about the intended impacts of aid amongst the stakeholders, but no 
process existed for verifying that the observed consequences were causally connected to 
the intervention. 
 
Despite bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote evaluation thinking via logical 
frameworks, internal evaluations often failed to adequately determine long-term 
impacts—i.e., they could not produce the evidence needed to move from outputs to 
impact within the LFA. Because impacts could not be adequately measured, donors 
would never know the economic and social effects of their investments (Leeuw, 2005).  
 
The beginnings: The Evaluation Gap Working Group’s quest for evaluating impact  
In 2004, with funding from the Gates Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation, the Center 
for Global Development (CGD) convened a working group to tackle two areas: first, to 
investigate why rigorous impact evaluations of social development programs were 
relatively rare; and second, to propose how to stimulate more and better impact 
evaluations. The working group leaders from CGD were William Savedoff, Ruth Levine, 
and Nancy Birdsall. The group stood in the tradition of aid critics and maintained the 
underlying assumption that the impact of past aid had been unclear: 
“Yet after decades in which development agencies have disbursed billions of 
dollars for social programs, and developing countries and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have spent hundreds of billions more, it is deeply 
disappointing to recognize that we know relatively little about the net impact of 
most of these social programs” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 1).  
 
The group posited that the World Bank and United Nations agencies might have spent 
billions of dollars on dubious development projects without knowing whether these 




In September 2005, the working group leaders presented an initial consultation draft on 
the CGD’s website for comments.22 In May 2006, the CGD launched the report at the 
Rockefeller Center in Bellagio, Italy, and invited representatives from international 
organizations, bilateral donors, private foundations, and developing countries (Center for 
Global Development, June 12, 2006). This final report had the provocative title “When 
Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation,” which called for 
more and higher-quality impact evaluations. The report found a gap in both the quantity 
and quality of impact evaluations (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 10). Regarding 
the low quantity of impact evaluations, it reported that few incentives existed for donor 
institutions to produce evaluation reports that would generate valid evidence and gauge 
program effectiveness; they typically produced monitoring reports. In the LFA scheme, 
they measured the lowest level, i.e., the link between input and output. The working 
group, however, was concerned about “impact” (i.e., the final level of the LFA; cf., 
previous section), and they called for rigorous investigation as to whether a development 
intervention had reached this final level of the results chain. 
 
These rigorous impact evaluations would fall outside the organization’s normal budget 
and planning cycles (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 2). Insufficient valid 
evidence would lead to confusion over the effectiveness of development interventions. In 
the absence of knowledge, funders tended to operate under the assumption that any 
development intervention would at least have some positive effect.  
 
Regarding the low quality of impact evaluations, the group found the quality of existing 
evaluations to be poor. These were concerned mostly with outputs rather than impacts of 
development programs. Even when evaluations attempted to measure effects and impacts, 
poor methodological choices would lead to an overestimation of positive effects. Instead, 
impact evaluations would need to test the “net effect” directly attributable to a specific 
intervention. The report stated that “no responsible physician would consider prescribing 
medications without properly evaluating their impact or potential side effects” 
(Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 3), and therefore clinical trials had become “the 
standard and integral part of medical care” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 15). 
                                                 
22 Cf., http://www.archive.org (http://www.cgdev.org) for access. 
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Referencing the medical model of experimental trials indicated the group’s preference for 
RCT evaluations. 
 
Are rigorous impact evaluations limited to RCTs? 
The report called for more and more rigorous evaluation approaches that tested whether 
development interventions had an impact—that is, whether they produced the results they 
were originally pursuing. The group defined impact evaluations as “studies that measure 
the impact directly attributable to a specific program or policy, as distinct from other 
explanatory factors” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 10). Impact evaluations 
gauged the “net impact” of an intervention, which was the change of the condition that 
the intervention sought to alter, minus all the other factors that simultaneously affected 
the conditions (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 2). From a methodological stance, 
a core concept of investigating the net impact was the “counterfactual,” i.e., what would 
have happened without the program. Therefore, the report posited: “Impact evaluation 
asks about the difference between what happened with the program and what would have 
happened without it (referred to as the counterfactual)” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 
2006, 12). An example would be whether children in Progresa villages would stay in 
school and learn more than they would have without the Progresa program. The net 
impact would be the gain in yearly attendance or the increase in test scores, based solely 
on the Progresa program. The evaluator, however, would never be able to encounter the 
counterfactual. To simulate the counterfactual, the evaluator would need a comparison 
group: 
Most notably, [impact evaluations] require attention to gathering information 
from appropriate comparison groups so that valid inferences can be made about 
the impact of a particular program compared with what would have happened 
without it or with a different program. This type of data collection must be 
considered from the start (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 13). 
 
The comparison groups would simulate the counterfactual situation. Evaluators would 
need to collect data on the conditions of interest before and after the intervention. From 
this point, it is only a short leap to recommending the RCT as the ideal evaluation design, 
because the treatment and the control group characteristics would be equally distributed 




In fact, the initial consultation report from September 2005 suggested that RCTs were the 
authors’ preferred method. This initial report, however, explicitly stated that it 
represented only the views of the working group leaders (Savedoff, Levine & Birdsall, 
report, September 15, 2005, i). The authors stated in a footnote that a major area of 
debate was whether the working group should indicate a preference for RCTs:  
The extent to which the “Club” should favor random assignment studies was 
discussed extensively by the members of the Evaluation Gap Working Group. The 
consensus was to recognize and support random assignment studies, however the 
group did not reach a specific conclusion about how much of the club’s funding 
should be earmarked for random assignment studies (Savedoff et al., 30). 
 
According to the authors, because the working group’s mandate was merely concerned 
with impact evaluations, focused attention on RCTs was warranted (Savedoff et al., 
report, September 15, 2005, appendix 10). The authors suggested that: “Because studies 
with randomized assignment face the largest obstacles relative to their promise in 
knowledge building, more than half of the Club’s funds should be earmarked to support 
studies with randomized designs.” (Savedoff et al., vii). 
 
The second draft did not directly state a preference for RCTs. However, the focus on the 
concepts of “net effect,” “counterfactual,” and “comparison groups” indirectly leaned 
toward the RCT as the preferred approach. As mentioned, the group anchored their 
arguments in the success of rigorous clinical trials in medicine. They stated that the 
reason why clinical trials of medications have become a standard and integral part of 
medical care was to counter the risk of wasting public resources or harming participants 
(Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 15). Although the history of medical trials did 
not indicate a primary concern for wasting public funds—but rather the patient’s 
money—aspects of harm and safety were driving forces in the requirement of well-
controlled clinical trials before a medication’s marketing approval (cf., Drug Efficacy 
Amendment of 1962 in chapter two). The working group’s direct reference to the medical 
field indicated a preference for RCTs.  
 
They recommended that researchers “choose the best method” for collecting and 
analyzing data and drawing valid inferences. In their view, “it is usually worth asking 
whether a random-assignment approach—that is, randomly choosing which individuals, 
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families, or communities will be offered a program and which will not—is appropriate 
and feasible” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 15). If RCTs were not feasible, 
evaluators could apply other evaluation approaches, including well-controlled before-
and-after studies, interrupted time-series studies, and matched comparison studies (ibid., 
15). In the tradition of the Campbell Collaboration and the Cochrane Review, the 
working group indirectly established a hierarchy of methodological approaches to 
generate evidence, which the working group explicitly cited as sources for finding 
evidence-based health interventions (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 17; 30).  
 
Overall, the working group was foremost concerned with methodological and technical 
issues in development evaluation, in particular the issue of “internal validity” (Evaluation 
Gap Working Group, 2006, 17). They cited methodological shortcomings and gave 
negative examples of flawed methods, such as before-and-after assessments and 
evaluations with incompatible comparison groups. In the appendix, they quote D. Levine, 
stating that because RCTs were “more convincing than other research methods, most 
evaluations should involve randomization” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 73). 
The authors also referred to the DOE’s What Works Clearinghouse’s efforts to review the 
quality of research studies in education, where well-designed RCTs provided the 
strongest evidence of causal validity (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 77; cf. 
chapter three). The report ended with the following statement: “Random-assignment 
approaches have been demonstrated to be a feasible and rigorous approach to impact 
evaluation in many situations and should therefore be encouraged and promoted where 
appropriate” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 80). 
 
The group anticipated some common critiques about impact evaluations: “Critics 
sometimes claim that impact evaluations can only tell whether something has an impact, 
not why and how” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 25). The group countered that 
a well-done impact evaluation would go beyond the question of whether an intervention 
had an impact: it would also find out about why and how that impact had occurred. 
Evaluators would need to have “sound theories and models” and could obtain evidence 
about the program’s mechanisms by collecting data on processes and intermediate 
outcomes. The group saw an impact evaluation as more than just estimating the average 
 
 130 
size of an effect—which is most often the central finding of an RCT. A broader interest 
seemed to exist assessing “which interventions work under given conditions, what 
difference they make, and at what cost” (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 2). They 
recommended replication of impact evaluations of similar programs in different places, as 
the most systematic way of increasing the evidence base (ibid., 14). The group argued 
that well-done impact evaluations would also provide sufficient information about the 
context to help decide whether findings could be generalized to other situations 
(Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 14). They did not explain, however, how these 
generalizations to other situations could be accomplished. 
 
The group pointed out that findings of impact evaluations could be conveyed easily to 
policy makers (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 25). Progresa served as an 
example that policy makers valued the RCT approach and decided to continue funding 
based on positive RCT findings. The group quoted Julio Frenck, Mexico’s former 
Minister of Health, on the importance of knowledge gained through impact evaluation 
studies, which could serve as public good (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 26). 
They even pointed out that Mexico had passed legislation requiring impact evaluations 
for a wide range of social development programs (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 
31). The authors also concluded that Progresa’s success influenced the design of similar 
programs throughout the world (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 18). Ironically, 
the impact of RCT use on policymaking and program expansion to other countries was 
not itself tested via an RCT, something the working group did not point out. They made 
causal statements without the existence of RCT data.  
 
The quest for a global institution to promote rigorous evaluation evidence 
The working group painted two scenarios for the future development community, one 
pessimistic and one optimistic: 
Imagining 10 years into the future… the international community could be in one 
of the two situations. We could be as we are today, bemoaning the lack of 
knowledge about what really works and groping for new ideas and approaches to 
tackle the critical challenges of strengthening health systems, improving learning 
outcomes, and combating the scourge of extreme poverty. 
Or we could be far better able to productively use the resources for development, 
based on an expanded base of evidence about the effectiveness of social 




The pessimistic scenario described the status quo of development evaluation, which 
means groping in the dark. To reach the optimistic scenario, the group called for 
collective action. To increase the number of rigorous impact evaluations, the working 
group recommended a voluntary pooled impact evaluation fund (Evaluation Gap 
Working Group, 2006, 8). Member countries and organizations would contribute funding. 
Although the cost of an impact evaluation might be too high for an individual 
organization, a group effort that would distribute costs could fund impact evaluations. 
This approach would thereby generate valuable evidence and produce knowledge 
comparable to a “public good.” In the long run, ignorance would be more expensive than 
impact evaluations (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 23). The working group 
argued that a pioneering effort by only a few at the vanguard would kindle a larger 
movement (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 9; 43). This is reminiscent of Everett 
Rogers’ idea of diffusion, where a few pioneers may trigger an innovation that would 
later be mainstreamed (Rogers, 1962). 
 
The fund would pursue several goals, including but not limited to: (1) establishing quality 
standards for rigorous impact evaluations, (2) administering a review process for 
evaluation designs and studies, and (3) organizing and disseminating information. What 
the quality standards would look like was left open, but some critics felt that the proposal 
favored RCTs as the highest standard. Just the idea of a small group of select people 
putting standards into place was ill-received by some in the development community. 
 
Two working group members from the World Bank, Francois Bourguignon and Paul 
Gertler, added reservations to the report (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 44–45). 
They dissented on issues of how to increase the number of rigorous impact evaluations, 
and they were especially wary of the nature of the institutional arrangement. Rather than 
suggesting the addition of another institution, which might increase transaction costs and 
bureaucracy, they believed in strengthening partnerships between developing country 
governments, multilateral institutions, NGOs, and researchers. They emphasized the need 
for capacity building within aid-receiving countries to be able to locally plan and conduct 
impact evaluations. Ultimately, additional quality impact evaluations would only pay off 
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if recipient countries would use their findings. The working group co-chairs did not find 
Bourguignon and Gertler’s reservations justified (Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006, 
45). 
 
One year later, the Center for Global Development convened an expert group in 2007 to 
discuss the charter document for an entity that could fulfill those tasks. The CGD 
founded the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE) in 2008, with 
considerable start-up funds from the Gates Foundation. 3IE started to pool funding from 
developed and developing countries to pay for impact evaluations since 2009. 
 
On the one hand, people recognized the dearth of high-quality impact evaluations and the 
need for generating knowledge about what works in development. On the other hand, the 
publication of the Evaluation Gap report startled the development community, as social 
scientist Alexandra Caspari observed (Caspari, 2008). They were afraid that the new 
institution would establish an RCT hierarchy, channeling already sparse funding to 
meaningless experiments. 
 
In general, the CGD report became a major factor in the RCT debate in international 
development. It utilized the best development scientists to produce a report that 
questioned past evaluation practices and recommended a renewed effort in producing 
rigorous evidence. Although the taskforce members disagreed over the exact 




3. The Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation: Searching for a 
compromise on impact evaluation methodology 
As part of my research, I investigated how The Network of Network for Impact 
Evaluation (NONIE) dealt with RCTs by analyzing NONIE’s working papers and drafts 
and attending the NONIE meeting in Washington, DC, in 2008. As a multilateral network 
comprising communities for whom impact evaluation is imminently relevant, NONIE is a 
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perfect example of the ambivalence surrounding RCTs. In the following discussion, I 
present my analysis of the NONIE working papers and drafts, and my observations of the 
2008 meeting. 
 
I got involved with NONIE through the American Evaluation Association’s Topical 
Interest Group on International and Cross-Cultural Evaluation (ICCE). During ICCE’s 
annual meeting in November 2007, Zenda Ofir, the former chair of the African 
Evaluation Association, announced a search for evaluators from developing countries to 
participate in a NONIE meeting held in Washington D.C. in January 2008. When I stated 
my interest in impact evaluation, Ofir suggested I contact NONIE’s chair, Howard White, 
who was then a member of the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. White 
suggested I observe the January 2008 meeting—a meeting crucial to finalizing the 
guidelines on impact evaluation. It would be the third and last meeting of the broader 
plenum; after which only the steering committee would convene. During the January 
2008 meeting, I was able to observe the plenary sessions, subgroup discussions, and 
hallway conversations. I also collected the distributed documents such as working papers 
and printed slides. After the January 2008 meeting, I followed up with several NONIE 
members, including Howard White and Patricia Rogers, the latter of whom became the 
commentator of the final guidance document. I am indebted to both for their reflections 
on the NONIE process. 
 
Members of international organizations were compelled to act on CGD’s Evaluation Gap 
report (Caspari, 2008, 138), because they felt uneasy about the proposed new institution 
prescribing methodological choices for impact evaluation. Instead they wanted to develop 
their own guidelines based on their prior work in the field. As a result, several 
multilateral institutions formed the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE) 




Members of NONIE agreed on the need for rigorous impact evaluations. However, they 
were unable to agree on how to actually best evaluate impact. Should evaluators follow a 
quantitative decision tree of methods—starting with RCTs and quasi-experiments—or 
should they rather emphasize participatory evaluations with observational evidence? The 
draft documents of the NONIE working groups demonstrate the struggle for explicating 
methodologies that all NONIE members could support. The role of the RCT in the 
methodology toolbox remained unclear. 
 
More generally, the NONIE example illustrates how the quest for more rigor in 
development evaluation was accompanied by an ambivalent stance towards RCTs. 
Members of the international development community felt excluded from the decision-
making process and could not support a move toward more quantitative impact 
evaluations. The question of political dominance partially replaced the original 
methodological focus. 
 
NONIE background: Responding to the Evaluation Gap report 
In November 2006, four months after the Evaluation Gap report’s launch, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC) convened a working group on impact evaluation for its annual 
meeting in Paris. They formed the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE), 
which was originally planned as a donor network consisting of the following bilateral and 
multilateral development institutions: the OECD DAC Evaluation Network, the United 
Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), and the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) of the 
multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank sponsored the secretariat of NONIE, 
housed at its headquarters in Washington, DC. NONIE’s objective was to improve 
collaboration in the production of relevant and rigorous impact evaluations, to share 
experiences in conducting rigorous impact evaluations, and to explore the role of impact 
evaluations in the overall evaluation efforts. These goals were very much in line with the 
objective of the Center for Global Development’s report, but without adding a new 
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institution (NONIE, November 15, 2006). Another difference was that in addition to 
focusing on the need for high internal validity by addressing selection bias—which the 
Evaluation Gap Report had already made its major focus—NONIE also emphasized the 
need for policy relevance, which included the applicability of findings to other 
contexts—i.e., external validity. 
 
In a room document from the Paris meeting, NONIE reported that in order to balance 
pragmatics and rigor, “impact evaluations need[ed] to be well-contextualized and policy 
relevant” (NONIE, November 15, 2006). Again, NONIE attempted to strike a balance 
between internal and external validity. They also tried “to maintain a flexible approach, 
exploiting possibilities for mixed methods whilst retaining technical rigor.” Early on, 
NONIE also emphasized the need to include developing countries as partners and to 
provide capacity development. NONIE thus took the position of Bourguignon and 
Gertler, who had dissented in the CGD report suggesting the creation of a new institution 
for impact evaluation; they called instead for a joint effort between developed and 
developing partners. 
 
As a NONIE member said during a later meeting: “The Initiative was supposed to be an 
answer to the Center for Global Development. The three networks [of which NONIE was 
composed] said that we have done impact evaluation, we bring our expertise together, 
and we come up with guidelines” (NONIE notes, January 14, 2008). NONIE’s plan was 
to create general guidelines for conducting impact evaluations. To develop these 
guidelines, the NONIE members formed several subgroups. 
 
NONIE convened a two-day meeting at the World Bank in Washington, DC, in January 
2008 to discuss the drafts of the NONIE guidelines developed by the subgroups. I 
attended this meeting and observed the discussion of the draft documents. The following 
discussion reports my observations and analysis of this meeting.  
 
In order to follow a participatory evaluation approach and to include evaluators from 
developing countries in the discussion, NONIE invited twelve representatives from 
developing countries to their meeting (NONIE notes, January 14, 2008). The twelve 
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invitees were members of the African Evaluation Association (AfrEA) and the 
International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE)—i.e., groups that were 
already active in the evaluation community.  
 
The NONIE meeting preceded The World Bank’s conference “Making Smart Policy: 
Using Impact Evaluation for Policy Making.” The conference was a sign that impact 
evaluation was at the forefront of international development thinking. The fact that one of 
the invited guest speakers was the CGD’s Nancy Birdsall, who had been a lead author of 
the Evaluation Gap report, showed the importance of the CGD report in the new interest 
in impact evaluation.23  
 
The NONIE “Experimental Group” and the NONIE “Alternative Group” 
The NONIE working groups had prepared documents to be discussed during the January 
2008 NONIE meeting. The two subgroups working on methodological questions were 
subgroup 1, which focused on experimental and quasi-experimental designs (henceforth 
“The Experimental Group”), and subgroup 2, which focused on alternative designs 
(henceforth “The Alternative Group”). The goal of the meeting was to discuss the draft 
documents and pull them together into a comprehensive guidance document on impact 
evaluation. The groups would then present a summary statement during the World 
Bank’s impact evaluation conference. 
 
The Experimental Group authored the documents “NONIE: Impact Evaluation Guidance, 
Section 1: Introduction” (cited as NONIE Intro, 2008), and “NONIE Subgroup 1: Impact 
Evaluation Guidance, Section 2: Experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to 
impact evaluation” (cited as NONIE SG 1, 2008). The Alternative Group authored 
“NONIE Subgroup 2: NONIE Impact Evaluation Guidance” (cited as NONIE SG 1, 
2008).24 Other documents referred to in this discussion included PowerPoint 
presentations at the NONIE meetings from the Experimental Group and Alternative 
Group (e.g., cited as NONIE SG 2 presentation, January 14, 2008), my personal notes 
                                                 
23 Nancy Birdsall did not attend the conference due to sickness. 
24 These documents were originally uploaded to the NONIE members’ page of the World Bank’s 
website www.worldbank.org/ieg/nonie/members.html, but have been removed. 
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(cited as NONIE notes, January 14, 2008), and the NONIE draft statement distributed at 
the World Bank conference (cited as NONIE statement, 2008). 
 
Different emphasis in impact evaluation 
The Experimental Group and the Alternative Group both started off with the same 
definition of impact, provided by the OECD Development Assistant Committee’s 
glossary of evaluation and results-based management (OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, 2002): 
“Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (NONIE 
Intro, 2008, 1; NONIE SG 2, 2008, 2) 
 
This definition stands in line with the Logical Framework Approach, where impact 
symbolizes the last stage of the results chain. The approach is illustrated by the 
Experimental Group in their introductory draft (FIGURE 3). 
 
FIGURE 3: Results chain from input to impact 
 
Source: NONIE Intro, 2008, 1 
 
An impact evaluation should test the link in the causal chain from input to impact. The 
focus on impact moves away from the output model (e.g., school attendance) toward an 
outcome or impact model (e.g., quality of education and quality of life). Outputs are 
typically the numerical units that inputs created (e.g., numbers of children that attend 
school). Outcomes are typically defined as short- and medium-term results (e.g., smarter 
children), whereas impacts are long-term effects (e.g., higher wages as adults). Impact 
evaluations, therefore, focus on the more long-term effects. 
 
The Experimental Group and the Alternative Group emphasized different aspects of the 
definition of impact and thus came to different conclusions for choosing methodologies. 
The Experimental Group focused on the expression “effects produced by.” An impact 
Input Output Outcome Impact 
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evaluation would need to tackle the problem of attribution of these effects: How much of 
the observed effects can be attributed to the intervention itself (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 1)? 
The Experimental Group thus framed impact as “net effect,” similar to the Evaluation 
Gap Working Group’s definition of “net impact.” 
 
The Alternative Group focused on the multi-faceted, non-quantitative nature of impact, 
including the full range of impacts at all levels of the results chain. They quoted the 
second part of the OECD DAC definition: 
“These effects can be economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, 
technological or of other types (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 2). 
 
The Alternative Group specifically referred to the levels of families, households, and 
communities, as well as institutional, technical, and social systems. They also 
emphasized the long-term, complex nature of impact. As a result they found the RCT—a 
simplistic methods in their view—an inappropriate tool for most impact evaluations. 
 
Although both groups started with the same definition of impact, agreements on the 
concept of rigorous impact evaluations were hard to reach. One key question was to what 
degree an impact evaluation actually relied on a counterfactual, which could be 
represented by, for example, a randomized control group or comparison group. 
 
The Experimental Group’s counterfactual response to impact evaluation 
The Experimental Group argued that that any evaluation of impact required a 
counterfactual statement of effects produced by the intervention—i.e., effects that would 
not have been observed in the absence of the intervention. Therefore, how to address the 
counterfactual would be the central issue in impact evaluation design (NONIE Intro, 
2008, 1). In another section, they wrote that: “The NONIE guidance is concerned with 
impact approaches which establish a counterfactual” (NONIE Intro, 2008, 2). 
 
The Experimental Group conceived of the counterfactual as how the situation would have 
developed without the intervention (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 1). By comparing the factual 
and counterfactual situation, they would be able to attribute the net effect to the 
intervention. Such a comparison between factual and counterfactual was challenging, 
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because, as the subgroup reported: “It is not possible to observe how the situation would 
have been without the intervention” (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 1). 
 
For the Experimental Group, the most common solution to isolate the net effect was the 
selection of a comparison group (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 2). The evaluators needed to be 
careful that the comparison group would exhibit characteristics similar to the treatment 
group, minus the influence of the intervention (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 3–4). The 
Experimental Group argued that the statistical chance for biased assessments would be 
small when the treatment and the control group were selected randomly (NONIE SG 1, 
2008, 4). At the same time, they acknowledged that such “true experimental designs” had 
been rare in development settings. They referred to medical tests that routinely use the 
RCT approach (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 4). 
 
The Experimental Group suggested using a decision tree to select the appropriate 
evaluation approach for addressing selection bias (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 6; cf., FIGURE 4).  
 
FIGURE 4: Decision tree for selecting an impact evaluation approach 
 




If an evaluation were to be designed before an intervention had started, the first question 
would be whether an RCT would be feasible. If not, they suggested other designs. In the 
event the selection of treatment group is based on observable differences, they 
recommended quasi-experimental designs. If unobservable differences are time invariant, 
they recommended panel data-based designs. If the differences between the treatment and 
control group are unobservable and could not be estimated, they found that the problem 
of selection bias could not be addressed (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 6). Instead, they suggested 
“plausible association” via program theory and triangulation. However, the Experimental 
Group would not consider this design a rigorous impact design. Such a design would fall 
under interpretive-qualitative approaches. 
 
The Experimental Group envisioned a decision-tree where the RCT would be the top 
choice if feasible, whereas qualitative approaches would be the bottom choice if none of 
the quantitative techniques worked. Still, the Experimental Group maintained that so-
called rigorous impact evaluations would not be restricted to experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches. (Quasi-)experimental approaches would only apply for 
interventions with many observations. However, when the number of observations was 
small—such as in cases of institutional or national policy change—quantitative and 
statistically-based approaches would no longer be meaningful. Instead, they suggested a 
modeling-based approach and a narrative approach along the lines of historical research 
(NONIE Intro, 2008, 5). The Experimental Group did not explicate these non-quantitative 
approaches. Had they provided further elaboration on these methodologies, they might 
have more successfully demonstrated their commitment to including alternative non-
quantitative methods. 
 
An impact evaluation would need to answer not only the question of whether the program 
works, but also the question of why there was or was not an impact (NONIE Intro, 2008, 
3). Answering the why question would help generalize from a specific context, and it 
would also help in making decisions about scale-ups and how to improve interventions 
(NONIE SG 1, 2008, 5). In fact, impact evaluations that focused merely on measuring 
impacts would be mere “black box evaluations,” without any indication as to why the 
intervention had the expected impact (see also Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007). In order 
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to open the black box, the Experimental Group suggested mixed-methods evaluations that 
included qualitative and quantitative information (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 6). 
 
For the Experimental Group, evaluators would need to establish a program theory in 
order to answer the “why question.” Such a theory-based evaluation design would 
reconstruct the logic behind a program and identify the channels through which the 
program was expected to operate (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 5). Program theory would 
explicitly capture how, why, and for whom an intervention should generate a certain 
impact (see also Caspari, 2009, 206). To reconstruct a program theory, evaluators would 
rely on the review of planning documents, such as Logical Framework Approaches. 
Rigorous impact evaluations would finally be able to test the assumptions of Logical 
Framework Approaches, which had been used since the early 1970s.  
 
A rigorous impact evaluation combined with a theory-based analysis would increase the 
relevance of an evaluation for policy makers. This echoed the opinion of Howard White, 
a member of the Experimental Group, that “there is not necessarily a tradeoff between 
what is called here rigorous impact evaluation—i.e. one which applies the appropriate 
technical procedures—and relevance, which depends on a well-contextualized theory-
based approach” (White & Barbu, 2006, 2).  
 
Overall, the Experimental Group found that any impact evaluation would need to 
explicitly deal with methodological problems when measuring impact (NONIE Intro, 
2008, 2). Especially at issue was the selection bias. Evaluators could use a variety of 
methods, albeit preferably quantitative, to test the validity of the program’s theory-based 
assumptions and to analyze the various links in the intervention chain (NONIE SG 1, 
2008, 5). The Experimental Group stressed the importance of mixed-methods evaluations 
that included both qualitative and quantitative information (NONIE SG 1, 2008, 6). 
 
In sum, the Experimental Group was not interested in the polarization of quantitative 
approaches versus qualitative approaches. However, they found that qualitative 
approaches alone would not be able to address the problem of selection bias. They saw a 
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need for mixed-methods evaluations to explain why and how interventions worked, and 
left it to the Alternative Group to illustrate these qualitative evaluation approaches. 
 
The Experimental Group’s arguments were more diversified than the Evaluation Gap 
Working Group’s report regarding methodological choices. They provided a decision tree 
on how to select evaluation designs, which was based on the timing and the available data 
for an intervention. The decision tree, however, was only limited to interventions that 
contained many observations (i.e., units under study), which is often not the case for 
institutional policies or country-wide interventions. Finally, although the decision tree 
was not intended as a hierarchy of methods, it was still close to hierarchical thinking. 
This approach was something that the Alternative Group did not appreciate this, given 
their preference for methodological pluralism. 
 
The Alternative Group’s factual response to impact evaluation 
In the foreword, the Alternative Group’s report on alternative designs made the following 
statement: 
“SG 1 has provided an introductory document [i.e., NONIE Intro, 2008]. SG2 
submits that this has a narrow perspective and does not address the 
comprehensive view of impact evaluation that is espoused by NONIE members.  
SG2 thus presents an alternative proposal for Section 1 of the NONIE Guidance 
Document (See Section 1 of the SG2 document). This presents a multi-faceted 
and contextual character of impact evaluation in development contexts.” (NONIE 
SG 2, 2008, i) 
 
The Alternative Group set a confrontational tone with these words. They accused the 
Experimental Group of being too narrow in their understanding of impact evaluation and 
suggested a more comprehensive view of impact evaluation. For one, they did not want to 
restrict themselves to methodological issues. They also wanted to address issues on 
ethics, implementation, and management of impact evaluations. Second, they found the 
Experimental Group’s definition of impact to be too narrow. Recall that both subgroups 
started with the same definition of impact by the OECD DAC glossary (cf., above). The 
Experimental Group emphasized the idea of the counterfactual and net effect. The 
Alternative Group emphasized the complex nature of impact. They did not find the 
concept of a counterfactual a necessary part of impact. They also did not subscribe to the 
concept of attribution—i.e., whether changes could be attributed to the intervention—
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because they felt attribution generally implied a counterfactual. Instead they preferred the 
concept of contribution. They argued against the use of an “explicit counterfactual,” 
which they equated with the use of randomized control groups or RCTs. Instead, the 
Alternative Group used the concept of a causal contribution analysis, which would rely 
on qualitative approaches. 
 
The Alternative Group observed that many development interventions were non-
standardized, emergent, and complex. Such interventions included community 
development, natural resources management, and emergency situations (NONIE SG 2 
presentation, January 14, 2008). Emergent outcomes would make pre-identification of 
outcomes difficult (NONIE SG 2, 2008 23). Therefore, complex interventions would 
often not allow for an explicit counterfactual via a randomized control group. For 
evaluation purposes, no counterfactual would be necessary. The Alternative Group 
quoted the historical sciences and the natural sciences, which generated evidence without 
the use of a formal counterfactual (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 16). 
 
A complex intervention would need a multi-disciplinary, mixed-methods evaluation 
approach that established rigor via triangulation (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 3; 14). The 
Alternative Group rejected any idea of a decision tree. They found that “methodological 
appropriateness should be considered the ‘gold standard’ for impact evaluation” (NONIE 
SG 2, 2008, ii), a statement that the Experimental Group could probably also accept.  
 
Each impact evaluation would test a theory against “logic and the evidence available on 
the various assumptions behind the theory of change.” Evaluators would identify possible 
explanations for the program impact and then rule these out, based on observational 
evidence (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 24). Sources for plausible program theory could be expert 
opinions, beneficiaries, and research (NONIE SG 2 presentation, January 14, 2008). 
 
The Alternative Group deplored that the Experimental Group provided what they felt was 
an overly simplistic response to the need for policy evidence, because experimental and 
quasi-experimental approaches would only capture “what works, based on numbers and 
statistics” (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 4). Impact evaluations, however, would need to use more 
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complex models to address impact from various angles. The Alternative Group relied on 
the concept of “realistic evaluation,” which Pawson and Tilley had developed in the 
1990s in the United Kingdom. Realistic evaluation asked more comprehensive questions, 
including: “What works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects, and 
how?” (NONIE SG 2, 2008, 25). A rigorous impact evaluation would address all these 
questions. Only then could it guarantee both internal validity and external validity, i.e., 
generalizability and transferability to other policy contexts (NONIE SG 2 presentation, 
January 14, 2008).  
 
The Alternative Group’s arguments were important because they opposed a narrow 
concept of impact evaluation as measuring merely net effect. At the same time, the 
Alternative Group did not adequately value the concept of the counterfactual and 
attribution. In line with what one NONIE member emphasized, I argue that the 
counterfactual is an imaginary notion, and that in fact, every impact evaluation would 
have to deal with such an imaginary or implicit counterfactual (NONIE notes, January 
14, 2008). Moreover, there was no substantive distinction between attribution and 
contribution, the main difference being in the emphasis of other simultaneous effects 
when using the term “contribution.” But even contribution analysis would deal with 
cause-effect questions when evaluating impact. The Alternative Group also did not 
explicate alternative methods in detail to assess and understand program impact. 
 
The 2008 NONIE draft statement and its controversy 
NONIE encompassed a variety of opinions and conceptions of what impact evaluation 
was. The Experimental Group emphasized mostly methodological questions about 
selection bias. The Alternative Group was concerned with qualitative approaches and 
understanding impact evaluation in a larger development context. Finding a unifying 
voice was a difficult undertaking. The final plenary session of the NONIE meeting in 
January 2008 illustrated the heterogeneity of opinions and inability to reach a satisfactory 
consensus.  
 
Before the final session, the NONIE leadership had circulated a two-page summary, 
“Draft NONIE Statement on Impact Evaluation” (NONIE statement, 2008). The first 
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paragraph was concerned with the need for quality impact evaluations, especially in the 
context of the Millennium Development Goals and results agenda. In the second 
paragraph, the summary quoted the OECD DAC definition of impact. Accordingly, 
quality impact evaluations would focus on long-term effects, including negative, indirect, 
unintended and secondary effects. The evaluations would thus encompass more than just 
positive, direct, intended and primary effects—which would be more easily measured. 
However, the summary did not include the second part of the definition of impact, which 
concerned the economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, and technological 
effects. It was this latter half that had been of greater concern to the Alternative Group.  
 
The draft stated that impact evaluations would be issues-driven and priority-driven. 
Therefore, they would use appropriate methods. This meant that they would not choose 
interventions based on their amenability to certain impact evaluation approaches. This 
was an indirect reference to choosing only interventions to be evaluated that would allow 
for RCT methodology. The consultation draft of the Center for Global Development had 
stated that half of the impact evaluations had to be RCTs—which would not have tailored 
the method to the topic under study. 
 
The NONIE draft statement then listed the available methodological choices in the 
following order: randomized controlled trials, regression discontinuity, propensity score 
matching, and other regression-based approaches that deal with problems of sample 
selection. The statement further acknowledged that these quantitative approaches could 
not be used widely for the type of existing interventions. Approaches would therefore 
need to include other methodologies to cover the full range of development interventions 
including sector-level and country-level interventions. Unfortunately, the NONIE 
statement did not include what those methodologies should be. 
 
The summary draft did not emphasize any hierarchical order of these quantitative 
approaches, as the Experimental Group had implied in their decision tree. The statement 
did not include qualitative methodologies as stand alone for impact evaluation. The 
NONIE statement, however, specifically promoted the use of mixed methods. The 
statement referred to “quantitative and qualitative data,” thus being mostly concerned 
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with how the data were collected rather than how they were analyzed. The statement did 
not make a clear distinction between data collection and data analysis methods. 
 
On the one hand, the draft statement emphasized the problem of biased sample selection 
that would bias impact estimates, which would decrease internal validity. On the other 
hand, NONIE also advocated a “theory-based evaluation design” according to Pawson 
and Tilley’s principles of realistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). This approach 
was much more concerned with external validity: “under which circumstances findings of 
the evaluation are transferable to other contexts.” (NONIE Statement, 2008) A theory-
based design would establish a hypothesis on the process of an intervention from its 
inputs to outputs, outcomes, and impact (cf., the Logistical Framework Approach in 
Figure 2, and the results chain in FIGURE 3). Thus, an impact evaluation would move 
beyond the question of merely whether an intervention had its intended effect—which 
had been a major focus of clinical RCTs in drug development. Theory-based designs 
would also address the “question of why—or why not—an intervention had the intended 
impact.” Opening the black box of development of particular interventions would help 
clarify the mechanism of an intervention via its result chain and thus could offer clues 
whether it could be replicated in other contexts. Thus, an impact evaluation would 
contribute to policy relevance, because policy makers were interested in how and why 
interventions worked. 
 
The NONIE summary also emphasized the collaborative, participatory partnership of 
evaluators from developing and developed countries. NONIE supported a “Southern-led 
evaluation program” (NONIE statement, January 5, 2008). NONIE’s decision to include 
members from developing countries in the development of impact guidelines showed 
their commitment in Southern-Northern partnerships.  
 
When the NONIE leadership presented the draft statement, several NONIE members 
expressed their discontent (NONIE statement, January 5, 2008). One member argued: 
“The statement refers to a wide variety of potential methods, but it is implied that there is 
a hierarchy of methods. It does not quite say that, but it is implicit” (NONIE notes, 
January 14, 2008). The person requested the removal of all the quantitative methods from 
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the list, because their inclusion could make a false impression regarding NONIE’s mixed-
methods stance. He also suggested making the “mixed-methods” stance more visible in 
the statement. 
 
Referring to the subgroup documents, one NONIE member poignantly raised the question 
as to how NONIE could rapidly come to a principal agreement, as it would be naïve to 
assume that they had a finalized document in hand (NONIE notes, January 14, 2008). 
Another person from a developing country demanded a new statement to address the 
various gaps identified by the Alternative Group and which would go beyond the 
methodological issues. She felt the statement to be too one-sided and too premature to be 
released in its current form. Members in general felt that the NONIE statement was 
preliminary. NONIE itself was regarded as a lightly structured, fledgling organization, 
still forming in the next decade.  
 
The NONIE meeting ended with the agreement of hiring an external consultant to create 
a compromise between the subgroup documents. The dissatisfactory conclusion of 
NONIE’s January 2008 meeting did not change for the better in the following year. In 
fact, divisions grew and a compromise proved to be unreachable. The inclusion of a 
wider group of evaluators, including representatives of national evaluation associations 
and representatives from developing countries, revealed that impact evaluation was not a 
clearly defined topic, and the role of the RCT in impact evaluation remained unclear. 
 
The 2009 NONIE guidance document: A contested compromise 
The NONIE steering committee asked Frans Leeuw, who was from the Maastricht 
University in the Netherlands, to produce the final draft of the NONIE guidelines based 
on the subgroups’ individual documents. The committee also invited Patricia Rogers 
from RMIT University in Australia, who had advised NONIE’s Alternative Group, to 
comment on Leeuw’s draft. 
 
Leeuw and his collaborator Jos Vaessen presented their draft at the international Impact 
Evaluation Conference in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2009. Up front, the guidance document 
added the following caveat: “The document should not be taken to represent the agreed 
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positions of all the individual NONIE members. The network membership and the 
authors recognize that there is scope to develop the arguments further in several key 
areas.”25 Because member perspectives on the definition, scope, and appropriate methods 
of impact evaluation differed widely, the final NONIE guidance merely represented the 
views of the authors commissioned by NONIE, Leeuw and Vaessen. 
 
The nine-page executive summary, drafted by Arup Banerji from the World Bank, 
outlined the methodological approaches to impact evaluation (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, 
ix). Banerji referred first to the agreed-on definition of impact, in accordance with the 
OECD DAC glossary. Then he focused on two concepts of impact evaluation: attribution 
and counterfactual—both of which were in the original NONIE Experimental Group draft 
(NONIE SG 1, 2008). In line with the Alternative Group, the guidance stated that: “No 
single method is best for addressing the variety of questions and aspects that might be 
part of impact evaluations” (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, x). Nor, they argued, was there a 
“gold standard, in the sense of a single method that is best in all cases” (Leeuw 
& Vaessen, 2009, xiii). However, depending on the scope, objectives, and design of the 
intervention, some methods would have a “comparative advantage over others in 
analyzing a particular question or objective” (ibid., x, xiii). For “single-strand” 
interventions, experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation designs might have a 
comparative advantage in assessing attribution of causal effects (ibid., x, xiii)—a 
statement which the Experimental Group would have supported. On the other hand, 
programs deemed “complicated” and “complex” with extensive range and scope would 
not be suited for narrow “counterfactual estimation” by RCTs or quasi-experiments 
(Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, xiv). Regression-based approaches could be used instead. The 
authors characterized non-quantitative techniques as being less effective in many of the 
cases addressing attribution—an opinion that the Alternative Group would have disputed.  
 
Non-quantitative techniques would help in the theory-based unpacking of institutional 
and beneficiary levels of impact. A non-quantitative, theory-based approach would help 
stakeholders understand an intervention. The evaluators would first need to develop a 
theory of intended or implicit objectives, and then identify the sometimes tacit social, 
                                                 
25 http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/nonie/guidance.html, retrieved September 7, 2011. 
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behavioral, and institutional assumptions these objectives entailed (Leeuw & Vaessen, 
2009, xii). The evaluation would then test those assumptions by either reconstructing the 
causal “story” or by formally testing those assumptions. Qualitative methods would help 
with “construct validity” by ensuring that the variables being measured adequately 
represented the underlying realities of development interventions (Leeuw & Vaessen, 
2009, xv). A mixed-method triangulation of data collection and analysis would increase 
internal, external, and construct validity (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, xvi). Overall, the 
authors concluded that, “well-designed quantitative methods are usually preferable for 
addressing attribution and should be pursued when possible” (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, 
xv). For single-strand, relatively homogeneous interventions, the authors described RCTs 
as “better than most other methods in terms of internal validity,” based on a clearly 
identified counterfactual (ibid., xv). External validity would rely on systematic repetition 
of RCTs across a range of settings and policy options.  
 
Overall, both the executive summary and the main document attempted a compromise 
between the two NONIE subgroups, but ultimately they were unable to fully integrate the 
Alternative Group’s call for non-quantitative methods to establish causal effects. Like the 
Experimental Group, Leeuw and Vaessen called for establishing a counterfactual. They 
used the example of installing water pumps as a rare case, where a factual evaluation 
would suffice to capture impact (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, 21). Normally, controlling for 
other influences would require a control group, which would simulate such a 
counterfactual. Random assignment to the participant and control group would be 
considered the best way to create equivalent groups (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009, 22). The 
second best alternative would be matching techniques by creating control groups similar 
to the participant groups (ibid., 23). Labels such as “best” or “second best” were 
reminiscent of the decision tree used by the Experimental Group. From a counterfactual 
perspective, the RCT was the best evaluation design, but not necessarily the most 
feasible. The authors pointed out that counterfactual evaluations could not be 
implemented in full-coverage interventions, such as price or environmental policies. 
Qualitative methods, however, would have the drawback of not quantifying effects 
attributable to an intervention (ibid., 31). They often could provide a framework in which 




In a personal communication, Patricia Rogers stated that the authors did not integrate her 
concerns about RCTs or her comments about alternative designs into the final document 
(Rogers, personal communication, April 29, 2010). Rogers was disappointed about the 
process of finalizing the NONIE guidance and felt that her voice and the voice of her 
colleagues from the Alternative Group had not been adequately reflected. 
 
During a NONIE steering committee meeting, Andrew Warner from the NONIE 
secretariat pointed out that NONIE’s evaluators came from “different intellectual 
subcultures” (Warner, presentation, October 3, 2008). He noted that some disputes were 
“really more about words than anything else,” while others were rooted in 
misunderstandings or partial understandings about other methodologies. There was, 
however, a “remaining core of real disputes on substantive issues” (Warner, presentation, 
October 3, 2008), which I will further explore in the final chapter where I compare 
arguments of RCT supporters and RCT critics. I found that semantics differed in how 
people used central terms such as “impact evaluation,” “counterfactual,” and “mixed 
methods.” I argue that even the concept of an RCT suffered from partial 
misunderstandings, especially surrounding the word “controlled.” Did “controlled” mean 
just purely statistical control, or was some other control exercised in an RCT? For several 
evaluators, the term “control” implied external control, and thus was suspect from a 
participatory evaluation tradition. 
 
In sum, the NONIE-internal struggles showed that disagreement still existed concerning 
the role of RCT designs in development evaluations. On the one hand, one group called 
for rigorous methods based on RCTs wherever feasible. On the other hand, qualitative-
participatory evaluators argued for methodological pluralism to adequately determine 
program effects and underlying processes. They were also concerned that the exclusive 
focus on methodological questions would overlook issues of policy relevance and 




4. European Evaluation Society’s criticism of RCT primacy 
The Center for Global Development’s report also triggered a response from the European 
Evaluation Society (EES). In December 2007, EES released a statement regarding “the 
importance of a methodologically diverse approach to impact evaluation – specifically 
with respect to development aid and development interventions.” And in April 2009, EES 
released “Comments on the Draft NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation.” In both 
cases, EES shared disappointment about the increasing preference given to randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) for evaluating impact. 
 
In the 2007 statement, EES denounced one contemporary perspective being strongly 
advocated, which was that “the best or only rigorous and scientific way of doing [impact 
evaluations] is through randomized controlled trials (RCTs).” Instead, EES supported 
“multi-method approaches” and would not consider “any single method such as RCTs as 
first choice or as the ‘gold standard’” (ibid., 1).  
 
What, specifically, did EES mean by “method” and “RCT”? The very expression 
“method,” derived from the Greek word for ‘way’ (met-odos), is an ambiguous term with 
various meanings depending on context, though it most frequently refers to ways of data 
collection, data analysis, and overall function. First, EES seemed to regard the “RCT” as 
an exclusive method—one either uses it or one does not. I would argue, in contrast, that 
the RCT is a sample-generating method, which should be combined with multiple 
methodological tools for data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Secondly, the EES 
statement seems to equate the RCT with a laboratory experiment, where the experimenter 
and the environment exert control over the subjects and are hence “controlled” trials (cf., 
Table 9, point 2). This is a misleading view of RCTs. The RCT does not exercise control 
over the study subjects by controlling their environment; it controls via statistical control, 
which is anchored by the random assignment process. The RCT would therefore allow 
for less environmental control because it statistically controls exogenous factors (cf., 
chapter 6). This was a fundamental insight by Ronald Fisher. 
 
EES criticized the RCT along several lines. The following eight points summarize the 




TABLE 9: EES’s arguments against RCTs to determine development impact 
An RCT … (1) is not able to assess complex, nonlinear interventions with multiple 
causes;  
(2) needs to rigorously control for context and other intervening factors;  
(3) is unable to adapt interventions during the evaluation process;  
(4) is unethical at times;  
(5) lacks generalizability/external validity and thus prohibits 
representativeness for scaling-up;  
(6) promotes black-box evaluations without understanding the 
intervention process (i.e., it does not understand “what works for whom 
and under what circumstances”);  
(7) does not focus on unintended, unanticipated outcomes; and 
(8) does not focus on participatory evaluation. 
Compiled and adapted by the author 
 
Table 9 highlights the EES criticism that RCTs would not allow for adapting 
interventions during the evaluation process. In reality, program administrators often had 
to adapt development interventions to the changing political or economic environment, 
such as civil war. Medical trial literature, however, has questioned this inability of RCTs 
to adapt. Clinical trials have been using adaptive models (Cook, 2007). A further critique 
was that RCTs would focus only on the desired short-term effects, but they might not 
capture more comprehensive, long-term, unintended, and unanticipated effects. RCT 
baseline data may not capture unintended effects, and thus would not be used to 
determine the program’s net effect. The issue of how to define effect had played an 
important role in NONIE’s process of establishing guidelines for rigorous impact 
evaluations. In general, several arguments brought forward by EES were valuable in as 
much as they pointed out RCT limitations—limitations that could be addressed via 
adding other methodological approaches. 
 
As point (8) indicates, the statement follows the participatory evaluation tradition such as 
the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) developed by Robert Chambers in the 1980s, 
combining various activist participation and observation tools (Chambers, 1994). 
Participatory approaches proposed that any intervention impact was temporally and 
culturally situated (Mayoux & Chambers, 2005, 35). Thus, local beneficiaries had critical 
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knowledge of program implementation and effects, and could therefore make valuable 
contributions to the evaluation process (Mayoux & Chambers, 2005, 25).  
 
The “analytical capabilities of local people” were important in generating reports on 
program impact (Chambers, 1994, 953). Participatory approaches, such as PRA 
countered seemingly top-down, standardized, and blueprint models of evaluations, based 
on unreliable data from questionnaire surveys. Participatory evaluations would empower 
local people, would be more exploratory in nature, and would be adaptable to the local 
context. They originally deemphasized formal methods, and instead encouraged personal 
judgment (Chambers, 1994, 959). Participatory approaches partially arose out of a 
political and transformative purpose—a purpose specifically intended to make the poor 
capable, powerful, and self-validating (Mayoux & Chambers, 2005, 29, 36; Chambers, 
1994, 963). Participatory evaluation was an important reference point of the EES 
statement as well as NONIE’s Alternative Group. Contrarily, RCT evaluators from 
Western countries would bring a flair of “colonialism” to the developing world (cf., 
Duncan, 2008). Furthermore, any attempt to establish a rigorous hierarchy of methods 
was found suspicious of being exclusionary. 
 
The 2009 “EES Comment on the Draft NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation” 
supported the original two-page NONIE statement from January 2008 and pointed to the 
Guidance’s deviation from the original idea of methodological diversity. Even if the 
NONIE statement was devoid of any methodological hierarchy—though, recall that one 
NONIE member pointed out that the methods list started with RCTs—the Experimental 
Group’s document contained a decision tree of what methods to use. The RCT was the 
first choice. The NONIE Guidance no longer incorporated such a decision tree, but 
pointed to the comparative advantages of each method. EES seemed to be overcritical of 
the NONIE Guidance, partially because it had felt under-represented in the feedback 
loop. 
 
Both EES documents assumed an egalitarianism among methods, and they alerted 
evaluators to take into account alternative approaches and methods for producing policy-
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relevant impact evaluations. They did not, however, further explicate these alternative 
approaches and methods. 
 
5. USAIDs new evaluation policy—attempting to strike a balance  
The new evaluation policy of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
2011 reflected a move towards both using RCTs and mixed methods. Ruth Levine, who 
had co-led CGD’s Evaluation Gap Working Group, became the director of evaluation at 
USAID in 2008. Levine’s goal was to make USAID the frontrunner development agency, 
as it had been in the 1970s (Levine, presentation, April 28, 2010). Recall that USAID 
developed the Logical Framework Approach in 1971, which many bilateral and 
multilateral agencies proceeded to implement in subsequent years up until the current 
day. 
 
USAID’s new evaluation policy (2011) attempted to promote both experimental designs 
and qualitative approaches. The Evaluation Policy Task Team took RCT criticism into 
account and argued for evaluations based on best methods (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, January 2011): 
 
“Based on the best methods:26 Evaluations will use methods that generate the 
highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the questions being 
asked, taking into consideration time, budget and other practical considerations. 
Given the nature of development activities, both qualitative and quantitative 
methods yield valuable findings, and a combination of both often is optimal; 
observational, quasi-experimental and experimental designs all have their place. 
No single method will be privileged over others; rather, the selection of method or 
methods for a particular evaluation should principally consider the empirical 
strength of study design as well as the feasibility (9).” 
 
The statement demonstrated a well-balanced view of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in evaluation, respecting the value of each method in evaluation and supporting a 
combination of those. The statement seemed to reflect EES’s quest for methodological 
pluralism without hierarchical thinking, as no method should be privileged over others. 
Note, however, that this statement was not limited to impact evaluation, but referred to 




In the tradition of CGD and NONIE (Experimental Group), the USAID group argued that 
any impact evaluation needed a rigorously defined counterfactual. For impact 
evaluations, they argued that “experimental methods generate the strongest evidence” (9). 
Put another way, evaluations where “beneficiaries are randomly assigned to either a 
‘treatment’ or a ‘control’ group provide the strongest evidence of a relationship between 
the intervention under study and the outcome measured” (4). As a result, when 
determining impact, “alternative methods should be utilized only when random 
assignment strategies are infeasible” (4). These statements revealed a clear primacy of the 
RCT over any other method for impact evaluation. 
 
In sum, the RCT thinking in international development arose from a general 
disappointment in evaluation quality. The Logical Framework Approach of 1971 
addressed the need for impact-oriented thinking in development. Development agencies, 
however, were not able to measure whether they had truly achieved the desired impacts. 
The 2006 Center for Global Development’s Evaluation Gap report deplored the dearth of 
rigorous impact evaluations and suggested forming a council to promote them. The 
multilateral and bilateral institutions responded with the Network of Network on Impact 
Evaluation (NONIE), which attempted to develop guidelines for quality impact 
evaluations. While the members agreed on the definition of impact, they could not agree 
on how this impact would be best measured. One working group suggested a decision 
tree, which started with the RCT as the best method, while another group wanted 
methodological pluralism. NONIE did not author the final Guidance document. The 
European Evaluation Society negatively responded to RCT movements and suggested 
methodological diversity. The new USAID Evaluation Policy incorporated both 
traditions: RCT-preference for impact evaluations, and multi-methods approach for 
evaluations in general.  
 
This discussion of RCTs in international development shows how the methodological 
pendulum has moved from the RCT-only side toward a more inclusive approach in order 
for evaluations to become more policy relevant. Conditional cash transfer evaluations, for 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Emphasis in original text 
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instance, often include a qualitative-observational study to understand the underlying 
processes of the intervention, which are important for generalizing findings. Furthering 
this line of argumentation in the policy recommendations (cf., Chapter 5), I point to the 
often-unacknowledged fact that RCTs always incorporate many qualitative-interpretive 
components, which evaluators and policy makers need to understand to make sense of 
RCT findings and put them into the right perspective. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE RCT MODEL IN COMPARATIVE POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE AND ITS CHALLENGES 
What lessons for program evaluation can be discerned from the use of RCTs in three 
distinct areas of policy making? How can these lessons inform public policy evaluation? 
To answer these questions, I first provided a nuanced analysis of how the RCT 
movements emerged and developed individually in the policy fields of medicine, 
education, and international development and how they encountered and dealt with 
opposition (cf., chapters 2, 3, and 4).  
 
In this chapter, I first compare policy perspectives, and I demonstrate that the seemingly 
disparate policy fields all privilege the RCT. However, this privileged status is more 
easily accomplished in medicine than in education or international development due to 
the nature of the evaluation. Still, even medicine has encountered a countermovement 
criticizing the sole reliance on RCTs—a countermovement whose advice education and 
international development might be well-advised to heed. 
 
Second, I analyze the different perspectives among RCT supporters and RCT critics 
across the three policy fields in order to construct a scaffolding for productive discussions 
of RCTs. As I show, epistemological disagreements and interpretive differences in 
terminology –even the term RCT—fueled the debate over the primacy of RCTs. I argue 
that achieving a consensus on terminological use of concepts would assist in bridging the 
RCT supporters’ and critics’ understanding of the RCT model. 
 
Third, I identify challenges of implementing the RCT model across all three policy fields, 
again referring back to chapters 2, 3, and 4. I argue that the fields of education and 
international development may not just point to the strengths of the RCT model in 
medicine, but also highlight the need to closely investigate its challenges—challenges 
that are even more pressing for education and international development than for 
medicine. For example, one of the most central factors that RCTs are meant to address—
heterogeneity—does not only apply to individual subjects such as patients, but also to 
households, education systems, and the policy context in general. A policy maker needs 
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to understand the challenges of using the RCT model, such as how to deal with the 
problem of insignificant RCT findings. They may further benefit from understanding how 
challenges associated with RCTs were resolved across policy fields. For example, the 
medical field reduces the number of insignificant findings by conducting more pre-
clinical, pre-RCT research. Understanding these challenges helps evaluators and policy 
makers to understand the appropriate application of the RCT model by neither 
overestimating nor underestimating its power and use.  
 
My comparative analysis leads to policy recommendations that foster a sound 
understanding of the RCT model and what its place is in the knowledge and policy 
generation process. I argue, for example, that evaluators and policy makers need to 
understand possible biases in the RCT model (cf., chapter 2), the qualitative-interpretive 
reasoning surrounding the RCT process, and how representative findings really are. I also 
recommend broadening the evidence-base beyond the RCT model through, for example, 
utilizing cost-effectiveness research when evaluating impact. By doing so, RCT 
evaluations may become more relevant for the particular policy context. 
 
Lastly, I conclude this chapter by offering my view of limitations of the study and 
directions for future research. Future research would benefit from, among other things, a 
similar analysis for non-experimental methods and how they could contribute to 
evaluating impact in public policy. 
 
1. Comparative perspective of RCT movements in medicine, 
education, and international development 
Comparing the RCT movements across the three policy fields of medicine, education, 
and international development reveals many parallels beneath the idiosyncrasies of each 
field. Table 10 summarizes a comparison of the RCT movements across the three policy 
fields. Note that medicine appears to be the frontrunner, with education and international 
development following. The recent references of these latter fields to the “higher status” 





TABLE 10: Comparison of RCT movements in medicine, education, and 
international development 
                 Field 
Topic 
Medicine Education International 
Development 
Adoption of RCT 
approach 




1960s health and 
nutrition studies 








2006 CGD report 
Institutionalization 
of RCT approach 






2011: Preference in 
impact evaluation 
(USAID) 















Adoption of the RCT approach 
In the field of medicine, the U.K. Medical Research Council promoted randomized 
medical trials in the 1940s through studies such as the Streptomycin trial of 1948. Soon 
thereafter trials were popularized in the United States, culminating in the Poliomyelitis 
trials in the 1950s. By utilizing public schools, the Polio trial became a “public 
experiment.” The desperate need for a vaccine and the positive results of the trial helped 
foster the general acceptance of RCTs as an evaluation tool—a tool that would modernize 
medicine into a lifesaving profession. 
 
By looking up to the medical sciences as the frontrunner in designing and implementing 
RCTs, scientists in education and international development recognized RCTs as the 
modern methodological approach. RCTs of health and nutrition interventions entered the 
field of international development in the 1960s (e.g., the Guatemalan Villages study). The 
U.S. Government also sponsored large-scale education trials in the 1970s and 1980s, such 
as the Head Start experiments.  
 
It was medicine that paved the way for RCTs to be accepted as scientific methodology 
and modernized means of knowledge generation. So-called lower-status policy fields 
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such as education and international development subsequently adopted the RCT 
methodology to transform themselves into more scientific disciplines. What they did not 
realize is that large-scale RCTs in medicine are only a small slice of knowledge 
generation. The drug development process utilizes large-scale RCTs only in the third 
phase. Education and international development did not put a similar system into place 
that required and valued pretrial research. They therefore may have introduced RCTs too 
prematurely as an evaluation tool in the knowledge generation process. 
 
Renewed interest in RCTs 
The Evidence-Based Medicine movement in 1992 was an attempt to bring RCT evidence 
to the medical practitioner’s office (Evidence-Based Medicine Work Group, 1992). Also 
beginning in 1992, the Cochrane Collaboration produced systematic reviews, which used 
an RCT hierarchy of evidence to evaluate existing research in medicine. They considered 
the RCT the optimal evaluation design, and any quasi-experimental and non-
experimental designs were discounted against the RCT standard. 
 
In the late 1990s, stakeholders in U.S. education and international development had 
become dissatisfied with the available evidence base of effective programs and found that 
past evaluations often had justified program interventions without truly establishing the 
causal attribution of program effects. Modeled after Evidence-Based Medicine, the 
National Reading Panel established experimental standards of evidence in 2000. 
Moreover, the federal Institute of Education Sciences established the What Works 
Clearing House in 2003, which promoted RCTs as the default approach in educational 
impact evaluations. A main problem in education was that most of the previous research 
were not RCTs and therefore would not be included in the review process, but discarded 
up front. 
 
In international development, the renewed RCT movement started with the establishment 
of nongovernmental academic institutions, such as the Jameel Poverty Action Lab at 
MIT, which offered services of RCTs in international development. In 2006, the Center 
for Global Development published the Evaluation Gap Working Group’s report on 
rigorous impact evaluation, which triggered a large-scale debate over the privileged use 
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of RCTs. The World Bank and other nongovernmental institutions increasingly valued 
RCTs as the strongest evaluation designs for assessing program impact. Finally, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development established their evaluation policy in 2011, 
promoting RCTs as the preferred approach for impact evaluations. One problem was that 
RCTs are not feasible for all policy topics, such as macroeconomic or environmental 
policy interventions, which affect the total population—as opposed to a discrete medical 
intervention. 
 
Institutionalization of the RCT approach 
As discussed in chapter two, the Federal Drug Administration had regulated that each 
new drug needed to be based on RCT evidence. Education and international development 
are far from this stage. However, these policy fields have developed their own systems of 
making RCTs the preferred methodological choice, and they have established evidence 
hierarchies and policy priorities.  
 
Since 1970, the FDA requires that each new drug be supported by at least two positive 
RCTs in phase-three trials before it can be distributed in the market. Some exceptions 
apply to rare diseases and long-known drugs such as acetylsalicylic acid. Note that RCTs 
are only required in one stage of drug evaluation, and thus they are not the only 
recognized method in the larger evaluation process. 
 
In the field of education, the U.S. Department of Education’s (USDOE) priority for 
scientifically based evaluation in education (2005) is not an absolute priority. Although 
USDOE prioritizes RCTs over non-experimental methods when evaluating studies of 
similar quality, USDOE considers non-experimental research designs fundable if they 
demonstrate high scientific quality. The RCT movement in U.S. education has influenced 
the discourse and culture of educational evaluation through review institutions. One of 
them is DOE’s What Works Clearinghouse, which functions as a review filter for RCT 
evaluations. One core problem was that WWC only found a few programs to be effective 
when employing the RCT evidence hierarchy. Therefore, school districts and education 
practitioners did not find the reviews useful for their curriculum planning (U.S. 




In the arena of international development, institutions do not have the power of 
legislating methodological choices in evaluation approaches. Funding of development aid 
is diverse. However, private foundations such as the Gates Foundation or the Hewlett 
Foundation favor experimental evaluations; both foundations fund domestic and 
international projects. Furthermore, a few institutions have committed themselves to 
experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation designs. The World Bank established the 
Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF), which has only been funding experimental and 
quasi-experimental evaluations. Originally, they restricted their funding to RCTs, 
although they opened the pool in the following year. It is unclear what triggered the 
change, but most likely the RCT criticism of certain constituents supported the change. 
 
Influencing policy via funding choices rather than regulations on methodology is less 
obvious, but it can be equally powerful. For example, RCT funding priorities could 
increase funding for conditional cash transfer programs, but not for macroeconomic 
changes. 
 
Countermovements against RCT primacy 
In all three policy fields criticism and debates have arisen overt the value of RCTs to 
demonstrate effectiveness. In medicine, the physician Archibald Cochrane, known as the 
father of Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), had already pointed out snags with the RCT 
methodology. He suggested being cautious when large sample sizes generated 
statistically significant results (Cochrane, 1971). Since the 1990s, the model of 
personalized medicine questioned the idea of the average patient, a notion upon which the 
RCT model was based. Instead, medical clinicians demanded personalized care tailored 
to the individual patient rather than a patient group. Sir Michael Rawlins, chair of the 
U.K. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), remarked that RCTs 
had been put on an "undeserved pedestal" (Cuthbertson, 2008). Rawlins argued that 
RCTs have limited external validity because they are typically used for "specific types of 
patients for a relatively short period of time." Instead, Rawlins recommended a diversity 





In U.S. education, the opponents of the RCT movement were mostly school practitioners 
and administrators, education evaluators, and theorists. They vehemently opposed the 
federal administration’s demand for RCT primacy. Instead they argued for 
methodological pluralism. They were initially unsuccessful in getting their cause heard, 
as the AEA counterstatement to the proposed Federal Priority of experimental 
evaluations showed (cf., chapter three). 
 
In international development, the Center for Global Development’s 2006 report on the 
evaluation gap stirred disagreements from development evaluators and practitioners over 
the value of RCTs for evaluations of development interventions. The Network of 
Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE) directly responded to the CGD report and 
created a community of development practitioners and theorists who were interested in 
high-quality impact evaluations. NONIE members agreed that evaluation questions and 
contextual factors drive methodological choices, and not the reverse. There was 
disagreement about the value of RCTs. As shown in chapter four, some NONIE members 
were heavily opposed to the RCT primacy and instead promoted methodological 
pluralism or egalitarianism. Others insisted on the superior quality of the RCT approach, 
provided its implementation was feasible. 
 
RCT critics across all three policy fields saw a threat of the RCT primacy in crowding out 
other valuable, and sometimes more appropriate evaluation methods. They were 
concerned that privileging RCTs would create narrow policy solutions for complex 
problems. 
 
Adjustments within the RCT movement 
In all three policy fields, the “RCT pendulum” is swinging away from RCT primacy back 
to the center. The FDA commissioner Margaret Hamburg called for more flexible 
standards of drug evaluations and for a reevaluation of methodologies beyond the RCT. 
She suggested revisiting unsuccessful RCTs in the past through the lens of biomarkers 





The funding of comparative effectiveness research by U.S. legislators was an important 
step toward embracing a more inclusive evaluation approach in medicine. Up until now, 
the FDA has not required drug testers to use equivalency control groups, i.e., control 
groups receiving the best available drug on the market (cf., chapter two). However, 
findings from no-treatment controls are not as relevant for clinical practice, and thus they 
do not greatly inform decision making (i.e., doctors typically prescribe an FDA-approved 
drug for an ailment, but the question is whether there is a more effective drug than the 
one originally prescribed). However, in the area of education and international 
development, comparative effectiveness research has not yet been widely used. For 
example, in the STAR trial, the control groups could not utilize the same amount of 
resources for another intervention like extended school day or school year. Similarly, the 
Mexican Conditional Cash Transfer experiment used no-treatment conditions as controls. 
Small-scale experiments in Malawi and Morocco have so far incorporated comparative 
treatment arms with conditional and unconditional cash transfers (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2011, 80). This would make comparative effectiveness evaluation possible and more 
relevant. 
 
In the field of education, the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) did not respond 
initially to the criticism of the narrow definition of evidence, but later USDOE expanded 
the evidence hierarchy to include single case studies reviews (2010), as shown in chapter 
three. John Easton, the new director of the Institute of Education Sciences, also expressed 
a more inclusive view of methodological choices. He stated that “we must expand our 
repertoire of rigorous methodologies,” which included non-experimental evidence 
(Easton, speech, March 28, 2011). Since the Obama Administration, a desire for more 
relevant, multi-methods evaluations of educational programs arose, swinging the methods 
“pendulum” to a more central position. At this point in history, it is unclear whether this 
desire has yet redirected education funding towards more inclusive evaluation 
approaches. 
 
In international development, USAID’s new evaluation policy (2011) underscored the 
value of both RCT designs and qualitative approaches. At first blush, they appeared to 
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fully integrate criticism against privileging just one method, and they argued for 
evaluations based on best methods à la NONIE’s Alternative Group (U.S. Agency for 
International Development, January 2011). They further argued that evaluations should 
use methods that generate the highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds 
to the questions being asked. Their statement promotes a well-balanced mix of qualitative 
and quantitative, experimental and non-experimental methods. Yet, their stance on the 
topic of methods for impact evaluation belied this openness: “Experimental methods 
generate the strongest evidence,” and “alternative methods should be utilized only when 
random assignment strategies are infeasible” (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, January 2011). These statements do not align with their original quest for 
methodological balance, but treated the RCT as preferred method. But in general, USAID 
has been open to refining the question of methodological choice, and they are also 
considering alternative approaches. 
 
In sum, the RCT movements in education and international development were inspired 
by the RCT use in medicine. They arose from a general search for a more scientific 
evaluation approach and from dissatisfaction with evaluation quality. While FDA directly 
institutionalized the RCT via requiring 2 RCTs per new drug approved, USDOE and 
USAID established preference priorities for RCTs by prioritizing funding of programs 
with an RCT attached. All three policy fields managed to federally regulate the 
preference for experimental designs in their way, but they also responded to criticisms 
and ultimately adjusted their evaluation policies accordingly. In the following section, I 
show that a closer look at RCT criticism in medicine can be helpful for soundly 
evaluating the RCT model as an evaluation tool for policy makers in education and 
international development. 
 
2. Comparing arguments of RCT supporters and critics 
The pendulum is in motion from RCT primacy toward greater methodological pluralism. 
The catalyst for this shift arose from the different views of RCT supporters and RCT 
critics. A closer look at these differences generates a more nuanced understanding of the 
RCT as evaluation tool. In the following section, I identify terminological and 
epistemological differences between the views, but I also show that core beliefs are 
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Chapter four revealed terminological differences in the language use of RCT evaluators 
and their critics in international development. Howard White rightly argues that as long 
as these terminological differences prevail, a constructive debate about methodological 
choices can hardly take place (White, 2009). Evaluators have varied understandings of 
the notions of, for example, impact, counterfactual, attribution, and randomized 
controlled trial. These different understandings are typically due to the varied 
professional background of evaluators. Table 11 schematically compares a few 
terminological differences between RCT supporters and RCT critics.  
 
TABLE 11: Terminological differences between RCT supporters and RCT critics 
               Sides 
Term                
as defined by RCT supporters as defined by RCT critics 
 
(a) Impact Net effect Long-term effects 
(b) Counterfactual Theoretical concept Real control group 
(c)RCT Statistical control for 
differences 
Physical control  
 
(a) Definition of impact 
One crucial dividing line is how RCT supporters and RCT critics understand the term 
“impact.” The divergence in definitions convolutes the RCT debate. When using the term 
“impact” in development evaluation, both RCT supporters and RCT critics typically refer 
to the OECD DAC’s definition, but emphasize different parts. RCT critics underscore 
multidimensional aspects, such as positive and negative, primary and secondary, direct 
and indirect, intended and unintended effects; as well as economic, socio-cultural, 
institutional, environmental, and technological changes (cf., OECD Development 
Assistance Committee, 2010), none of which an RCT would be able to easily measure. 
One of many challenges in measuring such multidimensional aspects would be the need 
for the unit of assignment and analysis to coincide. In contrast, RCT supporters take a 
more narrow focus on impact as “net effect,” i.e., comparing the outcomes of an 
intervention with what would have happened without the intervention (cf., Gertler, 
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Martinez, Premand, et al., 2011). They typically rely on a limited number of measures 
and then compare the baseline with the end measurements. Unanticipated effects, by 
definition, would not be captured by baseline measurements and would thus not be part 
of an RCT evaluation. RCT critics rightly point out the discrepancy between what RCTs 
typically measure and how multidimensional impact is defined. 
 
I have already shown how the supporters and critics of RCTs emphasize different aspects 
of the definition of “impact.” Whereas RCT supporters tend to emphasize the causal 
aspect, RCT critics typically emphasize the multi-dimensional aspect of the definition. 
Both aspects are part of the definition, yet shifting the focus slightly has major 
consequences for methodological ideologies. This dissonance highlights how difficult it 
is to standardize a term’s use in the sub-fields of evaluation, where users’ background 
and training casts different meanings on methodological concepts. The 
misunderstandings that have resulted underscore the need to agree on terminological 
meaning. 
  
(b) Definition of counterfactual 
RCT supporters and RCT critics use the term “counterfactual” differently. RCT 
supporters do not necessarily think that a randomized control group produces a real 
counterfactual. They think of the counterfactual as a theoretical idea, which a well-
controlled comparison group would merely approximate. In fact, the randomized control 
group could never simulate a true counterfactual. Counterfactuals by definition can not 
exist, because they refer to what would have happened if a person or group had not 
received an intervention. Counterfactuals might be approximated by randomly assigning 
different subjects to different interventions. RCT supporters typically believe that 
determining the impact—i.e., net effect—requires a well-controlled comparison group, 
which would imperfectly represent the counterfactual via randomization.  
 
RCT critics, however, tend to equate the counterfactual with a randomized control group. 
They do not believe in the necessity of a so-called “counterfactual analysis” to establish 
causal impact. So when both sides seem to disagree on whether a counterfactual is 
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necessary in determining program impact, they may not be talking about the same 
concept. 
 
The different understandings of counterfactual lead to the question of to what degree an 
impact evaluation needs to approximate a counterfactual situation. RCT supporters and 
RCT critics seem to disagree in this regard. Obviously, a true counterfactual is not 
necessary for knowledge generation because it does not exist by definition. In general, a 
counterfactual situation, if simulated either by a control group or statistically, would help 
in determining impact. However, a factual analysis of the program (without a comparison 
group) might also be sufficient in determining impact, similar to knowledge generation in 
the natural sciences. This would be especially true when there are few external factors 
that could influence impact. Howard White, for instance, referred to an intervention for 
making water transport more efficient. An impact evaluation of such an intervention did 
not require a counterfactual because no additional changes were made to the water 
system (White, Barbu, 2006). 
 
(c) Definition of randomized controlled trial 
In general, experimental and qualitative evaluators interpret the concept of the 
randomized controlled trial itself differently. The common rationale for performing an 
RCT is the idea of establishing a causal connection through the use of a simulated 
counterfactual, represented by the randomly assigned control group. For experimentalists, 
the RCT stands out from other approaches through the concept of random assignment and 
the existence of a (randomly assigned) control group. In the tradition of Ronald Fisher, 
RCT supporters emphasize that these two characteristics make experiments suitable for 
the field beyond an artificial laboratory.  
 
Evaluations can take place in a laboratory setting or in a field setting. Wilhelm Wundt 
founded experimental psychology in the 19
th
 century and created the experimental 
laboratory wherein researchers tested humans in a controlled environment. Its purpose 
was to reduce the variance of possible influential variables. Research subjects were 
isolated from the routine of ordinary living. Researchers then manipulated the variable 




RCT critics sometimes equate RCTs with these laboratory experiments. This is a false 
equation, based on a misunderstanding of the nature of RCTs. This misunderstanding 
might arise from an evaluator’s limited knowledge of quantitative methods, and of RCTs 
in particular. RCT critics sometimes regard the terms “RCT” and “quantitative” 
interchangeably, which is also incorrect. In fact, RCTs have many qualitative elements, 
such as choosing sample and interpreting findings (cf., policy recommendations). 
 
RCT critics sometimes believe that the term “controlled” in randomized controlled trials 
refers to the externally controlled context of the treatment and control group, as would be 
the case in a laboratory experiment. They sometimes think that RCTs exercise control 
over the study subjects by controlling the subjects’ environment. However, the nature of 
control lies primarily in the random assignment process, not in the control of exogenous 
and endogenous variables. Therefore, the RCT would actually allow for minimal 
environmental control because it statistically controls exogenous factors via 
randomization. Fisher was right in his observation that RCTs equalize the innumerable 
factors and causes of disturbances that would change soil fertility (cf., chapter one, 
Fisher, 1935, 21). The theoretical equalization of exogenous factors allowed researchers 
to conduct fertilizer studies outside the laboratory in the first place. RCT supporters 
emphasize this advantage of requiring less control. Still, RCT critics are right in that 
RCTs are controlled in the sense that RCTs typically follow a strict protocol with 
obtaining baseline and end measurements, in monitoring and managing attrition in both 
study groups, and in making sure the intervention is implemented correctly. 
 
RCT supporters and RCT critics would benefit from making their terminology even more 
transparent, especially given that the evaluation field encompasses so many professional 
backgrounds. The OECD DAC glossary on key terms in evaluation and results-based 
management is a successful example of how to achieve definitional transparency (OECD 
Development Assistance Committee, 2002), but even a glossary leaves room for 
interpretation as the term “impact” revealed. I suggest that a similar glossary of impact 
evaluation would be a worthwhile starting point for bringing clarity into the controversy 
over RCT’s role in evaluation. The NONIE guidelines, as discussed in chapter four, were 
 
 170 
intended as a start, but they did not result in the anticipated common ground for defining 
and guiding impact evaluations. A renewed effort is needed to reach common ground. 
 
Epistemological differences between RCT supporters and RCT critics 
Apart from terminological differences, RCT supporters and critics exhibit 
epistemological differences, i.e., differences stemming from how humans think about the 
world. Applied to the field of policy evaluation, epistemological differences arise from 
how RCT supporters and RCT critics think differently about how evaluation generates 
knowledge. Thinking about these differences allows a more nuanced understanding of the 
RCT as a policy tool. RCT supporters versus RCT critics would disagree in the following 
topics, organized in Table 12 : 
 
TABLE 12: Epistemological differences RCT supporters and RCT critics 
               Sides 
Term                
RCT supporters RCT critics 
(a) Hierarchy RCT as apex in methods 
hierarchy 
No evidence hierarchy, but 
methodological equality 
(b) Sources of 
evidence 
Evidence from (quasi-) 
experiments only 
Evidence from experimental and 
non-experimental approaches 
(c) Complexity RCTs are preferred for complex 
interventions in complex 
situations 
RCTs are not suitable for 
complex interventions in complex 
situations 
(d) Concept of 
science 




Evaluations need to be scientific 
in the first place 




Yes, should be used Yes, should be used 
 
(a) Hierarchy: RCT as apex in the methods hierarchy? 
One fundamental question is whether the RCT should be the apex in the methods 
hierarchy to establish causal impact. For the RCT supporters, the answer is yes. The first 
question an evaluator should ask is whether an RCT is feasible (cf., Subgroup 1’s NONIE 
document). Whether an RCT is feasible depends, among other things, on the number of 
units of assignment (White, 2010, 155). For small numbers of assignable units, some 
RCT purists would argue that no causal statements about program impact can be made 
because an RCT is not feasible. For RCT pragmatists, quasi-experimental and other 
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quantitative approaches could be used to attribute causal effects to an intervention with 
few or just one assignment unit. For example, a macroeconomic intervention to adjust 
inflation or interest rates could rely on historical data to demonstrate impact. However, 
such evidence would not be as strong as the evidence produced by an RCT, because there 
would not be a strong counterfactual like the randomized control group. 
 
For qualitative evaluators, there is no hierarchy of methods. The EES statement, for 
example, emphasized the equality of methodological approaches (cf., chapter 4). 
Therefore, the RCT should not be the default approach for determining causal effects. 
They would further argue that non-experimental, observational evidence is equally valid 
for determining causal effect. They refer to those areas of the natural sciences and 
humanities that rarely use RCTs to arrive at their answers. These areas do not treat non-
experimental approaches as second class.  
 
Even Sir Michael Rawlins, chair of NICE, suggested moving away from the vertical 
concept of evidence assessment (cf., chapter two), where there would be a clear winner at 
the apex (i.e., the RCT). The question is what should be put in place of a hierarchy. 
Referring to the equality of approaches does not give the evaluator and policy maker any 
guidance for when to use what method. 
 
(b) Sources of evidence: From (quasi-)experiments only? 
RCT supporters and RCT critics typically disagree as to whether non-experimental 
methods can generate evidence on causal effect. As previously indicated, non-
experimental approaches such as interpretive data analysis do not necessarily use an 
explicit counterfactual, but are factual in nature instead. Qualitative analysis is focused on 
what has actually happened instead of what would have happened without the treatment.  
 
RCT evaluators argue that an impact evaluation requires at least an implicit 
counterfactual, and that the RCT produces the strongest version of such a counterfactual. 
Qualitative evaluators, however, may not think that a counterfactual is necessary to 
determine impact. They tend to regard factual analysis as sufficient for determining 




The “smoking and lung cancer” correlation is a commonly cited example used by 
experimentalists and qualitative evaluators to make a case for experimental or non-
experimental analysis (cf., chapter three). Both sides agree that RCTs cannot be ethically 
implemented in the smoking case. The fundamental causal question is whether non-
experimental evidence suffices for establishing that smoking causes lung cancer. Non-
experimental evidence could be quasi-experimental, quantitative and non-experimental, 
or qualitative. In the lung cancer example, experimentalists might emphasize that 
randomized smoking experiments were done with animals. With animal experiments, 
however, the question of external validity has not been resolved. Because RCTs were 
only performed on exemplars of animal species, the applicability of their findings to the 
human species is unclear. They might argue that quasi-experiments in the human species 
have shed further light on the connection, where treatment and control persons were 
matched by individual characteristics. However, as with all quasi-experimental designs, 
the question of “unobservables” is unresolved. Therefore, experimentalists would argue 
that the evidence about smoking and lung cancer is not as strong as it would be with an 
RCT. Conversely, qualitative evaluators would argue that non-experimental analysis of 
smoking and lung cancer is sufficient to determine causal effect. In particular, systematic 
observation and measurement of individual cases could transfer the correlation into a 
causal connection by excluding alternative explanations (Scriven, 2008). 
 
The “smoking and lung cancer” case ties into the previous issue of methods hierarchy and 
illustrates the need for a more inclusive understanding of evidence, where non-
experimental sources are also used. 
 
(c) Complexity: RCTs suitable for complex interventions in complex situations? 
RCT supporters and RCT critics disagree as to whether RCTs can adequately evaluate the 
effects of complex interventions in complex situations. Patricia Rogers and others have 
argued that RCTs are appropriate for simple linear interventions, such as drug treatments 
or the provision of educational materials, while pointing out that RCTs are inappropriate 
for complex interventions with multiple determinants (cf., chapter four). Such complex 
interventions in complex environments include sector-wide approaches at a country or 
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regional level—such as macroeconomic interventions that change interest rates, espouse 
human rights intervention, or lead to institutional changes—and interventions 
continuously adapted to a changing environment. 
 
However, in his article on the summative evaluation of the RCT approach, Scriven 
recognized the usefulness of RCTs, especially in complex situations where evaluators 
would have a difficult time accounting for all influencing factors (Scriven, 2008). In the 
1920s, Ronald Fisher had already stated that one major reason to conduct RCT studies 
was to randomly equalize the heterogeneity of the environment (Fisher, 1921). Under this 
lens, RCTs seem very useful for determining effects in complex situations. The main 
problem is that RCTs per se are not able to answer the question of why the interventions 
were effective in such complex situations. Therefore, RCT findings cannot be readily 
applied to other settings. 
 
(d) Concept of science: Universal rules or changing rules? 
The fundamental difference between RCT supporters and RCT critics is their view of 
what science is and what it can do. NONIE members consulted Patton when they put 
together their draft on alternative methods for causal impact evaluation (cf., chapter five). 
In the newest edition of his Utilization-Focused Evaluation (2008), Patton added a 
section on why RCTs should not be the gold standard in evaluation. Patton criticized 
experimental evaluation as being a positivistic enterprise that assumed an objective 
reality based on immutable laws and universal rules. Evaluation would therefore become 
a science of “just getting the facts right,” and would profess to describe things as they 
really were and how they really worked—which Patton criticized as an illusion (Patton, 
2008, 8). Patton countered that in science bare facts did not exist. Whether things would 
work depended on the sociopolitical and cultural context.  
 
Anthony Bryk rightfully pointed out that the question was not whether “something 
works” in general and whether there was some “fixed, true, general effect” to be 
estimated. On the contrary, the question was what effects accrue when enacted by 
different individuals working under varied contexts (Bryk, email communication, January 
2, 2011). He continued: “Rather than a fixed treatment effect, intervention effects exist in 
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a multi-facet[ed], multivariate distribution. Consequently, depending on where you 
inquire, different results will occur” (ibid.). These variable intervention effects in various 
contexts make it difficult to insist on such general rules. This does not mean that the RCT 
is not useful in knowledge generation. Patton agreed that the ideal way to control 
extraneous influences was to randomly assign units to treatment and control groups 
(Patton, 2008, 447). The RCT would create a “hypothetical counterfactual” of what 
would have happened to the treatment group if they had not received the treatment. 
Random assignment would distribute known and unknown extraneous causes evenly 
across treatment and comparison groups, and therefore average the effect of extraneous 
factors. The RCT, however, does not provide a window to universal rules, but rather to 
changing rules, depending on the particular context. 
 
(e) Participatory evaluation? 
RCT supporters and RCT critics differently value the importance of political inclusion 
and participation in an evaluation. RCT supporters tend to focus on issues of selection 
bias and internal validity—that is, whether units were selected by chance and whether the 
program intervention had produced the desired net impact. Usually outside entities 
implement RCTs in program beneficiary groups. Because RCTs require random 
assignment by an unbiased entity, they have the reputation of being “guinea pig” 
experiments, in which people are treated as study objects rather than human subjects. 
Humans or households cannot decide whether they want to be in the treatment or control 
group. 
 
RCT critics, such as members of the NONIE Alternative Group, are interested in the 
political process of evaluation and are concerned about the appropriate inclusion of 
program stakeholders in the evaluation process (cf., chapter four). They fear that RCT 
implementation disempowers intended program beneficiaries by having external 
evaluators assess the program. They prefer to employ local evaluators with local 
knowledge, who would be less likely to suggest randomized allocation. RCT critics see 
RCTs as a Western invention that is imposed on the developing world (Duncan, 2008). 
The evaluation theorist Jennifer Greene even accused RCTs of being “inherently 
undemocratic” because data are extracted from the local population without engaging 
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them (Greene, presentation, April 2, 2009). The evaluation practitioner Zenda Ofir, 
former president of the African Evaluation Association, found that the RCT movement 
itself was a way to control and exert influence over countries, along with war, trade 
policies, investments, and other strategies (Ofir, email communication, August 6, 2007). 
Representatives from developing countries felt that the RCT approach was foreign to 
their way of thinking, and they thus perceived it as a new type of colonialism. 
 
However, RCTs do not necessarily need to be undemocratic or anti-participatory, and 
RCT supporters would deny criticism implying that they are either. The economist Esther 
Duflo prided herself in spending a great deal of time “speaking with people in the 
villages, not sitting in the capital city talking to donors” (MIT Technology Review, 
January 2010). Speaking with people is a start, but does not yet make an evaluation 
participatory. It is still the case that representatives of Western countries initiate and 
conduct RCTs in developing countries. Even in the Progresa case, the Mexican decision 
makers had received their training in the United States, so they were indirectly influenced 
by Western thought. The World Bank and other multilateral agencies provide capacity 
building to evaluators in developing countries (e.g., the Africa Impact Evaluation 
Initiative), but even then knowledge transfer emphasizes the original knowledge gap. 
 
(f) Best method: Should the best method be used? 
RCT supporters and RCT critics might agree that an evaluator should use the best method 
available (White, 2010, 162). However, they are polarized about what the best available 
method would be in certain instances. For RCT supporters, the decision tree for methods 
choices always starts with the question: Is an RCT feasible (cf., Figure 4)? 
Experimentalists do prefer RCTs for causal questions with large sample size; if 
randomization is not possible due to ethical or political constraints, such as in the 
smoking-cancer example, they suggest using other quantitative quasi-experimental 
designs. For qualitative evaluators, no such decision tree exists. They do not give RCTs 
this preferential treatment. Instead, they believe in methodological pluralism and methods 
equality without a rigid methods hierarchy. In his book, Developmental Evaluation 
(2010), Patton found the real gold standard for impact evaluation methods to be 
“methodological appropriateness”—that is, matching methods to the nature of the 
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question and the purpose of the evaluation, rather than “blind adherence to one particular 
design” (Patton, 2010, 39). What methodological appropriateness means is a question still 
up for discussion. Qualitative evaluators have not explicitly demonstrated how they go 
about deciding which method to use.  
 
In the field of evaluation, experts often describe themselves as either qualitative or 
quantitative evaluators. This distinction signals their interests and expertise. A qualitative 
evaluator is more likely to use participatory and utilization-focused approaches, while a 
quantitative evaluator might have a strong background in experimental and quasi-
experimental designs. Their segregation into qualitative, quantitative, or experimental 
evaluators does not mean that there are insurmountable differences in their views, but 
degrees of disagreements. 
 
RCT supporters value the strengths of experimental designs more than qualitative 
evaluators do. They believe that an impact evaluation needs to establish internal validity 
before questions of external validity can be raised (Glennerster, presentation, November 
10, 2008). They maintain that qualitative methods themselves are not able to establish 
internal validity, although these might assist in strengthening external validity. In 
contrast, qualitative evaluators may emphasize the strengths of qualitative tools and when 
and where they would be superior to quantitative approaches. They also like to point out 
challenges of RCTs, which RCT supporters often know equally well, but may find less 
problematic because they focus on internal validity as an RCT’s strength. 
 
There is a range of viewpoints between the extremes of “RCT primacy” and 
“methodological pluralism.” There are many RCT supporters and RCT critics who do not 
adhere to either extreme of the continuum, but who stand more in the middle. They might 
be able to have a constructive discourse about their perspectives on methodological 
choice. 
 
Although this section has so far emphasized the divergent viewpoints, RCT supporters 
and RCT critics have a common ground where a constructive dialogue could and should 
start. First, both sides agree that an impact evaluation should be driven by the particular 
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evaluation question and not by any preferred method. Second, they both agree that a 
triangulation of different methodological approaches and tools would increase the quality 
and relevance of an impact evaluation. Third, they acknowledge challenges of RCTs 
across policy fields. These three points of agreement could stimulate a constructive 
conversation between RCT supporters and RCT critics toward broadening the 
methodological toolbox. 
 
3. Challenges of RCTs 
The RCT theorist Fisher argued that a statistician’s task was to determine how to evaluate 
the limitations of the data in hand and to recognize the limitations of the experimental 
approach (Fisher, 1933, 46). This insight also holds true for decision makers and policy 
makers who are the audience for RCT results. Often times, however, they focus on the 
strengths of RCTs (i.e., internal validity and scientific authority), while forgetting to also 
point to the limitations and challenges of RCTs. 
 
TABLE 13: Challenges of RCTs by topics in medicine, education, and international 
development 
                 Field 
Topic 
Medicine Education International 
Development 
(a) Heterogeneity 






























Due to wrong 
dosage or 
administration 
Due to missing 
catalysts such as 
experienced 
teachers 
Due to missing 






quality of life 








(g) Change of 
policy priorities 




The policy fields of medicine, education, and international development are each faced 
with their own nuanced group of limitations and challenges. Understanding these 
challenges will help evaluators and policy makers value the RCT in a realistic way. 
TABLE 13 summarizes challenges of using RCTs in policymaking by topic. I explicate 
these based on materials from previous chapters. 
 
(a) Heterogeneity of target variables 
One shortcoming of RCTs is the limited applicability of findings to other populations and 
contexts, especially when the RCT is locally restricted and confined to a select pilot 
sample. First and foremost, RCTs target the question of causal attribution whether a 
specific intervention in a particular context brought about certain outcomes (Pawson & 
Tilley, 1997). RCTs do not automatically support the transfer of particular findings to 
other populations and contexts. 
 
In the field of medicine, the heterogeneity of patients outside a trial has been a major 
concern. Often times, the patient sample does not represent the general run of patients, as 
Austin Bradford Hill pointed out (Hill, 1937, 9). The exclusion and inclusion criteria, as 
outlined in the clinical trial registers, prevent many patients with the medical condition 
under study from participating in a trial. For example, RCTs often exclude comorbid 
patients who suffer from more than one disease. Therefore, trial findings do not 
automatically apply to these patients. 
 
In education, the heterogeneity of students, teachers, and the education system in general 
poses a challenge. The Tennessee Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment, for 
example, found that smaller class sizes increased academic student performance in the 
pilot (cf., chapter three). However, the Tennessee evidence did not map directly onto 
California, a state that serves a much larger and more diverse student population than 
Tennessee does. Furthermore, class sizes in the Californian school system were originally 
much larger than in Tennessee, and thus, while the reduction was of similar size, the 
reduced class size was still larger than the class size in Tennessee. The Tennessee RCT 
only answered the question of the reduction of class size from 24 to 16 students, but it did 
not address what would happen if class sizes were reduced from 30 to 20. Finally, the 
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Tennessee trial did not address the larger-scale issue of teacher supply. The state of 
California, for instance, did not have the required supply of teachers to appropriately 
implement class-size reduction. This example illustrates the difficulty of transferring 
evaluation findings to other contexts. 
 
In international development, applying RCT findings across different national and 
cultural contexts is even more problematic due to their heterogeneity. The application of 
RCT findings may turn out differently in culturally and economically distinct societies. 
The problem of heterogeneous target populations in international development can be 
illustrated by the RCT evaluation of Progresa, a conditional Cash Transfer Program in 
Mexico. Many contextual variables existed that influenced the success of the 
intervention. Were the program applied to fathers or in an Arabic country, the results 
might have been different. 
 
(b) Heterogeneity of study population 
A related problem is representativeness of findings for heterogeneous study groups. RCT 
findings foremost yield an average impact estimate on the particular study population 
(e.g., an average human or an average household). RCTs, however, do not provide 
individual-level impact estimates. Such average humans and households are artificial 
constructs and thus are not meaningful for policy makers who are concerned about 
individual-level policy solutions.  
 
In medicine, average findings of drug effectiveness may not be relevant for patients with 
certain heterogeneous characteristics. In education, average findings of a reading 
intervention may not be relevant for a bilingual student. In international development, 
conditional cash transfers may be less effective for households living far from a school 
building. Estimating impacts for subgroups, such as elderly patients, would be more 
informative for decision makers. However, RCT experts rightly believe that subgroup 
analysis is not permitted in an experimental design when random assignment has not 
taken place within those subgroups in the first place. It is often hard to predict which 
subgroups will exhibit unexpected results. This shortcoming does not allow evaluators to 
determine how the program affected individuals or subgroups. Policy makers, however, 
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would like to know more than average and size of the measured effect because they must 
address needs of various constituents. For example, a legislator might not want to 
promote an education initiative that would increase the achievement gap for minority 
students, or he might not feel comfortable suggesting a certain job placement program 
that would put African-American women at a disadvantage. An RCT is typically not 
designed to answer questions specific to subgroups. If it were, sample size would need to 
increase significantly for those subgroups in order to achieve statistically meaningful 
results. 
 
(c) Black box of the underlying intervention process 
RCTs are black box evaluations (Bourguignon & White, 2007). The term “black box” 
refers to the idea of a machine that receives inputs and generates outputs. The process in 
the box is not visible to outside observers. For example, psychologists characterize 
human consciousness as a black box, whose underlying structure, dynamics, and 
mechanisms are not fully understood (Silverman, 2006).  
 
In drug trials, black box evaluations are common. The mechanisms of many psychotropic 
drugs are not known. For example, while Bupropion was tested as a smoking cessation 
drug, researchers observed its mood-lifting capability. They tested the drug for its 
antidepressant effects. Although researchers confirmed the effects, they were not able to 
determine the exact mechanism for how this drug worked in the human body, also called 
pharmacokinetics. For medical purposes, opening the drug’s black box is not necessary 
because its active ingredient, i.e., Bupropion, is known. So the drug can be repeatedly 
manufactured using this ingredient. This is typically not the case in non-medical 
intervention. A program often consists of several components and human mediators. For 
example, a new education program does not just consist of a textbook and manipulatives, 
but also requires teachers to implement the program and students to collaborate. That is 
to say, an education program does not simply work like a medication that a person 
swallows; an education program operates in a complex social and cultural environment. 
Knowing the pathways of the impact would be helpful in applying RCT findings to other 
policy contexts. The black box phenomenon is even larger with complex and 
multidimensional programs, because more factors interact. Patricia Rogers pointed out 
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that evaluators would need to carefully develop a program theory to start opening this 
black box for complex programs (Rogers, 2008).  
 
In medicine, preclinical testing in laboratories also serves the purpose of understanding 
the biological pathways through which a drug works. In the case of education and 
international development, such laboratory testing would be difficult to perform. 
 
To a certain degree, RCTs could assist in opening the black box, according to J-PAL 
associate Bruno Crepon (Crepon, personal communication, June 18, 2008). Crepon 
argued that one could construct treatment and control groups that test the assumptions of 
those underlying processes. For example, a job creation program for hard-to-place 
individuals could provide these individuals with new skills (i.e., the treatment group) or 
could give employers incentives to hire these individuals (i.e., the control group). The 
comparison between those groups could test whether job creation programs work through 
the mechanism of skills or employer incentives. A major drawback of this experimental 
process is that many RCTs would need to be performed to really determine the precise 
mechanism of an intervention. Evaluators acknowledge, therefore, that RCTs alone do 
not open the black box of how a program works, and they understand the importance of 
qualitative-interpretive approaches for opening this black box. For example, qualitative-
interpretative observations, similar to the role of preclinical testing in drug development, 
could help in investigating the underlying processes and channels through which an 
intervention is effective. 
 
Qualitative-interpretive studies generate a different kind of evidence via observations and 
interviewing, which allow for establishing a hypothesis and then following iterative data 
interpretation. Although experimentalists are skeptical about using interpretive data 
analysis for determining causal effect, they would agree that it could explain causal 
processes. 
 
(d) RCT evaluations often produce insignificant findings 
Still, a major challenge of RCTs has been that the majority of findings are statistically 
insignificant. Often, the large-scale federally funded RCTs in the 1980s arrived at 
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statistically insignificant results. Thomas Cook found that most educational RCTs yielded 
statistically insignificant findings (Cook, 2006). As a result, policy makers became 
frustrated over the fact that expensive federal experiments did not yield the desired 
results and thus eventually reduced funding. From a policy perspective, there is a danger 
that policy makers dismiss interventions based on insignificant findings from RCTs, 
given that statistical insignificance does not necessarily imply overall program 
ineffectiveness. Regarding statistical significance testing, recall that Ronald A. Fisher 
regarded the level of probability of .05 as merely a convenient convention (cf., chapter 1). 
Today it is often applied as a rigid standard for deciding whether a program works. RCT 
results with a p value of less than .05 are then automatically called insignificant findings, 
but maybe not rightfully so. 
 
Findings may appear to be insignificant for several reasons. One is that, indeed, the 
intervention is ineffective. However, another explanation is that the intervention in its 
current form or in its current context is on average ineffective; but small changes in the 
study population, the study context, or the intervention itself might yield significant 
findings. This potential misrepresentation of an intervention’s effectiveness leads to a 
major problem of RCTs: they only test a small portion of possible policy interventions in 
possible contexts. 
 
Statistical insignificance can also result when the tested intervention is a necessary but 
insufficient component to produce statistically significant results. Lack of treatment 
integrity and failures in implementing the program may exist. The odds of 
underestimating effects in RCTs are larger than the odds of overestimation (Wittmann, 
2011). Medical clinicians are often disappointed that the interventions they use in daily 
practice do not prove to be effective in RCT evaluations (Wittmann, Klumb, 2006). As 
noted above, statistical insignificance does not automatically imply program 
ineffectiveness. Other catalysts may be needed to make an intervention effective. One 
example comes from an RCT suggesting that textbooks proved ineffective in increasing 
student performance (Kremer 2008). What this RCT did not find out was whether 
teachers had the necessary training to use the textbooks effectively, or whether the 
textbooks were suitable for the particular students. Teachers might have needed 
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additional training in using these textbooks effectively, or the books’ content or language 
might not have been age appropriate. Many reasons may exist for why the particular 
textbooks were not an effective way of instruction in this particular context. Only 
qualitative inquiry would help answer the question of why textbooks were ineffective and 
how to improve their effectiveness. 
 
Statistically insignificant findings can be the starting point of a program’s elimination. It 
is therefore necessary to ask whether the public program fails due to inadequacies of the 
program or due to deficits in the research approach used (Wittmann, 2011). Peter Rossi’s 
Iron Law of social program evaluation pointed out that “nothing works” for many 
programs: “Most programs, when properly evaluated, turn out to be ineffective or at best 
marginally accomplishing their set aims” (Rossi, 1978, 574). Why would this happen? 
Over-reliance of significance testing may be one answer. The choice of inefficient 
evaluation approaches is another possibility. It is important to tailor evaluation 
methodology to practical demands.  
 
(e) Capture long-term impact 
RCTs are used to determine whether a program has had the desired impact. RCT critics 
refer to the OECD DAC definition of impact, which includes more aspects than just the 
desired impact (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2002). These aspects 
include positive and negative, short-term and long-term, direct and indirect, as well as 
intended and unintended components of impact. The definition also encompasses 
economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, and technological levels of effect.  
 
Evaluations in general may suffer from a narrow time horizon with short-term impact 
measures, because funders may need a quick turnaround of one or two years to produce 
evaluation results (Bamberger, 2006). Frequently drug studies entail only a few weeks of 
administering a drug, even with chronical-use drugs such as cholesterol-reducing 
medication. Long-term effects, especially their side effects, cannot be studied in so short 
a time. In international development, Progresa is an example of a program that used a 
pipeline approach where the comparison group received the same treatment 20 months 
after the original treatment group did. The primary outcome measure was school 
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participation, which did not automatically predict whether students would complete their 
education and benefit from it in the labor market. Improvement of educational outcomes, 
increase of employment, and a general increase in income to break the generational cycle 
of poverty would be true impact measures, but these were difficult to measure. Ideally, 
Progresa would have excluded the control group from the intervention for several years, 
but that was not feasible, ethically or politically. Increasing the time horizon would have 
raised ethical issues of excluding the control group from conditional cash transfer once 
data on promising effects of Progresa became available. 
 
When employing a comprehensive definition of impact, one single pre- and post-
intervention measure of the outcome variable of interest is often insufficient. Wittmann 
and colleagues argued for longitudinal data analysis with several points in time that 
measure outcomes (Wittmann, Klumb, 2006). This allows evaluators to capture a “larger 
slice” of intervention effects over longer periods. 
 
Furthermore, an intervention typically does not just affect one level, such as the 
household level. Policy interventions typically affect several levels in a society: 
individuals, households, communities, institutions, regions, and nations. RCTs cannot 
determine the causal effects at all of these levels. If an evaluation would like to 
comprehensively capture the intervention impact, it would need to not just measure the 
effects at the level where the original randomization took place, but also capture 
institutional, societal, and regional changes. Technically, the level of analysis must 
follow the level of random assignment. When communities are the unit of randomization, 
then evaluators should not analyze individual-level outcomes to determine program 
impact. Internal validity cannot be guaranteed, and the evidence is less strong. The same 
is the case for extrapolating findings to higher levels based on the original scheme of 
random assignment. The Guatemalan village study illustrated the temptation to perform 





(f) RCTs take part in the political process 
The limitations and shortcomings that affect quantitative approaches in general naturally 
apply to RCTs. They may result from the political process to which evaluations belong. 
Time constraints and resource constraints often do not allow for high-quality 
experiments. As mentioned above, some quantitative measures used in RCTs might be 
narrow. The U.S. Head Start evaluation, for example, used test scores as outcome 
measures. The experiment did not use other less quantifiable outcomes, such as student 
motivation or self-confidence. Qualitative-observational components such as classroom 
observations might have captured important but less quantifiable results. At least in 
theory, some of these limitations could be addressed by changing funding cycles and 
donor requirements. These solutions apply for both quantitative and qualitative 
evaluations. To measure long-term effects and sustainability of programs, for example, 
longer time horizons are needed. 
 
Donald Campbell argued that “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for 
social decision-making, the more subject it will be to distort and corrupt the social 
processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1976, 49). This statement is especially 
true for the use of RCTs in the political process, and it particularly applies when there are 
commercial interests involved. In the field of medicine, the Federal Drug Administration 
attempted to guarantee drug safety and ensure drug effectiveness by requiring that each 
new drug provide evidence from two RCTs. Researchers found, however, that if 
commercial drug manufacturers sponsor the RCT, the drugs are much more likely to 
show effectiveness than with non-commercial funders. Commercial bias is possible via 
opportunistic choices in the RCT process, for example, by using narrow inclusion 
criteria. 
 
In education, there is some commercial bias as well. Textbook markets are worth 
multibillion U.S. dollars. Textbook companies jumped on the “bandwagon” of RCT 
evidence in the aftermath of Reading First and NCLB. Their interest was to show that 
their educational programs met the criterion of scientifically based evaluation. Rather 
than performing their own RCT evaluations, they initially aligned their products with 
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what was considered scientifically based. They ultimately crowded out products that did 
not fit the criteria. 
 
In international development, certain “pet” programs have emerged. The CCT program is 
sold as hard evidence, although it is still unclear whether conditions are necessary. 
School-based deworming is another example where private foundations and governments 
were enthusiastic followers, but where RCT results did not add much knowledge. 
 
(g) RCT findings change the policy focus 
From a policy perspective, the new focus on RCTs might change how resources are 
allocated in the public sector. Programs in which RCTs can show positive effects might 
be funded in the future, whereas programs in which RCTs are not feasible or desirable 
might be discontinued. Under the federal Reading First initiative, reading programs that 
did not show an alignment with the evidence-based five reading pillars were excluded 
from funding. Phonemics programs for which more experimental evaluations existed 
were more frequently funded under the Reading First component of the 2001 NCLB, as 
illustrated in chapter three. Later, the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) excluded 
observational non-randomized studies from their database. In international development, 
private foundations such as the Gates Foundation or the Hewlett Foundation have 
preferred to fund health and education programs with a strong RCT base. 
 
There is a danger that policies may get evaluated and funded solely based on the fact that 
they are amenable to RCT evaluations. For example, RCTs are not possible for 
interventions that do not directly affect individuals or households, which means that their 
effects cannot be measured on an individual or household level. This is the case for 
macroeconomic, structural, and often environmental policies. The preference for RCT 
evaluations creates a project selection bias. Dina Pomeranz welcomed a shift in 
structuring aid delivery based on evidence from RCTs (Pomeranz, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
May 13, 2008). In her view, funding should be made conditional on evidence created by 
RCTs, i.e., only programs with an experimental basis would deserve and receive funding. 
But only funding programs with an RCT basis introduces bias for certain policy fields 




In medicine, bias would be toward frequent diseases that have large income potential. 
RCTs cannot be performed for rare diseases, which also promise less income. In the area 
of literacy education, phonics instruction is more susceptible to RCTs than the whole of 
language arts education. In international development, health and education interventions 
are most easily measured by RCTs. Macroeconomic or environmental policies are less 
amenable to RCTs and they would thus potentially get less funding. 
 
In this section, I have illustrated various challenges the RCT model faces. While all these 
challenges of using the RCT model are already present in the field of medicine, education 
and international development exacerbate these obstacles due their complex interventions 
and contexts. When RCTs are taken out of the context of treating an individual for a 
biological disease and into the context of treating student groups for educational 
performance or households for socio-economic problems, the challenges of applying the 
RCT model increase. Because the explanatory power of an RCT is always zero (thus 
“blackbox evaluations”), evaluators need to find ways of explaining the impact. This is 
where hermeneutic-interpretive observations—i.e., understanding the issue at stake—
begin. 
 
4. Policy recommendations for judging the RCT model 
In order to use credible evidence of program impact, policy makers need to be alerted to 
several issues. At times, evaluators point to the strengths of certain methodologies, but 
they do not equally emphasize their limitations and where other methodologies should be 
preferred or at least added. This problem is especially true for the RCT model because it 
has attached an aura of “scientificness” and objectivity, no doubt partially due to its 
success in finding life-saving medicines (c.f., Tuberculosis and Poliomyelitis trials).  
 
In the following, I provide five policy recommendations derived from the described RCT 
movements and debates. They are meant to inform how to evaluate impact in public 
policy (cf., TABLE 14). Some of these recommendations stem from the use of RCTs in 
the medical field, but can be also applied to the other policy fields of education and 




TABLE 14: Policy recommendations for evaluating impact 
(a) Understand biases associated with RCTs 
(b) Understand the qualitative-interpretive components of RCTs 
(c) Clarify representativeness of RCT findings 
(d) Expand evidence base beyond the RCTs 
(e) Produce evaluations on comparative effectiveness 
(f) Strengthen the evaluation function 
 
(a) Understand biases associated with RCTs 
Although in general RCTs minimize selection bias, they are not necessarily immune to 
other types of biases. Ernest House argued that, despite the obvious advantages of RCTs 
for establishing internal validity, they might be biased in other respects (cf., chapter 2; 
House, 2008, 416). House identified 14 sources of bias for RCTS in drug testing, 
resulting from opportunistic choices, such as using a homogeneous population (e.g., 
patients with only one disease). These biases occur to an equal extent in other policy 
areas, such as education and international development. The choice of a sample with 
homogeneous characteristics—e.g., students above the poverty level; households that 
have access to certain public facilities—can influence results. The choice of time scale 
can likewise influence results—e.g., when chronic-use drugs are tested for a short period 
or a reading intervention is tested only for a few weeks. These sources of bias do not pose 
threats to internal validity, but they negatively affect external validity, i.e., the 
representativeness of findings for other populations. 
 
A conscious use of qualitative-interpretive approaches could help identify potential biases 
in RCT studies and determine to what degree RCT findings could be applied to other 
contexts. Apart from these opportunistic biases, one needs to keep in mind that no 
research approach, including the RCT with its hallowed association with the sciences, is 
able to produce objective information. An RCT result is not a bare fact. RCTs generate a 
number that quantifies the difference between treatment and control group measurements. 
For one, this number is only a probabilistic data point, referring to how likely it is that the 
particular treatment group is better off than the control group. For another, the number is 
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by no means a hard fact from which a clear policy solution automatically follows. 
Instead, the number needs to be interpreted and applied to the policy issue in question. 
 
(b) Understand the qualitative-interpretive components of RCTs 
Pairing RCT evaluations with interpretive components is not only a requirement, but part 
of its design and application. Every RCT relies heavily on qualitative-interpretive 
components throughout the evaluation process. This includes analyzing whatever prior 
research is available in the policy field, which requires a judgment of which studies are 
relevant and evaluating those studies for their relevance. Such background research is 
essential in order to clarify the policy issue under study and to plan the evaluation design. 
RCT theorist Ronald Fisher argued that every RCT needed to start with the selection of 
an explicitly formulated hypothesis, which was always inductive and thus subject to 
qualitative-interpretive reasoning (Fisher, 1933, 9). Qualitative skills assist in deciding on 
the sample size, which in turn depends on the sample heterogeneity and the expected size 
of the effect—both of these are estimated rather than known. Qualitative skills are 
required to predict potential causal effects, to determine which baseline measures are 
relevant, and to understand the political and social environment where the experiment is 
to be performed. Furthermore, after running the statistical-experimental model, the 
evaluator needs to interpret RCT findings and generate policy conclusions. These skills 
contain qualitative elements that cannot be derived from pure cause-effect quantification. 
Interpretive reasoning helps make RCT findings relevant for policy makers; it can set the 
boundaries in which the findings are most likely applicable and determine how 
representative those findings are—an issue separately covered in the next 
recommendation. In fact, the quality of an RCT directly depends on the appropriate 
utilization of interpretive-qualitative skills to determine program impact.  
 
Frequently, RCT evaluators are unaware that they are not merely required to perform a 
quantitative evaluation, but that they must also use qualitative-interpretive skills when 
planning and executing an RCT. They need to become more aware of these interpretive-
qualitative components of their evaluations so that they can be positively utilized. Policy 





(c) Clarify representativeness of RCT findings 
Program evaluation as an applied science is, per definition, interested in producing 
research relevant to the larger society, thereby applying findings to contexts beyond the 
studied population. Application of RCT findings to other policy contexts requires 
establishing a qualitative theory of equivalency. This means determining the relations that 
need to hold between the RCT sample population and the population in the new policy 
context. This could also be called the transferability or translation of RCT findings to 
other policy contexts. Fisher emphasized that no isolated experiment, however significant 
in itself, could suffice for demonstrating the general effectiveness of an intervention 
(Fisher, 1935, 16). The medical statistician Hill argued that to extrapolate from a sample 
to the general run of patients, one would need to carefully consider if the sample was 
fully representative of all patients, and not in any way biased or selected (Hill, 1937, 9). 
 
I find the most lucid statement of the problem argued by the philosopher of science, 
Nancy Cartwright. She analyzes this problem of equivalency in her work on external 
validity (Cartwright & Munro, 2010; Cartwright, 2009, Cartwright, 2007): although 
RCTs may be internally valid, they alone do not generate any external validity. 
Additional interpretive-qualitative reasoning is necessary to generate externally valid 
findings. However, many RCT evaluators stop with the determination of internal validity, 
or make statements about general representativeness of findings without basing these 
claims on systematic reasoning. In contrast, policy makers need to carefully test RCT 
findings to determine the degree to which they are applicable to the new policy context. 
 
A related issue is moving from a pilot experiment to a large implementation of a 
program. As shown in chapter two, the Poliomyelitis experiments were subjected to 
stringent oversight in the vaccine production, whereas the nation-wide implementation a 
year later used a less stringent process, due to the exponential increase in demand for that 
vaccine. As a result, the vaccines used in the Salk trial and the vaccines used in the 
general distribution differed and resulted in higher infection rates in the latter group. This 
problem of re-applying pilot findings is even larger in educational systems with more 
factors to consider. The Tennessee Class Size Reduction experiment, for example, 
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provided statistically significant findings for the sample population of seventy-nine 
schools narrowed down by size and facility, but not necessarily for a more general 
population. The challenge is determining in what other contexts one would obtain 
equivalent, or at least similar, findings. Put another way, what components of the original 
tested intervention and its policy context would be required to guarantee the applicability 
of findings in a new policy context? 
 
Heterogeneous populations and intervention components under study may increase 
representativeness. When designing an RCT, an important question is: How much 
heterogeneity does the evaluator allow without jeopardizing statistically significant 
findings? In the discipline of community health, Penelope Hawe and coauthors have 
taken a provocative stance in arguing for what they call “out-of-control” trials—so-called 
because they are not restricted to a homogeneous population and program structure 
(Hawe, Shiell, & Riley, 2004). They argue that RCTs would be suitable for complex 
interventions, when one allows for heterogeneity in, for example, intervention 
characteristics and treatment units, inter alia. For instance, one single RCT could include 
various obesity programs, such as personal counseling or group counseling. These 
counseling services might be offered to various clients, such as middle-aged males or 
teenage girls. Hawe et al.’s argument countered RCT skeptics (e.g., NONIE’s Alternative 
Group), who opposed RCTs for complex interventions. These skeptics argued that RCTs 
were only appropriate for single-strand initiatives, with a concrete intervention and 
explicit expected outcomes, such as body height. Hawe et al. argued, however, that RCTs 
could still be performed in heterogeneous treatment and control groups. In fact, they 
would create a more realistic picture of real-world situations. However, I would argue 
that “out-of-control” RCTs have major drawbacks. Heterogeneity in the implementation 
of an intervention, specifically of the subjects and their context, could lead to greater 
uncertainty as to why an intervention worked. Furthermore, less control could mean a 
lower chance of significant findings due to the heterogeneity of subjects, contexts, and 
interventions. The evaluator thus needs to find a compromise between heterogeneous and 





(d) Expand the evidence base beyond the RCT 
In the 1980s, Lee Cronbach had already challenged the preference given to RCT 
approaches to guarantee internal validity, and he emphasized the need for generalizability 
of results. He therefore argued for correlational approaches, whose predictions are better 
tailored to “real life” and offer better generalizability (Wittmann, Klumb, 2006). 
 
Evaluators may also look beyond experimental approaches to determine program impact. 
Impact evaluations rely on a simulated counterfactual, either explicit or implicit. 
Experimental evaluations as well as qualitative-interpretive evaluations and quantitative 
single-case studies are predicated on the notion of a counterfactual. A counterfactual 
concept is important because it deals with possible exogenous factors that may affect the 
program outcomes. For example, a sick person might be showing relief of symptoms via 
the bodily healing process, even when not receiving a certain drug. The Streptomycin 
trial found some cases where patients improved their health without the antibiotics. 
Campbell and Stanley called this effect “maturation” (Campbell & Stanley, 1967). 
Repeated single-case studies at various locations and times reduce the threat of such 
maturation by subjecting a particular unit to an intervention at different points in time. 
They thus approximate the counterfactual diachronically. Since 2010, the What Works 
Clearinghouse recognizes single-case studies as a valid approach in determining program 
impact (Kratochwill et al., June 2010). 
 
The fields of education and international development would also be well advised to 
learn from medicine. Large-scale RCTs cover only a small portion of medical research. 
This small proportion is because thousands of chemical compounds exist, but only a few 
can be tested by RCTs. Pre-clinical tests need to make a first cut in separating the 
promising from the less promising compounds. Qualitative-interpretive observations may 
serve a similar purpose in other policy fields, by allowing the selection of promising 
interventions in education and international development. 
 
Furthermore, personalized medicine and translational approaches have been on the rise, 
moving from the bench (i.e., the laboratory) to the bedside, where systematic 
observational evidence in collaboration with medical practitioners is used. Observational 
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data from preclinical, phase 1, and phase 2 trials contribute to determining causal effects 
of medications (Solomon, presentation, June 19, 2009). These trials often use a general 
elimination approach to systematically test the competing explanations of program effects 
(Scriven, 2008). These and other designs are important complements to the phase 3 
textbook RCT. They broaden the evidence base, and thus the scientific base, for policy 
decisions. 
 
(e) Produce evaluations on comparative effectiveness 
Comparative effectiveness research (CER) in health could serve as a frontrunner 
approach for education and international development. CER is a recent movement that 
emphasizes the comparability of findings. Rather than using non-treatment control 
groups, CER requires that the control group receive the best available treatment on the 
market. For example, any new anti-depressive medication would need to be compared to 
the best currently available antidepressant. Similarly, in education and international 
development, RCTs could compare novel interventions to the best available known 
treatment. For example, rather than comparing reduced class-size to regular class size, the 
evaluators could compare class-size reduction to an extended-school-day program. Or, 
schools districts could compare in-classroom reading programs with small group tutoring 
programs. These types of comparisons would be more meaningful for policy makers, who 
must choose between competing interventions within budgetary constraints. Not only 
would these results be more relevant for decision makers, but they would also be more 
ethical because both groups could potentially benefit from the program. 
 
CER also emphasizes the generalizability of findings to the general run of patients, as 
Hill would have put it. CER relies on pragmatic trials, i.e., trials in routine clinical 
practice, and also it values observational findings and modeling. CER thus provides 
greater methodological flexibility and does not necessarily privilege the RCT over all 
other methods. 
 
CER is also concerned with heterogeneous patient characteristics and subgroup 
distinctions. RCT researchers, however, do not use subgroup analysis when the original 
random assignment has not taken place according to these subgroups. In contrast, CER 
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attempts to include subgroup analysis and thereby strengthens externally valid results. In 
education and international development, CER could encourage subgroup analysis, while 
statistically accounting for the change in the unit of analysis. CER would help identify 
differences of findings among beneficiary groups and thus would contribute to more 
relevant findings for contextual policymaking. 
 
The cost factor can also be part of comparative effectiveness research. The question then 
goes beyond whether “the intervention [is] effective,” and asks if it is worth the money 
invested (Wittmann, 2011). This answer is evaluative-judgmental, going beyond the RCT 
methodology, and incorporating qualitative reasoning. 
 
(f) Strengthen the evaluation function 
Evaluation findings should assume a more relevant role in the policy-making process. 
One condition for doing so would be to increase the credibility of the evaluation function. 
Policy makers could be trained in how to utilize evaluation findings so that they could 
gain a realistic perspective on the strengths and limitations of evaluations and RCT 
evaluations in particular. In turn, evaluators could prominently include caveats on RCT 
findings in evaluation reports, especially regarding their representativeness for other 
policy contexts. Policy makers might then be less apt to use findings inappropriately. 
 
Regarding the evaluation process itself, evaluation teams should reflect interdisciplinary 
and methodological diversity to provide well-balanced impact evaluations. The 
evaluation teams would ideally include methodological specialists for both experimental-
quantitative and observational-qualitative approaches. Such integration would lead to a 
more balanced evaluation product. 
 
Progresa is a successful example how well-trained scholars transformed into influential 
practitioners who played a fundamental role in promoting the new conceptual approach 
of poverty reduction (Lustig, 2011, 2). These scholar-practitioners ensured the technical 
soundness and effectiveness of the program’s design; they incorporated rigorous impact 
evaluations in the program’s design; and they ultimately persuaded politicians to 
implement and keep the program in place (cf., chapter four). Despite all its limitations in 
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evidence, Conditional Cash Transfer became an important policy tool in poverty 
reduction. The evaluations were RCTs supplemented with strong qualitative approaches. 
Progresa is an exemplary story for the role of high-quality evaluations in policy-making. 
 
Synthetics reviews and meta-analyses of experimental and non-experimental findings 
should become more integrated in the policy review process. Organizations such as the 
Campbell Collaboration, or the International Initiative for Impact Evaluations, are prime 
examples of providing such syntheses on scientific findings in certain policy domains. 
Scientific reviews of evaluation findings could help in the utilization of impact 
evaluations in the political decision-making process. Ultimately, impact evaluations are 
only as valuable to the extent that they are able to inform the policy process. Based on 
these recommendations, impact evaluations could obtain the necessary level of influence 
on policy decisions. 
 
This study contributes to strengthening the evaluation function by providing a realistic, 
analytical assessment of the RCT as an evaluation tool to determine program impact in 
three distinct policy areas. The study’s principal contribution is an interpretive review of 
the RCT use and debates and how the RCT evolved and adapted from medicine, on the 
one hand, to education and international development, on the other. In particular, the 
study investigates the notion of the RCT as a seamless success story in medicine and how 
this notion underpins the use of RCTs in transforming other policy areas such as 
education and international development. Whenever RCTs become part of a political 
debate, policy makers and decision makers are reminded that even RCT results can be 
biased and political, despite their scientific, unbiased aura. 
 
5. Limitations of the study  
As is generally accepted, scientific knowledge is provisional and impermanent. Theories 
of cause and effect need to be updated and continuously based on new evidence, but by 
definition they can never be proven to be true. Equally, generalizations are necessarily 
uncertain, and it is often unclear how to determine the extent to which research findings 




It was necessary to make spatial-temporal interpolations, because I traced a 
methodological tool across time and policy domains. The documents I used were always 
specific data points situated in a set time and set space. These cases were only a few of 
many in which a concept such as the RCT manifests itself, and I had to make 
interpolations from one spatial-temporal context to another. The Center for Global 
Development’s (CGD) report, for instance, was published in May 2006. In December 
2007, the European Evaluation Society (EES) released a statement about the 
inappropriate use of experimental designs in impact evaluation. Although EES did not 
directly refer to the CGD study, I was able to link these documents; I had spoken to 
individuals who had participated in the drafting of the EES statement, in which they 
clearly made reference to the CGD study. I induced evidence from a limited number of 
contexts to make my case that the EES statement was a direct response to the CGD 
report. I chose a certain narrative and selected available sources as evidence to make my 
case, but other interpretations may be possible when using additional data. My 
interpretation is provisional and may change, based on new evidence. This possibility of 
changing findings is the nature of a hermeneutic-interpretive approach, just as new 
findings interact with a quantitative or experimental approach. 
 
My research study is limited to the RCT approach in three policy disciplines: medicine, 
education, and international development, and it should be read within these realms. The 
RCT movement, however, has spread to other disciplines, where it has been absorbed and 
discussed along different lines. For example, criminal justice has also relied on RCT 
evidence since the 1990s and has not faced much criticism or backlash (Sherman, 1998, 
4; Sherman, 2002). On the contrary, in education and international development, many 
evaluators criticized the RCT approach, as I showed in chapters three and four. 
Therefore, findings about the RCT movements may be different in other policy fields. 
 
Furthermore, this study focuses more on the methodological and practical challenges 
rather than on the political realities of using the RCT approach. The analysis of the 
Reading First Initiative and its state-level responses hint at the political consequences of 
implementing a so-called scientifically based research agenda, but they are not fully 
developed in this study. I opted for breadth rather than depth to accommodate a cross-
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disciplinary perspective. However, the rhetoric associated with the medical RCT as a 
success story reveals a desire for science to serve as an apolitical tool by enabling 
objective and unbiased policy making. As the example of Reading First illustrated, this 
adopting of science became a political tool legitimizing certain (phonics-based) practices 
in schools and school districts. Future research would benefit from further analysis of the 
political dimensions associated with using RCTs and quantitative methods more 
generally. 
 
6. Future Research 
Future research should comparatively explore these RCT movements across different 
cultures and in additional policy areas. For the field of medicine in the 1970s, Archibald 
Cochrane argued that the degree of RCT use had a geographical distribution: There was a 
high use of RCTs in the United States, United Kingdom, and Scandinavia, but almost 
none in Catholic, Communist, or underdeveloped countries (Cochrane, 1971). Although 
Cochrane’s claim is now 40 years old, it would be worthwhile to explore a modernized 
version of his view—asking in effect what the cultural, socio-political, and institutional 
factors are that lead to the promotion of RCTs in evaluation. Cochrane mentioned 
“authoritarianism” as a possible cause for a lack of RCTs. Cochrane’s question should be 
further explored. 
 
Although this study focuses on the RCT approach, an expansion of methodological 
approaches is necessary to effectively evaluate program impact. Many macroeconomic 
and macro-policy interventions do not allow for a random assignment of individual units, 
but rather deal with one unit, such as a national economy or an institutional change. 
Although a policy intervention might affect individuals and households, its primary 
influence is on institutions and processes. A control-group construction is not feasible as 
macroeconomic policies affect everyone. Therefore, it is necessary to develop and apply 
non-experimental methods to these macro-level interventions. Future research needs to 
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Definitions are based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Glossary of 
key terms in evaluation and results based management (2002) and the Research Methods 
Knowledge Base by William M.K. Trochim (www.socialresearchmethods.net). 
 
Activity: Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical 
assistance and other types of resources, are mobilized to produce specific outputs. 
 
Attribution: The ascription of a causal link between changes and a specific intervention. 
 
Attrition: Loss of subjects from the defined sample during the course of a study. 
 
Bias: A systematic difference from the population parameter of interest. 
 
Control group: A randomly assigned group as closely as possible equivalent to an 
experimental group (one that is exposed to a program), and exposed to all the conditions 
of the investigation except the program being studied. 
 
Counterfactual: The situation which hypothetically may prevail for individuals, 
organizations, or groups were there no intervention. 
 
Effect: Change due to an intervention. 
 
Effectiveness: The extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved. 
 
Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, 
etc.) are converted to results. 
 
External validity (cf., generalizability): The degree to which the conclusions in a study 
would hold for other persons in other places and at other times. 
 
Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed 
project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to 
determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is 
credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision- 
making process of both recipients and donors. 
 
Experiment (narrower sense): Randomized controlled trial. 
 
Experiment (broader sense): Scientific investigation in which an investigator manipulates 
and controls one or more independent variables to determine their effects on the outcome 
(dependent) variable. 
 
Generalizability (cf., external validity): The extent to which information about a program 
collected in one setting can be used to reach a valid judgment about how it will perform 




Impact: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. 
 
Input: The financial, human, and material resources used for the development 
intervention. 
 
Internal validity: The approximate truth about inferences regarding cause-effect or causal 
relationships. 
 
Level of significance: The probability that the observed difference occurred by chance. 
 
Logic Model: Displays the sequence of actions that describe what the program is and will 
do: how inputs link to activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact. 
 
Logical Framework Approach: Management tool used to improve the design of 
interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements 
(inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and the 
assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, 
execution, and evaluation of a development intervention. 
 
Output: The products, capital goods, and services which result from a development 
intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are 
relevant to the achievement of outcomes. 
 
Participatory evaluation: Evaluation method in which representatives of agencies and 
stakeholders (including beneficiaries) work together in designing, carrying out, and 
interpreting an evaluation. 
 
Qualitative data: Facts and claims presented in narrative, not numerical, form. 
 
Quantitative data: Facts and claims that are represented by numbers. 
 
Quasi-experiment: A quasi-experimental design is one that looks a bit like an 
experimental design but lacks the key ingredient, i.e., random assignment. 
 
Randomized controlled trial (RCT): Study in which units (i.e., people, households, 
communities) are allocated at random to receive one of several interventions. 
 
Regression discontinuity design: Participants are assigned to treatment or comparison 
groups on the basis of a cutoff score on a pre-program measure. 
 
Results chain: The causal sequence for an intervention that stipulates the necessary 
sequence to achieve desired objectives beginning with inputs, moving through 
activities and outputs, and culminating in outcomes, impacts, and feedback. 
 





Systematic review: The purpose is to sum up the best available research on a specific 
question by synthesizing the results of several studies (Campbell Collaboration). 
 
Triangulation: The use of multiple sources and methods to gather similar information. 
 
Unit of analysis: The least divisible element on which measures are taken and analyzed. 
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